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Updating the Building Code to Include Indoor Farming
Operations
Clint Simpson*
Abstract
Urban agricultural production has grown to be a critical tool
in the battles for food security and sustainability. A common
regulatory barrier to urban agricultural operations big and small has
been ambiguity in land-use laws.
Local governments are
increasingly friendly toward community gardens, small greenhouse
farming operations, farmers markets, and the like. Many have sought
to lift regulatory restrictions and provide clarity in the law.
However, while these efforts benefit a multitude of local
food production efforts, they do little to address the regulatory
ambiguities faced by commercial-scale, indoor farming operations,
especially vertical farms. Particularly concerning to indoor vertical
farms are the ambiguities implicit in the International Building Code
(“IBC”), which serves as the model building code for virtually every
American municipality. Currently, the IBC lacks any provisions
contemplating buildings purposed for large-scale indoor crop
production. While some state governments have traditionally
exempted agricultural buildings from this type of regulation, this is
neither a safe nor feasible solution for indoor farming operations.
This article seeks to provide alternative solutions. First, in the short
term, local governments should provide clear statutory guidance
concerning where indoor farming operations fit into the IBC scheme.
Second, as a more sustainable solution, the International Code
Council, should update the IBC to account for commercial-scale
indoor farming operations by including such operations under a
particular occupancy group.
I. Introduction
In recent years, there has been a drastic resurgence of urban
agricultural practices. 1 As people begin to prioritize self-sufficiency,
* The author is a student of the University of Arkansas School of Law, Class of
2020. He would like to thank Professor Carl J. Circo for his guidance and comments
throughout the process of writing the substantive portion of this note. He would also
like to thank his fellow editors on the Journal of Food Law & Policy, Collette Cox,
Jaden Atkins, and Evangeline Bacon, for their help in editing and revising this note.
Finally, the author would like to thank his wife, Keelie, and his family and friends
for their unwavering support.
1 See Michael Roberts & Margot Pollans, Setting the Table for Urban Agriculture,
in URBAN AGRICULTURE: POLICY, LAW, STRATEGY, AND IMPLEMENTATION 3, 3–9
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prefer locally sourced foods, and decrease their carbon footprints,
urban agriculture stands as an attractive alternative to traditional
models of food production. Urban agricultural practices include
raising livestock inside the city, small personal urban gardens, garden
clubs, community-supported agriculture ventures, farmers markets,
and larger commercial enterprises. 2 Commercial vertical farming
operations have grown alongside community-based farms and
gardens, 3 providing large-scale crop production with environmental
advantages over traditional commercial crop production. 4 While
indoor vertical farms are growing, the largest challenge they face is
in raising the capital necessary to get off the ground. 5 Local
governments can facilitate these fundraising efforts by making
regulations more friendly to indoor vertical farming operations.
Luckily, urban planning models that integrate local food
production systems into the fabric of land use have grown in
popularity, displacing the more restrictive traditional zoning
systems. 6 The broader trend of integrating agriculture into cities is
known as “Urban Agrarianism.” 7
Many city and county
governments have updated zoning ordinances and other regulatory
measures aimed at protecting small-scale urban agricultural
practices. 8 These measures focus more on expanding zoning
permissions, offering tax incentives, and exempting certain
structures from building codes. 9 While helpful to community
gardens and small, traditional farms, these policies shed very little
light on how building codes will affect indoor vertical farms.
Consequently, such policies leave large-scale, commercial urban
farms out of the picture.
This article highlights the need to fill the existing gaps in
pro-urban agriculture policy schemes. Specifically, it offers two
courses of action—one intended to alleviate the problem in the shortterm, and the other intended as a more permanent fix. First, local
governments need to provide clarification as to which occupancy
group governs indoor vertical farms. Publishing opinion letters that
(Am. Bar Assc. ed., 2015) (discussing the history and development of the current
American urban agricultural trend).
2 See id. at 4.
3 See AGRILYST, STATE OF INDOOR FARMING 7 (2017).
4 See generally Kheir Al-Kodmany, The Vertical Farm: A Review of Developments
and Implications for the Vertical City, 8 BUILDINGS 24 (2018) (providing an
overview of the benefits of vertical farming and the state of the industry).
5 AGRILYST, supra note 3, at 36.
6 Roberts & Pollans, supra note 1, at 12.
7 Id.
8 E.g., id. at 11–12.
9 See infra Part V.
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are directly on point is the easiest way to do this. Second, the longterm solution is to update building codes—specifically, the
International Building Code (“IBC”)—alongside zoning ordinances,
either by adding a new “occupancy group,” or adding statutory
clarity to the existing occupancy groups.
The background section of this article begins with a baseline
description of indoor vertical farming and explains why state and
local governments should seek to encourage the growth of
commercial indoor vertical farming operations alongside small-scale
urban agriculture. The next section then outlines current zoning and
building code barriers to urban agriculture, how local land-use
regulations have evolved to address these barriers, and why these
measures fail to address the current problems with building codes.
The next section then discusses the current deficiencies in the
International Building Code itself. Finally, the discussion section of
this article addresses why statutory clarification and modification of
the International Building Code is the next logical step in
encouraging indoor vertical farming.
II. Background
A. What is Indoor Vertical Farming?
To understand indoor urban farming, one must first be
familiar with urban agriculture generally. A fitting and popular
definition for urban agriculture is “the growing of plants and the
raising of animals within and around cities.” 10 As noted in the
Introduction, this can include a variety of crop production formats—
from backyard and rooftop gardens to neighborhood gardens on
combined lots. 11
From a very general standpoint, we can consider “indoor
urban farming” to be the raising of plants in enclosed structures in an
urban setting. Indoor farming facilities may be constructed
purposefully from the ground up or converted from existing
buildings. “Vertical farming” falls under the larger umbrella of
indoor urban farming for the purposes of this article. 12 In basic
terms, vertical farming is the farming of crops distributed vertically
rather than horizontally, as is done in traditional row-cropping. 13
10 Urban Agriculture, FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. OF THE U.N., http://www.fao.org/urba
n-agriculture/en/ (last visited Oct. 10, 2019).
11 Roberts & Pollans, supra note 1, at 4.
12 The “vertical farm” can be traced back as far as 600 A.D. to the Hanging Gardens
of Babylon, but the modern concept of vertical farming refers primarily to indoor
farming practices. See Al-Kodmany, supra note 4, at 32.
13 Id.
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While outdoor vertical farming is a relevant practice, it is of less
consequence for the purpose of this article. Accordingly, as used in
this article, “vertical farming” refers exclusively to vertical farming
methods that require permanent building structures. 14
There are essentially three types of vertical farms: (1) small
structures located on the rooftops of residential and commercial
buildings; (2) farms constructed from tall buildings with several
layers of growing beds (“modest-sized vertical farms”); and (3) what
Kheir Al-Kodmany refers to as “visionary” multi-story buildings
(“visionary vertical farms”). 15 This article concerns the latter two. 16
One common method of building modest-sized vertical
farms involves the conversion of abandoned factories or other
industrial buildings, as this method can drastically cut start-up costs
by eliminating the need to construct a new building. 17 “The Plant”
is one such farm. The Plant is an indoor vertical aquaponic farming
operation located in Chicago, Illinois, run by the non-profit
organization, Plant Chicago. 18 The Plant utilizes the “aquaponic”
method—a combination of aquaculture and hydroponic food
production—whereby a closed hydroponic system is created using a
symbiotic relationship between the production of fish and crops.19
The fish are grown for food production and their waste products are
then used to provide the necessary nutrients for hydroponic crop
production; the only required resource input is fish food. 20 Like
many other indoor vertical farms, The Plant utilizes an alternative
energy source—in this case, an anaerobic digester—for some of its
energy needs. 21 Moving forward, The Plant will act as an excellent
It is important to focus on permanent structures here because the vertical farming
operations discussed require sturdy, permanent buildings. Additionally, temporary
agricultural buildings such a hoop houses are regulated much more loosely by the
bulk of statutory land-use schemes. E.g., infra Section V.D.
15 See Al-Kodmany, supra note 4, at 2.
16 Rooftop vertical farms are typically small in scale and of such a construction that
they will reap the same regulatory benefits as traditional community gardens. Nicole
M. Reese, An Assessment of the Potential for Urban Rooftop Agriculture in West
Oakland, California (May 16, 2014) (unpublished Master’s Projects and Capstones)
(on file with the Gleeson Library, University of San Francisco).
17 Lisa Tomlinson, Indoor Aquaponics in Abandoned Buildings: A Potential
Solution to Food Deserts, 16 SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL’Y 16, 18 (2017)
(describing a case study of “The Plant,” an indoor farming operation built into the
Peer Foods Factory building in Chicago, the owner of which purchased the building
for the estimated value of the metal inside).
18 Who We Are, PLANT CHICAGO, http://plantchicago.org/who-we-are (last visited
Mar. 29, 2019).
19 Tomlinson, supra note 17, at 16.
20 Id.
21 Id.
14
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example of how vertical farming operations may run afoul of local
regulations. 22
B. The Benefits of Indoor Vertical Farming
The last century saw a major shift in agricultural production,
away from small-scale, family-owned farming operations and
towards massive commercial farming operations. 23 While this
change in the industry allowed for significant gains in food
production, modern row-crop farming methods have had a disastrous
impact on the environment. 24 Tilling practices designed to plow
under the previous crop to prepare for the next crop increase soil
erosion. 25 No-tilling practices are not much better; while they limit
soil erosion, they also require a much greater application of herbicide
to kill the undesirable weeds that are normally prevented by tilling. 26
Indoor farming methods provide distinct advantages over traditional
farming in these areas. 27
One major benefit of indoor farming over traditional landbased agriculture is the reduced use of resources such as water.
Indoor farms can reduce water use by up to 90% when compared to
traditional agricultural methods. 28 Finally, indoor vertical farming
completely eliminates the use of tractors for plowing, planting seeds,
weeding, applying fertilizer, and harvesting, which collectively
account for more than 20% of all gasoline and diesel fuel used in the
United States. 29
Another major benefit of indoor farming is increased yield
resulting from several factors. First, indoor farming allows for yearround food production and is resistant to the effects of climate
change. 30 While traditional farming is dependent on favorable
weather, indoor farming systems are climate-controlled with great
See infra Section III.B.
See Trautmann et. al, Modern Agriculture: Its Effects on the Environment,
CORNELL COOP. EXT., http://psep.cce.cornell.edu/facts-slides-self/facts/mod-aggrw85.aspx (last visited Mar. 10, 2019) (discussing the effects of widespread use of
fertilizers and herbicides in modern agriculture).
24 Id.
25 Id.
26 Id.
27 Al-Kodmany, supra note 4, at 6 (“Designed to grow in a controlled, closed-loop
environment, these farms would eliminate the need for harmful herbicides and
pesticides, maximizing nutrition, and food value in the process.”).
28 See Al-Kodmany, supra note 4, at 15, 19 (describing existing vertical farms in
Memphis, Tennessee and Den Bosch, Holland).
29 See Al-Kodmany, supra note 4, at 4 (discussing fossil fuel use under a traditional
farming system).
30 Id. at 26.
22
23
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precision. 31 Second, popular methods for indoor crop production are
inherently more efficient; vertical hydroponic and aquaponic
growing systems allow plants to take in nutrients at a much higher
rate and produce faster growth. 32 A recent study found that a thirtystory vertical farm could produce 480 acres-worth of crop yield per
acre of base area. 33 This is not shocking when one considers that a
single-story hydroponic greenhouse can produce 8.71 pounds per
square foot of leafy greens compared to 0.69 pounds per square foot
when using conventional methods. 34
Finally, there are the secondary social and economic benefits
derived from the production efficiencies described above.35
Growing food indoors in urban areas supplies food during times
when outdoor crop production is interrupted. 36 Additionally, indoor
vertical farming provides a method of crop production that can
provide agricultural autonomy to areas with unfriendly climates. 37
Geographical regions that are hostile to traditional agriculture are
often very friendly to alternative energy production, like wind, solarphotovoltaics, and solar-thermovoltaics. 38 This provides regions
with an opportunity to establish sustainable crop production through
the construction of alternative energy sources alongside indoor
farming operations. 39
III. Modern History of Land Use and Agriculture in
the U.S.
While the umbrella of land use controls stretches beyond
zoning ordinances and building codes, these account for the bulk
regulatory challenges faced by vertical farmers discussed in this
article. This is because both zoning ordinances and building codes
prohibit certain uses and structures depending on the situation. 40 To
understand where we are now and one reason why the IBC is in such
Id. at 28.
Id. at 7; see also Wilson Lennard & Simon Goddek, Aquaponics: The Basics, in
AQUAPONICS FOOD PRODUCTION SYSTEMS: COMBINED AQUACULTURE AND
HYDROPONIC PRODUCTION TECHNOLOGIES FOR THE FUTURE 113, 138–39 (Simon
Goddek et al. eds., 2019).
33 See Al-Kodmany, supra note 4, at 4.
34 AGRILYST, supra note 3, at 14.
35 See generally Chirantan Banerjee, Up, Up and Away! The Economics of Vertical
Farming, 2 J. AGRIC. STUDIES 40, 51 (2014) (discussing the social and economic
opportunities associated with vertical farming).
36 See Al-Kodmany, supra note 4, at 28 (discussing the potential for indoor farming
to provide a source of food during times of reduced yield and drought).
37 Banerjee, supra note 35, at 51.
38 Id.
39 Id.
40 See discussion infra Section III.A; see discussion infra Section III.B.
31
32
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desperate need of update and clarification, one must first understand
how land use controls came to exist in their present form. Use-based
zoning and building restrictions that are ambiguous in definition and
scope—at least as it relates to agricultural purposes —create
headaches best soothed with express statutory solutions. This section
outlines the basics of use-based zoning restrictions and modern
building codes. Specifically, it shows how ambiguities in the current
law make it difficult or impossible to know how vertical farms will
be treated from one urban area to the next.
A. Euclidian Zoning Ordinances
Local government ordinances are the primary source of law
for zoning regulations. 41 Zoning laws are premised on state and local
government police power. 42 Local zoning regulation in the United
States dates to the colonies, where land use controls were often a
mayoral power. 43 These controls frequently allowed for urban
agriculture by their nature. 44
In the early twentieth century, new zoning practices started
to take over. 45 The effect of this was that American cities relegated
agricultural production out of urban areas. 46 With the advent of
railroads and refrigeration, perishable food did not have to originate
as close by to be fresh for consumers. 47 However, over the last
decade, urban agriculture has seen an explosion in popularity,
brought on by shifts in consumer priorities toward increased personal
wellness and environmental sustainability. 48
Much of the zoning power of American city governments
comes from iterations of the Standard Zoning Enabling Act, a model
law created by the U.S. Department of Commerce in 1924. 49 The
power of local government to enact such measures was established
Jeffrey P. LeJava & Michael J. Goonan, Zoning and Land Use Planning, 41 REAL
EST. L. J. 216, 225 (2012).
42 ROBERT R. WRIGHT & MORTON GITELMAN, LAND USE IN A NUTSHELL (West
Publishing Co., 1978) (4th ed., 2000).
43 JULIAN CONRAD JURGENSMEYER & THOMAS E. ROBERTS, LAND USE PLANNING
AND DEVELOPMENT REGULATION LAW 44 (West Group eds., 2003).
44 During this time, regulations were focused more on compelling development
within cities through affirmative use obligations. While agricultural land use
regulations existed, they related to fencing property rather than restricting
agricultural practices themselves. See id.
45 Id.
46 Roberts & Pollans, supra note 1, at 206.
47 Id. at 207.
48 See id., at 201–02 (tracking a drastic increase in the mention of “urban agriculture”
in the popular press and in law reviews and journals beginning in the mid-2000s).
49 U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, A STANDARD STATE ZONING ENABLING ACT § 1
(revised ed. 1926); see also JUERGENSMEYER & ROBERTS, supra note 43, at 68.
41
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in the seminal case Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co. 50 In
Euclid, the Supreme Court determined that a city government had the
power to create and enforce zoning laws as part of its police power. 51
In other words, cities can establish zoning ordinances to provide for
the health, safety, and welfare of citizens. 52 Cities use this police
power to safely manage their growth and development and keep
undesirable activities and building structures out of certain areas. 53
The method of zoning that grew out of Euclid, “Euclidian
Zoning,” still stands as the most common zoning method used
today. 54 The Euclidian Zoning model is predicated on the idea that
some uses of land are appropriate for certain areas while others are
not. 55 Local governments regulate land use by partitioning land into
districts based on the desired use. 56 Common district categories
include residential, commercial, mixed-use, industrial, and
agricultural districts. 57 Within each zone, particular uses may be
deemed “approved,” “permitted,” or “as a right” if the governing
body intended them to be allowed without interference. 58
Conditional use may be permitted on a particular lot for a purpose
that is considered appropriate for the zone type in some, but not all,
instances. 59 Conversely, prohibited uses may not be allowed at all. 60
B. Building Codes – The IBC
While building codes share a common purpose with zoning
ordinances in that they are intended to promote local health, safety,
and welfare, they are distinct from zoning ordinances in that—rather
than regulating the purpose of parcels of land—building codes
regulate methods and materials and establish other minimum
thresholds in the construction, maintenance, remodeling, and

Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 389-90 (1926); see also
JUERGENSMEYER & ROBERTS, supra note 43, at 44–45.
51 Vill. of Euclid, 272 U.S. at 387.
52 JUERGENSMEYER & ROBERTS, supra note 43, at 47.
53 Id. at 68–69.
54 Id.
55 LeJava & Goonane supra note 41, at 226–27.
56 Id.
57 Heather Wooten & Amy Ackerman, Seeding the City: Land Use Policies to
Promote Urban Agriculture 6, NAT’L POL’Y & LEGAL ANALYSIS NETWORK (2011).
58 Id.
59 Id.
60 Id. at 20.
50
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demolition of buildings. 61 The IBC is frequently used as a model and
has been adopted by most cities in the United States. 62
Like local zoning ordinances, the IBC groups different types
of buildings, called“occupancy groups,” based on their intended
use. 63 Much of the IBC’s application is predicated on which
occupancy group a given building falls under. 64 For instance, the
maximum number of stories and allowable height are determined by
occupancy group. 65 Occupancy groups include Assembly, Business,
Educational, Factory, High-Hazard, Institutional, Mercantile,
Residential, Storage, and Utility and Miscellaneous groups. 66
Without question, use-based regulatory schemes are an
effective way to ensure public health, safety, and welfare. There will
always be certain spaces, structures, and activities that are
incompatible—or even dangerous—with one another. However,
use-based restrictions can just as easily function as a barrier to urban
agriculture. This is particularly concerning where no forms of urban
agriculture are provided for at all or where the limited provisions that
do exist are vague in scope and definition. In regard to vertical
farming, knowing which occupancy group(s) a vertical farming
structure may fit into is of substantial importance because it
determines maximum height and number of stories, what zone a
vertical farm can operate in, and whether the processing of crops is
allowed on site.
IV. Current Barriers: What Stands in the Way?
In the classic use-based restriction tradition, local regulatory
barriers are designed with the purpose of either permitting or denying
particular uses and structures in particular areas. However, some
land use barriers may arise inadvertently—as a consequence of
statutory ambiguity, for instance. For this reason, it helps to
distinguish express or deliberate barriers to vertical farming from
incidental barriers.

61 JOHN MARTINEZ, Local Government Law § 16:27 (2018); see also Tomlinson,
supra note 17, at 18.
62 MARTINEZ, supra note 61, at § 16:27.
63 INT’L BLDG. CODE §§ 303–312 (2018).
64 See id. § 302.1.
65 Id.
66 Id. §§ 303–312.
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Express restrictions can come in many forms, including lot
size limitations, 67 setback requirements, 68 and restrictions on the sale
of agricultural products. 69 Inadvertent restrictions are more likely to
come about through statutory omissions and ambiguities, often
resulting from legislators failing to keep up with the times. However,
despite the fact that inadvertent barriers are unintentional by nature,
they frequently have the effect of exposing certain uses of land to
more express restrictions (i.e., failure to adequately define the scope
of a particular occupancy group can expose some buildings to
regulations that were not intended to apply to it). 70
A. The Problem of Ambiguity
The most readily-addressable barrier to vertical farming
operations is the ambiguity inherent in existing zoning and building
requirements. Even cities seeking to expand urban agriculture
generally may accidentally create ambiguities or fail to expressly
include a given method of farming or raising livestock in such a way
that prevents its propagation. This concern is evidenced by the
permeation of land use treatises discussing the definition of
“agricultural use,” “agricultural building,” and similar terms. 71
As discussed in the introduction to this article, urban
agriculture embodies a vast spectrum of food production, including
community gardens, backyard and rooftop gardens, commercial
greenhouses, apiaries, backyard livestock, and more. 72 With this
variety of use and application available under the “urban agriculture”
banner, local governments must take on the task of expressly
providing for all those agricultural activities they intend to
encourage. The consequence of not carefully including and defining
all potentially beneficial urban agricultural practices is that
prospective farmers are exposed to legal and financial risk.73
Additionally, because land use regulations include both zoning
See New Rochelle, N.Y., City Code §§ 89-16, 89–17 (prohibiting the raising of
livestock activities on lots less than two acres in size and mandating one acre per
animal, even for the raising of chickens).
68 Setback measures may even apply to accessory uses that are invaluable to vertical
farming operations. See St. Paul, MN, Code of Ordinances, tit. VIII, ch. 300, § 343
(restricting the height and area of solar power panels).
69 LeJava & Goonan, supra note 41, at 227.
70 See infra Section IV.C (discussing the consequences of vague definitions in the
IBC).
71 See 38 A.L.R. 5th 357 (discussing multiple state court decisions regarding the
definitions of “agriculture,” “agricultural building,” “farm building,” and the like);
see also Agricultural Exemptions, 4 AM. L. ZONING § 33:4 (5th ed.).
72 LeJava & Goonan, supra note 41, at 217.
73 Wooten & Ackerman, supra note 57, at 7.
67
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ordinances and building codes, legislators must be careful to provide
clarity in both regards.
B. Zoning Ambiguities
The term “Urban Farm” provides an excellent example of
ambiguity in legislation. In Seattle, Washington, an “Urban Farm”
is defined as a “use in which plants are grown for sale of the plants
or their products, and in which the plants or their products are sold at
the lot where they are grown, off-site, or both, and in which no other
items are sold.” 74 St. Paul, Minnesota defines the very same term as
“a commercial growing operation that is generally larger in scale
than a community garden.” 75 By contrast, Minneapolis, Minnesota,
defines the same term as “[a]n establishment where food or
ornamental crops are grown or processed to be sold or donated that
includes, but is not limited to, outdoor growing operations, indoor
growing operations, vertical farms, aquaponics, aquaculture,
hydroponics and rooftop farms.” 76 It is easy to see here how
statutory clarity dramatically improves one’s ability to understand
how the law will apply to them.
Another example of a zoning ordinance definition that tells
a potential vertical farmer very little about their legal risk is found in
Denver, Colorado. The City of Denver provides for urban crop
production as a non-primary, accessory use, defining “garden” as the
“growing and cultivation of fruits, flowers, herbs, vegetables, and/or
other plants” which may exist in addition to a residential structure. 77
On its face, this definition might encapsulate a respectable range of
personal and commercial levels of crop production. However, it is
unlikely that a large indoor farming operation will be welcome in the
zoning areas covered by this law, and prospective indoor farmers
have only the scope of the term “accessory use” by which to judge
their legal risk. While the intent behind such language may be to
open as many doors as possible, ambiguity stands in the doorway.
C. IBC Ambiguities
Ambiguous and underdeveloped building codes act as
another barrier to vertical farming development. While the business
group (“Group M”), factory group (“Group F”), and utility and
Goldstein et al., Urban Agriculture: A Sixteen City Survey of Urban Agriculture
Practices Across the Country 53, (Turner Envt’l. L. Clinic) (2011).
75 St. Paul, MN., Urban Agriculture Plan Ch. 3.13 (2011), http://www.minneapolis
mn.gov/www/groups/public/@cped/documents/webcontent/convert_265422.pdf;
see also Goldstein et al., supra note 74, at 30.
76 Minneapolis, MN, Code of Ordinances, tit. 20, ch. 520, § 12 (2019).
77 DENVER, CO CITY CODE § 11.12.8.2 (2018); § 11.2.6 (2018).
74
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miscellaneous group (“Group U”) all have potential relationships
with indoor crop production, the IBC does not provide a definition
that describes or encapsulates “vertical farming.” 78 At best, Group
U covers some kinds of agriculture-related structures under the term
“agricultural building[s].” 79 An “agricultural building” is defined as:
A structure designed and constructed to house farm
implements, hay, grain, poultry, livestock or other
horticultural products. This structure shall not be a
place of human habitation or a place of employment
where agricultural products are processed, treated or
packaged, nor shall it be a place used by the public. 80
Of great importance is the fact that there is no language
pertaining to the production, cultivation, or growing of crops in this
definition. 81 Nor does it expressly exclude such uses, prohibiting
only habitation, processing, treating, packaging, employment, and
public use for agricultural buildings. 82 Consequently, any local
government adopting these sections of the IBC without a
supplemental definition of “agricultural building” fails to provide
statutory clarity regarding buildings that actually operate as farms.
Outside of the Group U provision’s description of
agricultural buildings, the only other mention of food production in
the IBC is under Group F, which includes buildings used for
“assembling, disassembling, fabricating, finishing, manufacturing,
packaging, repair or processing operations that are not classified as a
Group H hazardous or Group S storage occupancy,” although the list
is not exhaustive. 83 The IBC lists “food processing establishments
and commercial kitchens not associated with restaurants, cafeterias,
and similar dining facilities more than 2,500 square feet in area”
under the Moderate-Hazard Factory Industrial Group (“Group F1”). 84 While filing vertical farms under Group F-1 would foreclose
on much of our problem—and make sense given that conversion of
factory buildings is such an attractive starting point for vertical
See Tomlinson supra note 17, at 21 (discussing the City of Phoenix’s
interpretation of the IBC).
79 INT’L BLDG. CODE § 202 (2018).
80 Id.
81 Note that “crop production” and “horticulture” are not used interchangeably in
most statutory schemes. See id; see also INT’L BLDG. CODE § C101.1 (2018).
82 While the IBC does not define “habitation” specifically, it defines a “habitable
space” as “[a] space in a building for living, sleeping, eating or cooking,” and
expressly excludes “[b]athrooms, toilet rooms, closets, halls, storage or utility
spaces . . .” INT’L BLDG. CODE § 202 (2018).
83 Id. § 306.1.
84 Id. § 306.2.
78
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farms—it is hard to construe this language in such a way so as to
capture indoor commercial crop production (absent an express
provision).
Other occupancy definitions of the IBC do not lend much
more support. For instance, the IBC also includes “incidental uses,”
which it defines as “ancillary functions associated with a given
occupancy that generally pose a greater level of risk to that
occupancy.” 85 However, these uses are restricted to those expressly
listed in IBC Table 509, which includes things like furnaces and
stationary battery storage, but nothing involving indoor farming or
agriculture generally. 86
The IBC’s treatment of construction materials further
complicates the building code scheme. The IBC separates
occupancy groups into sub-groups based on their elemental
construction materials. 87 IBC height and space requirements are
determined based on the occupancy group, the construction type, and
the existence of automatic sprinkler systems. 88 While this is all very
straightforward on its face, complications can quickly arise in a
mixed-use scenario. A single building may be subject to several
conflicting height and occupancy restrictions based on the occupancy
group and construction materials. 89
If the mixed-use conundrum were not enough, further
complicating issues like the conversion of existing buildings into
vertical farms is the fact that the IBC provides that, when a building
changes occupancy groups, it must meet the requirements of
additional codes, such as the International Energy Conservation
Code (“IECC”), at least where adopted. 90 Like the IBC, application
of the IECC depends in large part on the occupancy group a structure
fits into. This exacerbates the effect of the statutory ambiguity.
V. Analysis
A. Current Solutions: What They Are, and Why They Fail
Without the IBC
While restrictive, use-based urban planning models still
account for the majority of local ordinances, urban agricultureId. § 509.1.
Id.
87 Id. § 504.2.
88 See id. § 504.3–504.4.
89 See id.
90 See INT’L ENERGY CONSERVATION CODE § 505C (requiring any buildings
undergoing a change in occupancy group to comply with IECC provisions if the
change in use results in increased use of electrical energy or fossil fuels).
85
86
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friendly models are coming back into the foreground. 91 This increase
in public interest in urban agriculture has expanded into the legal
profession as well, with the mention of “urban agriculture” in law
journals increasing dramatically after 2008. 92 Specifically, there is a
shift in agricultural law away from the historical purpose of
preserving rural agricultural and toward legalizing and promoting
urban agricultural practices. 93 This urban planning movement—
which is designed to implement urban agrarianism—is known as
“agricultural urbanism.” 94 Agricultural urbanism operates as an
alternative to use-based urban planning in that it advocates for
sustainable urban agriculture as a mandated use, providing that
portions of land in a community are to be set aside for food
production. 95 This is analogous to the function of inclusionary
zoning for urban housing. 96
Much of the current legal discourse pertains to the need for
changes at the state and local level. 97 At these levels, legal efforts
geared toward the expansion of urban agriculture include approaches
such as changes in municipal zoning codes, 98 property tax
incentives, 99 and agricultural exemptions from land use laws. 100
These measures have been successful in breaking down regulatory
barriers and fostering community-based urban agriculture systems.
But, assuming the ultimate goal is to foster food security and
environmental sustainability, such measures must also address
commercial-scale vertical crop production. These efforts fall short if
building codes are left untouched. Pay careful attention to the
measures described below and where they fail to fill the gap left by
the outdated IBC.

Roberts & Pollans, supra note 1, at 9.
Id. at 5, Table 2.
93 See id. at 11 nn. 46–47.
94 Id. at 11 nn. 46-47.
95 Id.
96 Inclusionary zoning sets aside land for specific types of housing.
See
JURGENSMEYER & ROBERTS, supra note 43 at 6:7.
97 See, e.g., Wooten & Ackerman, supra note 57, at 10–15 (outlining a plethora of
legal frameworks promoting urban agriculture generally).
98 Kathryn A. Peters, Current and Emerging Issues in the New Urban Agriculture:
A Case Study, 7 J. FOOD L. & POL'Y 297, 313–28 (2011) (discussing zoning
measures).
99 See also UTAH CODE ANN. § 59-2-1703 (West 2014) (granting tax incentives to
urban farming operations that fall within certain lot size specifications and that have
been in operation for at least two years prior to application for the applicable tax
incentive); see also Roberts & Pollans, supra note 1, at 11–12.
100 LeJava & Goonan, supra note 41, at 227; see also Wooten & Ackerman supra
note 57, at 14.
91
92
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B. Zoning Updates
In the midst of use-restriction ambiguities, many cities are
making moves in the right direction by updating their zoning
provisions to expressly include desired forms of agriculture.
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, for example, has amended its zoning
provisions to permit urban agriculture as a primary or accessory use
depending on the zone. 101 It expressly provides for commercial crop
production as well. 102 Similar measures have been enacted in Jersey
City, New Jersey, 103 and Seattle, Washington. 104 Kansas City,
Missouri is another city on the rise. Specifically providing for
commercial crop production, Kansas City enacted a zoning
exemption for “crop agriculture,” or crop production intended for
sale off-site. 105 However, this measure still expressly requires that
all agricultural buildings comply with the applicable building
code. 106
These zoning permission updates are friendly to urban
agriculture generally and appear to pave the way for vertical farming
operations. However, each of these cities still requires that
agricultural buildings comply with relevant building codes or
contemplate buildings in a way that clearly fails to consider vertical
farms. 107 While express zoning permission alleviates concerns
around whether a parcel of land is appropriate for vertical farming, it
does nothing to address the difficulties of applying the building code
to the vertical farm buildings. 108 This illustrates why zoning
revisions alone cannot bridge the gap to allowing vertical farming.
C. Tax Incentives
Another area where local governments are trying to foster
growth is in property tax exemptions. Tax incentives seek to foster
PITTSBURGH, PA., CITY CODE § 911.04.A.2(a)-(c) (2018), § 912.07 (2015).
Id.
103 JERSEY CITY, N.J. CODE OF ORDINANCES § 345-60(V.1) (2011).
104 SEATTLE, WASH., CITY CODE §§ 23.42.051-.052 (2010).
105 CULTIVATE KC, Growing Good Food in Kansas City Neighborhoods: A Guide to
Urban Agriculture Codes in KCMO 4, https://www.cultivatekc.org/wp-content/upl
oads/2019/02/CultivateKC_Booklet_Codes_KCMO.pdf (last updated Apr., 2015).
106 Id.
107 See, e.g., JERSEY CITY, N.J. CODE OF ORDINANCES § 345-60(V.1); see also
SEATTLE, WASH., CITY CODE § 23.42.051 (restricting “[s]tructures for urban farm
use” to a height of twelve feet).
108 Buildings utilized in operations such as The Plant in Chicago, Illinois, illustrate
the difficulty here. See Chi., Ill. Municipal Code § 17-9-0103.3 (2017) (failing to
mention of buildings being used in vertical farm operations). See generally BUBBLY
DYNAMICS, LLC, The Plant, https://www.bubblydynamics.com/the-plant/ (last
visited Oct. 9, 2018) (describing the concept, purpose, and physical characteristics
of The Plant by the company that owns and operates it).
101
102
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the growth of urban agricultural operations by providing financial
incentives to offset start-up costs. This could be very important to
prospective vertical farmers worried about how they will pay for
labor, materials, property taxes, and building permits. States with
tax incentives targeting urban agriculture include Utah, California,
Maryland, New Jersey, Minnesota, and Missouri. 109 However, as
with many zoning updates, some will fall short of encouraging the
growth of vertical farming operations. Some tax incentives may not
apply to prospective vertical farmers at all, as the land or structure in
question falls outside the requirements for the incentives.
Utah requires that the lot size be at least two but not more
than five acres in area and that the lot was used for at least two
successive years preceding the tax year. 110 Because the purpose of
vertical farming indoors is to limit land use, this is antithetical to
vertical farming’s mission. Likewise, a prospective farmer would
have to farm the land for two years before applying for the tax
exemption and building a vertical farm.
California’s Urban Agriculture Incentive Zones Act (“UAIZ
Act”) allows acreage from one-tenth of an acre to a maximum of
three acres, but only applies to “vacant, unimproved, or blighted
lands [that can be] converted for small-scale agricultural use.” Here
again, a potential farmer looking to benefit from this law to develop
a vertical farm is out of luck. They are restricted to small-scale
production, which eliminates any profitability. This also further
exacerbates the challenge of getting capital funding in the first place.
Missouri’s Urban Agriculture Zone Exemption is quite
promising. It is likewise limited to blighted areas, but the definition
of “blighted” targets existing, run-down lots in urban areas. 111 This
law is specifically beneficial to indoor vertical farming operations
that seek to convert abandoned factory buildings or similar structures
into vertical farm sites. However, like every tax exemption example
given thus far, any buildings used or constructed on the property
must comply with Missouri’s version of the IBC. 112

Roberts & Pollans, supra note 1, at 12; see Martha Harrell Chumbler, The Tax
Implications of Urban Agriculture: Liabilities and Incentives, in URBAN
AGRICULTURE: POLICY, STRATEGY, AND IMPLEMENTATION 173, 173-194 (Martha H.
Chumbler et al. eds., 2015) (outlining various municipal and state approaches to
offering tax incentives for urban agricultural land use).
110 UTAH CODE ANN. § 59-2-1703 (West 2019). Note that the lot size restriction will
decrease to a minimum of one acre in 2020.
111 See Roberts & Pollans, supra note 1, at 182.
112 MO. REV. STAT. §§262.900.1–.2 (2014); see also Roberts & Pollans, supra note
1, at 182.
109
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D. Agricultural Building Code Exemptions
Agricultural building exemptions are generally applied at the
state level to address concerns like the one this article focuses on.113
While the IBC does not contain any agricultural exemptions itself, a
state government may preempt certain locally adopted portions of the
IBC to affect them. 114 Some exemptions pertain to building codes
and zoning ordinances alike. 115
Unfortunately, agricultural
exemptions to the building code often fail for three reasons. First,
they are subject to the same ambiguity problems discussed
throughout the article thus far. Second, much like the tax incentives
discussed above, building code exemptions often impose conditions
that new vertical farming operations will find impracticable if not
outright impossible to meet. Third, there is a legitimate concern that
exempting large structures from building regulations poses a risk to
public welfare—both from a human health and economic
perspective.
First, many agricultural exemptions simply will not apply to
vertical farm buildings, either expressly or because they suffer from
the same ambiguity problems inherent in the IBC occupancy group
definitions. 116 Because many exemptions tend to reference the
“agricultural building” as defined under Group U, the confusion
surrounding what types of buildings are covered remains. 117 This
E.g., FLA. STAT. § 163.3162 (2018).
FLA. STAT. § 163.3162 (“[A] county may not exercise any of its power to adopt
any ordinance, resolution, regulation, rule, or policy to prohibit, restrict, regulate, or
otherwise limit an activity of a bona fide farm operation on land classified as
agricultural land.”); IOWA CODE § 335.2 (“[N]o ordinance adopted under this chapter
applies to land, farm houses, farm barns, farm outbuildings, or other buildings or
structures which are primarily adapted, by reason of nature and area, for use for
agricultural purposes, while so used.”).
115 MO. REV. STAT. § 65.677(2018) (township zoning “shall not be exercised so as
to impose regulations or to require permits with respect to land, used or to be used
for the raising of crops, orchards, or forestry or with respect to the erection,
maintenance, repair, alteration or extension of farm buildings or farm structures.”)
116 See e.g., CANYON CTY. BLDG. DEP’T, AGRICULTURAL BUILDING EXEMPTION
(citing CANYON CTY., IDAHO BLDG. CODE ORDINANCE 04-11 §§ 06-01-07, 09(4)),
https://www.canyonco.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/Agricultural-BuildingExemption-Rev.pdf.; see also 2006 MISS. AG LEXIS 321, *17 (Opinion No. 200600436) (stating that structure must be used for storing farm products or implements
or will be used to shelter livestock).
117 E.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 674:32-c (“The tilling of soil and the growing and
harvesting of crops and horticultural commodities, as a primary or accessory use,
shall not be prohibited in any district. Nothing in this subdivision shall exempt new,
re-established, or expanded agricultural operations from generally applicable
building and site requirements . . .”). Note that because many vertical farming
operations convert old factory buildings or similar structures, this limitation fails to
reach vertical farming as we have discussed it here.
113
114
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was recently the subject of an Attorney General’s Opinion letter from
Mississippi, which determined that exemptions must be decided on
a case-by-case basis. 118
Second, agricultural exemptions often come with conditions
precedent that preclude new vertical farming operations.119
Requirements include minimum acreage, preexisting ground-crop
farming operations, strict zoning qualifications, and the like. 120 As
one Idaho county’s opinion letter stated, “[i]f you are not farming the
ground on which your Agricultural Building (“Barn”) is to be placed;
you probably do not qualify for an Agricultural Building
Exemption.” 121
Third, even when the agricultural building exemptions do
apply, it is not clear that they should. There is a genuine concern that
larger buildings of greater economic importance should be subject to
building code regulations. A white paper from the Minnesota
Governor’s Council on Fire Prevention and Control discussed this
issue in November of 2010. 122 With an apparent sense of urgency,
this white paper discussed losses related to snow-load collapse,
windstorms, and fire. 123 It concluded that non-engineered and
partially-engineered structures lack the structural accounting and
oversight to provide adequate safety for workers and pose a risk to
insurance companies. 124 While this is a larger policy issue in and of
itself, it calls into question whether agricultural exemptions can be a
meaningful part of the solution where vertical farming is involved,
especially when considering the types of structures involved in these
operations.

See 2006 MISS. AG LEXIS 321, *17 (Opinion No. 2006-00436); see also Hinds
County Board of Supervisors v. Leggette, 833 So. 2d 586, 592 (Miss. Ct. App. 2002)
(discussing factors and guidelines for making a factual determination as to what the
definition of an “agricultural operation” is in regard to a zoning exemption).
119 See CANYON CTY. BLDG. DEP’T, AGRICULTURAL BUILDING EXEMPTION (citing
CANYON CTY., IDAHO BLDG. CODE ORDINANCE 04-11 §§ 06-01-07, 09(4)),
https://www.canyonco.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/Agricultural-BuildingExemption-Rev.pdf.
120 Id. (requiring that buildings be constructed on a single parcel of no less than five
acres and in an agricultural district).
121 Id.
122 See MINN. GOVERNOR’S COUNCIL ON FIRE PREVENTION & CONTROL, BUILDING
CODE EXEMPTIONS FOR AGRICULTURAL BUILDINGS 4–5 (Nov. 24, 2010) (discussing
the risks associated with the exemption from the state building code for agricultural
buildings) [hereinafter WHITE PAPER]; see also Kuehl v. Cass Cty., 555 N.W.2d 686,
688–9 (Iowa 1996) (citing IOWA CODE § 335.2 (1995)) (ruling that hog barns
sufficient to house 900 feeder hogs are exempt from building codes).
123 WHITE PAPER, supra note 122, at 3.
124 Id. at 5.
118
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VI. Analysis: Solutions
A. Statutory Interpretation: Falling Just Short
One local government has attempted to tackle the issue of
vagueness in the IBC with administrative guidance. Phoenix,
Arizona, concerned with the IBC’s rigidity on urban agriculture,
updated its interpretation of the IBC to account for modern
agricultural practices by recognizing that commercial-scale indoor
agriculture differs from the accessory buildings allowed under Group
U. 125 To remedy this, Phoenix expressly declared that, under its new
interpretation, buildings used as growing areas fall under either
Group F or Group U designations. 126 However, any indoor farm
wanting to undertake retail sales also falls under Group M. 127
Phoenix accomplished a great thing here by clarifying the
application of its building code for many prospective indoor farmers.
However, the Phoenix scheme is not perfect. Because Group U,
Group F-1, and Group M buildings each carry their own permitting
requirements and limitations, any mixed-use building must jump
through the same or similar hoops mentioned earlier. 128 For a farm
attempting to grow, wash, and sell produce at the same building site,
it is a daunting task to keep up with three separate use group
provisions and all that they entail. Additionally, these provisions still
lack language for common indoor farming practices like those used
in aquaponics, as they contain no language pertaining to the
production of livestock. 129
Consider the previously described Chicago-based farm, The
Plant. 130 The Plant utilizes a converted factory to grow hydroponic
produce and raise fish in a closed system; it also incorporates an
anaerobic digester as a source of some of its electrical energy. This
complex and varied usage is left unaddressed by the City of
Phoenix’s efforts. 131 In fact, the inclusion of fish in The Plant’s
production scheme pushes the farm back into the same unknown
territory previously inhabited by “agricultural buildings” under
Group U, as the IBC states that livestock must be housed in

See CITY OF PHOENIX, INDOOR AGRICULTURAL OCCUPANCY CLASSIFICATIONS
(2013), https://www.phoenix.gov/pddsite/Documents/TRT/dsd_trt_pdf_00756.pdf;
see also Tomlinson supra note 17, at 21 (discussing the clarification).
126 Id.
127 Id.
128 Id.
129 Id.
130 See supra Section II.A.
131 See CITY OF PHOENIX, supra note 125.
125
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“agricultural buildings.” 132 This potentially creates an inherent
contradiction in the IBC’s treatment of such a building because, even
under the Phoenix interpretation, The Plant is both expressly not an
“agricultural building” where it is used for the production of crops
and is an “agricultural building” where it is used for the production
of livestock.
Critiques aside, the City of Phoenix has provided local
lawmakers with the building blocks of a solid short-term solution to
ambiguity in the IBC. The concern with statutory clarification is not
that it fails as a solution outright; indeed, explicit clarification as to
which occupancy group a farm building falls under is a step in the
right direction. Rather, the concern with statutory clarification is that
it can only go so far in the face of a nuanced, still-developing
industry. In other words, efforts like the City of Phoenix’s opinion
letter operate as useful, but temporary, salve to the problem of
ambiguity until a more permanent solution is available.
B. Updating the IBC
The more sustainable solution is a change to the law. The
problems highlighted in this article may be solved with something as
simple as the addition of new definitions, or carefully worded
interpretations. For building codes, this means a straightforward
modification of the IBC occupancy groups. Because virtually every
building code in the United States is modeled after the IBC and states
re-adopt the revised IBC every few years, changing the IBC directly
would mean that local governments are essentially required to do
nothing beyond continuing to adopt updated versions of the IBC.
The IBC would simply be changed at the top and adopted by the
states as usual. This is far more efficient than waiting on each state,
county, or municipal government to adopt its own interpretation of
the existing occupancy groups to facilitate vertical farming.
The only remaining question is which occupancy group to
use. Given the trend in converting old factory buildings to vertical
farms—as well as the need for flexibility in height and story limits—
the most fitting occupancy group currently is the Group F. If the IBC
were modified to incorporate “indoor crop farming” into Group F,
particularly Group F-2, the following goals would be accomplished.
First, the ambiguities that plague prospective vertical farmers now
would be eliminated. Second, it would avoid the massive complexity
of mixed-use in regard to all the various permits and hoops that
prospective farming operations would have to jump through. Third,
the contradictions in IBC use and height restrictions would be
132 INT’L BLDG. CODE

§ 302.1.
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avoided, as indoor farm building would no longer potentially fall
under the Group U or Group M categories.
VII. Conclusion
As described above, the popular regulatory measures of
updating zoning plans, providing tax incentives, and passing
statewide agricultural exemptions, are wholly inadequate for the
purpose of fostering vertical farming operations in urban
environments. Updated zoning plans tend to benefit community
agriculture, but fail to consider large vertical farming operations and
leave such operations at the mercy of statutory ambiguities. Tax
incentives and statewide exemptions from the building code likewise
fail to reach vertical farming buildings, either due to ambiguity or
disadvantageous conditions. Additionally, there are seemingly
legitimate public policy reasons for not allowing building code
exemptions for large, costly structures. Statutory interpretation may
alleviate certain problems in the short-term, but still leave some longterm issues with mixed-usage, particularly for farms that want to sell
produce on-site. Updating the IBC will alleviate all of these
problems and allow local governments to facilitate the growth of
vertical farming in the future.

Science and Risk Analysis in CPTPP/SPS-Plus:
Role Model or Unbearable Burden? ∗
Kuei-Jung Ni**
Abstract
Trade in food and agricultural products accounts for a
major part of global trade, and the trade continues to alert domestic
consumers to the risks associated with modern food processing and
production methods. The Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement
(TPP), now rebranded as the Comprehensive and Progressive
Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), represents a new
model of mega-regional trade pacts posed to set higher standards
for promoting and streamlining trade liberalization. Because of
concerns with national food safety regulations that could constitute
forms of non-tariff barriers, the CPTPP, in contrast to the World
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Trade Organization (WTO), stipulates further rules on parties’
sanitary and phytosanitary measures (SPS), achieving a type of role
model of SPS-plus.
This article explores the legal implications and
progressiveness of the SPS-plus design, particularly focusing on the
requirements of scientific evidence and risk analysis.
The
SPS-plus that sets hurdles for national regulatory regimes largely
reflects WTO jurisprudence, international health standards, and the
national regulations of the United States. I argue that the role
model may provide momentum to modernize parties’ food safety
regimes, but the cost of full compliance could be high. Genuine
collaboration, experience-sharing, and technological and financial
support between developed countries and less developed countries
may alleviate the difficulties of implementation and promote
coherence.
Key words: CPTPP, SPS-Plus, Food Safety, Science, Risk Analysis
I.

Introduction

Food trade accounts for a major part of global trade, and
domestic consumers are increasingly wary of the safety of imported
foods. Although food trade can ensure food security for countries
that cannot sustain themselves, it may also engender risks that
originate from modern food processing and production methods.
Therefore, national food authorities are expected to manage food
risks cautiously. Risk analysis consists of three components,
namely risk assessment, risk management, and risk communication,
which has become an important mechanism of risk control.
The incorporation of risk analysis in food regulations has
succeeded at global and local levels in ensuring food safety. The
Codex Alimentarius Commission (CAC), a World Health
Organization (WHO) and Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO)
subsidiary, is the leading international food safety institution. The
CAC not only engages in risk analysis in setting international food
standards, but also promotes the implementation of risk analysis
within national regimes. 1 The WHO and the FAO have jointly
produced a guidance document to help national authorities establish
food safety risk analysis regimes. 2 Nonetheless, the document,
CODEX ALIMENTARIUS COMM’N., WORKING PRINCIPLES FOR RISK ANALYSIS FOR
FOOD SAFETY FOR APPLICATION BY GOVERNMENTS 2–9 (2007), http://www.fao.org/
3/a-a1550t.pdf.
2 FOOD AND AGRIC. ORG. & WORLD HEALTH ORG., FOOD SAFETY RISK ANALYSIS:
1
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although useful in this regard, is implemented on a voluntary basis.
The European General Food Law represents a clear model of the
full incorporation of risk analysis in governing food safety, 3 and
the Food Safety Basic Law of Japan also recognizes the
indispensable role of risk analysis in ensuring consumers’
confidence in food safety. 4
Concerned with the impact of national regulations on
imported foods, the World Trade Organization’s (WTO) Agreement
on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS
Agreement) requires members to adopt risk-based decision-making
and especially to link trade measures to risk assessment. 5
However, the drafters of the SPS Agreement did not intend to
oblige members to build a thorough risk analysis system into their
regulations, despite certain provisions partially reflecting such
ideas. 6 Since the WTO Doha Round was in dilemma, trading
parties have turned their efforts to negotiating regional trade
agreements (RTAs). To further promote the international flow of
agricultural products without unjustified intervention, certain
SPS-plus disciplines have been pursued. 7 In contrast to the SPS
Agreement, most SPS-plus arrangements have emphasized
cooperation and effective coordination between parties. 8
Nonetheless, most of the agreements have shown little interest in
pushing for the establishment of an advanced system for risk-based
regimes beyond that of the WTO’s original mechanism. 9

A GUIDE FOR NATIONAL SAFETY AUTHORITIES xi–xii (2006), http://www.fao.org/do
crep/012/a0822e/a0822e00.htm [hereinafter FAO & WHO GUIDE].
3 Risk Analysis constitutes one of the general principles of European food law of
which definition has clearly been provided. See 2002 O.J. (L 31) 1–8 (defining
Risk Analysis as one of the general principles of European food law) [hereinafter
European General Food Law].
4 FOOD SAFETY COMM’N. OF JAPAN, JAPAN FOOD SAFETY BASIC LAW (2010),
http://www.fsc.go.jp/english/brochure/brochure2010/fsc10_p3.pdf.
5 See Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, arts.
5.1–5.4, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, Annex 1A, 1867 U.N.T.S. 493 [hereinafter SPS Agreement].
6 Id. arts. 5.5–5.6.
7 See Part II of this Article and corresponding footnotes.
8 See e.g., The Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement between the
European Union and Canada, entered into force provisionally on September 21,
2017, art. 5.4, https://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/in-focus/ceta/ceta-chapter-by-chapt
er/ [hereinafter CETA]; see also, The Economic Partnership Agreement between
the European Union and Japan, signed on July 17, 2018, entered into force on
February 1, 2019, art. 6, http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/in-focus/eu-japan-econom
ic-partnership-agreement/ [hereinafter Economic Partnership Agreement].
9 See id.
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The finalization of the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement
(TPP) involved many stages of negotiations and partners. It began
with plurilateral talks of the Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic
Partnership between Brunei, Chile, New Zealand, and Singapore. 10
Subsequently, more Asia-Pacific countries expressed interest in
joining the trade block. In particular, the United States’ (U.S.)
determination to lead and set the agenda for the mega-regional trade
arrangement made the TPP the most ambitious and unprecedented
RTA in both economic strength and standards. 11 The TPP
concluded in 2015 represented a new model of mega-free-trade
pacts and was posed to set higher standards for promoting and
streamlining trade liberalization, 12 and to espouse significant
values beyond trade and commerce concerns. 13
Since the Trump administration withdrew the U.S. from the
TPP in early 2017, the remaining 11 parties have endeavored to
keep the agreement alive. During the Trans-Pacific Partnership
Ministerial Meeting held in Da Nang, Vietnam, on November 11,
2017, the TPP-11 countries in the Pacific region—New Zealand,
Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia,
Mexico, Peru, Singapore, and Vietnam—reached a consensus that
the TPP would be temporarily replaced by the Comprehensive and
Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). 14
See Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership (P4), NEW ZEALAND
FOREIGN AFFAIRS & TRADE, https://www.mfat.govt.nz/en/trade/free-trade-agreeme
nts/free-trade-agreements-in-force/p4/ (last visited Oct. 26, 2019) (discussing the
timeline of the Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership which was signed in
2005 and entered into force in 2006); see also, The Trans-Pacific Strategic
Economic Partnership (P4), https://www.mfat.govt.nz/assets/FTAs-agreements-in-f
orce/P4/Full-text-of-P4-agreement.pdf.
11 See RAHEL AICHELE & GABRIEL FELBERMAYR, THE TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP
DEAL (TPP): WHAT ARE THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES FOR IN- AND OUTSIDERS? 4
(2015), http://ged-project.de/2015/10/09/who-wins-and-who-loses-with-tpp/.
12 But cf., Free Trade Agreements, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE
REPRESENTATIVE, https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements, (last
visited Oct. 26, 2019) (indexing the voluminous list of individual trade agreements
between the U.S. and other nations).
13 See Press Release, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Notification of
Completion of Domestic Procedures for the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP)
Agreement (Jan. 20, 2017), http://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/press4e_001443.h
tml (“It also seeks to deepen and broaden economic ties among countries and
regions that share fundamental values such as freedom, democracy, basic human
rights, and the rule of law, and is hence strategically significant in terms of
pursuing further regional stability.”).
14 See Press Release from Minister Taro Kono, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of
Japan, Agreement at the Ministerial Level on the TPP Negotiations Among 11
Countries (Nov. 11, 2017), http://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/press4e_001788.ht
ml.
10
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The CPTPP was signed in Chile on March 8, 2018. 15 The free
trade pact would become effective 60 days after at least six (or 50%)
of the signatories notified the Depositary (New Zealand) of the
completion of ratification procedures. 16 As of October 30, 2018,
six countries (Canada, Australia, Japan, Mexico, New Zealand, and
Singapore) have ratified the agreement. Therefore, the CPTPP
entered into force on December 30, 2018. 17
Several original commitments of the TPP, including
intellectual property and investment Chapters, have been suspended,
but the SPS Chapter remains unchanged. Due to concerns that
national food safety regulations could constitute a form of non-tariff
barriers (NTBs), the CPTPP, in contrast to the WTO, adds further
requirements to parties’ SPS measures, referred to as SPS-plus. 18
In particular, the CPTPP SPS Chapter explicitly requires risk
analysis and provides definitions for its components. 19 In contrast
to recent SPS-plus developments in other RTAs and free trade
agreements (FTAs), the CPTPP’s SPS approach appears unique and
ambitious. The effort to push the incorporation of the risk regime
into parties’ regulatory regimes is a progressive agenda that
presents both opportunities and challenges for national compliance.
This article explores the legal implications of the
progressive design of the SPS-plus model and assesses its impact,
particularly focusing on the requirements of scientific evidence and
a risk analysis regime. The difficulty for national regulatory
regimes to fulfill such high SPS standards seems apparent, but the
mandate may provide an opportunity to modernize national food
safety governance that has thus far been subject to political and
non-science-based considerations.
Part II introduces the
development of SPS-plus in RTAs. Part III of this article analyzes
the CPTPP’s approach to applying a risk analysis mechanism,
See Dave Sherwood & Felipe Iturrieta, Asia-Pacific Nations Sign Sweeping
Trade Deal Without U.S., THOMPSON REUTERS (Mar. 8, 2018, 12:12 AM)
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-trade-tpp/asia-pacific-nations-sign-sweeping-tra
de-deal-without-u-s-idUSKCN1GK0JM.
16 See id.
17 See Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership,
N.Z. FOREIGN AFFAIRS & TRADE, https://www.mfat.govt.nz/en/trade/free-trade-agre
ements/free-trade-agreements-in-force/cptpp/cptpp-overview/ (last visited Oct. 26,
2019) (discussing the origins of the CPTPP and ratification process).
18 See Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership,
signed on March 8, 2018, entered into force on December 30, 2018, ch. 7,
https://www.mfat.govt.nz/assets/Trans-Pacific-Partnership/Text/7.-Sanitary-and-Ph
ytosanitary-Measures-Chapter.pdf [hereinafter CPTPP].
19 Id. arts. 7.1, 7.9.
15
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describes the discrepancy between the WTO contexts and those of
the SPS-plus, and explores the implications of the obligations
imposed on the parties. Part IV discusses the challenges facing
the parties in implementing the added requirements. Part V
concludes that the significance and challenges of applying the
SPS-plus standards for improving national food risk regulatory
regimes are considerable. All parties to the new model of RTA
should work in good faith to make the arrangement beneficial to all
stakeholders.
II.

Developments of SPS-Plus in RTAs

The impasses of the WTO Doha agenda pushed trading
parties to pursue further trade liberalization by negotiating RTAs
and FTAs. 20 The aims of the free trade zones include, inter alia,
tariff reduction, trade facilitation, NTB elimination, regulatory
cooperation, and anti-corruption and environmental protection
These objectives exceed the original WTO
provisions. 21
commitments, namely WTO-plus. 22
When trade partners have pursued WTO-plus at regional
and bilateral levels, the premise of SPS-plus has also been included
in the negotiations. 23 During the past decade, many RTAs/FTAs
have been concerned with increasing NTBs and non-tariff measures
(NTMs). 24 Several reasons have made the move increasingly
urgent. Public health concerns, particularly for the risks brought
by imported agricultural products, have increasingly attracted the
attention of national consumers, prompting nations to increase the
level of protection concerning health and environmental safety and
tighten their regulations. 25 Regulation of imported foods has been
enhanced by requiring more inspections and sophisticated
certifications. These alleged NTBs or NTMs, many of which have
not been entirely science-based or rule-based, have alarmed
countries, particularly exporting countries. 26 Such countries have
MITSUO MATSUSHITA ET AL., THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: LAW,
PRACTICE, AND POLICY 24–25 (3rd ed. 2016).
21 International Free Trade Zone, ECONOMY WATCH (May 25, 2010),
https://www.economywatch.com/international-trade/free-trade-zone.html.
22 See Ken Ash and Iza Lejarraga, Can We Have Regionalism and Multilateralism?
in TACKLING AGRICULTURE IN THE POST-BALI CONTEXT 75–78 (Ricardo
Melédez-Ortiz et al., eds., 2014).
23 Id. at 77.
24 United Nations Conference on Trade and Dev., NON-TARIFF MEASURES:
ECONOMIC ASSESSMENT AND POLICY OPTIONS FOR DEVELOPMENT 4 (2018),
https://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/ditctab2018d3_en.pdf.
25 Id. at 85, 115.
26 United Nations Conference on Trade and Dev., NON-TARIFF MEASURES IN
20
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argued that SPS-plus should be constructed to prevent the abuse of
such measures or the implementation of disguised protectionist
policies. 27
In negotiations of SPS-plus arrangements, parties have
pursued some common goals, such as the further elaboration of
thorough scientific principles and risk analysis to support and
justify
food
regulations,
elimination
of
unnecessary
non-science-based measures, and expansion of the width and depth
of information sharing, including transparency requirements. 28 In
particular, to facilitate food trade, cooperation and consultation
mechanisms have been enhanced. 29 The relevant texts of the
CPTPP, the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement
between the European Union (EU) and Canada (CETA), and the
EU-Japan Economic Partner Agreement (EPA) reflect similar
approaches with minor distinctions. 30
In general, these
developments derived from a gradual consensus-building among
WTO members. Scholars have observed that “many SPS-plus
measures found in RTAs are already enshrined in the voluntary
guidelines of the WTO SPS Committee on how to implement the
WTO SPS Agreement.” 31 The mutuality and interdependence of
the agreements can help achieve the convergence of regional
SPS-plus approaches and multilateral developments. The progress
in RTAs thus, as observed, may be expected to promote the
multilateralization of such RTA-plus measures. 32

ASEAN 2, 125 (Lili Yan Ing et al. eds., April 2016), https://unctad.org/en/Publicati
onsLibrary/ERIA-UNCTAD_Non-Tariff_Measures_in_ASEAN_en.pdf.
27 Naoto Jinji, An Economic Theory of the SPS Agreement, THE RESEARCH INST.
OF ECON., TRADE AND INDUS. 1, 3, https://www.rieti.go.jp/jp/publications/dp/09e03
3.pdf.
28 RENÉE JOHNSON, CONG. RES. SERV., R43450, SANITARY AND PHYTOSANITARY
(SPS) AND RELATED NON-TARIFF BARRIERS TO AGRICULTURAL TRADE 11-12 (2014);
see also, CETA, supra note 8, chs. 4–5; Economic Partnership Agreement, supra
note 8, chs. 6–7.
29 Markus Wagner, The Future of SPS Governance: SPS-Plus or SPS-Minus? 51 J.
WORLD TRADE 445, 461 (2017).
30 CPTPP, supra note 18, chs. 7–8; CETA, supra note 8, chs. 4–5; Economic
Partnership Agreement, supra note 8, chs. 6–7.
31 Ash & Lejarraga, supra note 22, at 77.
32 See id. at 76, 81.
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Scientific Principles and Risk Analysis in
CPTPP/SPS-Plus
Overall Approach of the SPS Chapter of CPTPP

The U.S. was influential in shaping SPS-plus regarding
scientific principles and risk analysis during original TPP
negotiations. The proposal of the Office of the United States
Trade Representatives (USTR) transcended the existing rules under
the WTO and prior U.S. bilateral/regional trade deals. For
example, the USTR intended to clarify the elements of risk
assessment that were considered to be inadequately elaborated 33 in
the text of Article 5.1 of the SPS Agreement. The USTR’s
proposal was premised on the concern shared by many exporters
that some WTO members adopted import restrictions based on
flawed or even nonexistent risk assessments, and, consequently, an
“adequate” risk assessment must be further defined. 34
Considering its tensions with several countries in the Asia-Pacific
region (Japan, Korea, Taiwan, etc.) regarding certain food safety
controversies since 2011, the U.S. anticipated crafting the TPP/SPS
Chapter as a mega-regional template for future application. 35 The
negotiators consolidated the various SPS proposals into a single
text at the ninth round in Chicago, including key elements such as a
timeline for risk assessment, enhanced process transparency, and a
more specific definition of “sound science.” 36
Subsequently, U.S. agri-food groups started to jointly and
publicly make their appeals at the twelth TPP negotiation round in
Dallas. 37 Several recommendations aimed at revamping existing
SPS rules were proposed, including an elaborate set of risk
assessment and risk management requirements, enhanced
transparency (notification and explanation of new measures and a
reasonable length of time for public comments on draft measures),
and an emphasis on international standards and harmonization.38
These recommendations played a vital role in the subsequent
33

USTR May Offer Revised SPS Proposal in TPP, Aims to Go Beyond WTO,
INSIDE U.S. TRADE (July 22, 2011), https://wtonewsstand.com/content/ustr-may-off
er-revised-sps-proposal-tpp-aims-go-beyond-wto.
34 Id.
35 Id.
36 U.S. Tables Revised SPS Chapter, TPP Round Produces Consolidated Text,
INSIDE U.S. TRADE (Sep. 16, 2011), ProQuest Central, Document ID: 911969547.
37 Agriculture, Food Industry Seek WTO-Plus Rules for TPP Chapter, INSIDE U.S.
TRADE (May 18, 2012), ProQuest Central, Document ID:1014125823.
38 Id.
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rounds of negotiations.
The risk analysis mechanism has been adopted by several
international institutions that govern food safety, such as the CAC 39
and the 2001 Biosafety Protocol. 40
Some national and
supranational regulatory regimes have also applied and practiced
this model, including the EU 41 and Japan. 42
The WTO SPS Agreement requires compliance with
science-based and risk-based principles for adopting national SPS
measures. 43 However, the agreement only explicitly mentions the
idea of risk assessment and does not specify the terms of risk
management and risk communication. 44 The Panel in EC–
Hormones explained the essence of Article 5 of the SPS Agreement
by covering elements of both risk assessment and risk
management. 45 The broad approach to align the coverage with the
general understanding, however, was rejected by the Appellate
Body simply because such a wording of risk management did not
explicitly appear in the context. 46
Regulatory cooperation has constituted one of the major
goals of current RTA/FTA negotiations. 47 Such a mandate is also
See Food and Agriculture Organization [FAO] & World Health Organization
[WHO], Codex Alimentarius Comm’n: Report of the Twenty-Sixth Session, app. IV,
Ref. No. ALINORM 03/41 (June 30 – July 7, 2003), http://www.fao.org/docrep/00
6/Y4800E/y4800e0o.htm#bm24 (containing the working principles that guide the
work of the Commission and its subsidiary bodies regarding risk analysis).
40 See Cartagena Protocol on Biodiversity to the Convention on Biological
Diversity, arts. 15–16, annex III, adopted Jan. 29, 2000, 2226 U.N.T.S. 208,
(entered into force Sept. 11, 2003).
41 The European General Food Law, supra note 3, art. 6.
42 According to Japan Food Safety Basic Act, “a new concept of ’risk analysis’
was introduced to promote food safety in a more comprehensive manner. See
http://www.fsc.go.jp/english/brochure/brochure2010/fsc10_p3.pdf (last visited Oct.
10, 2018).
43 SPS Agreement, supra note 5.
44 See id. (discussing only risk assessment, without mention of risk management
or risk communication).
45 Panel Report, European Communities – Measures Concerning Meat and Meat
Products (Hormones), WTO Doc. WT/DS48/R/CAN, ¶¶ 8.94–8.95, 8.98 (Aug. 18,
1997) [hereinafter Panel Report, EC – Hormones].
46 Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Measures Concerning Meat
and Meat Products (Hormones), WTO Doc. WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R, ¶
181 (Jan. 16, 1998) [hereinafter Appellate Body Report, EC – Hormones].
47 See Alexia Brunet Marks, The Right to Regulate (Cooperatively), 38 U. PA. J.
INT’L L. 1, 64-65 (2016) (illustrating a number of RTA/FTA practices in enhancing
regulatory cooperation, particularly on SPS matters); see generally Eugenia
Costanza Laurenza & Fabienne Goyeneche, Regulatory Cooperation in Free Trade
39
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commonly required in many SPS Chapters of trade agreements.
For example, CETA reflects the trend. 48 The EPA also highlights
the significance of cooperation for easing possible health-related
Both agreements, despite being
regulatory disagreements. 49
negotiated by parties of developed countries, failed to elaborate a
risk regime beyond the original WTO/SPS design in the end. The
EPA—irrespective of its ambition to consolidate risk analysis, as
evidenced in an early EU assessment report 50—has turned out to be
a simple repetition of the WTO legacy. 51
By contrast, the CPTPP SPS Chapter has unequivocally
specified the requirement for risk analysis. 52 It is the first attempt
at incorporating a relatively sound risk-based and science-based
mechanism into a regional trade regime. 53 The unprecedented
approach is a clear indication of the original vision of the U.S. in
seeking the codification of high standards into SPS-plus. The
effort also represents a progressive development in the WTO/SPS
arrangement.
The U.S. has withdrawn itself from the TPP, but the
approach originally proposed by the U.S. continues to impact on its
current RTA negotiations.
The North America Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA) between the U.S., Mexico, and Canada has
been renegotiated since the Trump administration came into
office. 54 This RTA has been replaced by the newly-concluded
United States–Mexico–Canada Agreement (USMCA). 55 Some
Agreements: Perspectives from the Automotive and Information and
Communication Technology Sectors, 12 GLOBAL TRADE AND CUSTOMS J. 433 (2017)
(discussing the forms of regulatory cooperation and their use in modern free trade
agreements, particularly in the automotive industry and information and
communication technology sectors).
48 CETA, supra note 8, arts. 21.1– 21.2.
49 See Economic Partnership Agreement, supra note 8, art. 6.1.
50 See LSE ENTER., TRADE SUSTAINABILITY IMPACT ASSESSMENT OF THE FREE
TRADE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE EUROPEAN UNION AND JAPAN 59–60 (2015).
51 See Economic Partnership Agreement, supra note 8, arts. 6.4, 6.6 (reiterating
the mandate of the WTO SPS Agreement on risk assessment).
52 CPTPP, supra note 18, art. 7.9.
53 Because the U.S and other countries have a strong comparative advantage in
agricultural production, they consider import restrictions should meet more
reasonable and sound scientific tests to avoid NTBs. See notes 33–37 and
accompanying text.
54 The USMCA was concluded on Sep. 30, 2018. See Alan Rappeport, A
Last-Minute Deal With Canada Salvages a Trade Agreement, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1,
2018, at A1 https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/30/us/politics/us-canada-nafta-dealdeadline.html (last visited October 31, 2018).
55 Id.
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changes in the new trade deal originated from the TPP per se. 56 In
terms of the SPS rules, the USMCA maintains a large portion of the
TPP ingredients. 57 The provision concerning “science and risk
analysis” generally mirrors that of the TPP/SPS with minor
modifications. 58
B.

Implications and Progress of Risk Analysis in the
CPTPP/SPS Chapter

i.

General Idea of Risk Analysis in the CPTPP

The CPTPP’s definition of risk analysis 59 reflects the
common usage appearing at international, regional, and national
levels. 60 In particular, it increases the requirements for the format
of risk analysis and public involvement in the process by requiring
that the operation of the system be documented and opportunities
for public comment be provided to interested persons or parties.61
To clarify the application, the SPS Chapter specifies that such
requirements apply only to a risk analysis for a sanitary or
phytosanitary measure that constitutes a sanitary or phytosanitary
regulation for the purposes of Annex B of the SPS Agreement
(transparency). 62
In the pursuit of harmonization, the WTO/SPS Agreement
expects members to apply international standards, guidelines, and
recommendations and extends certain incentives, 63 but such
international standards are not binding on WTO members per se. 64
56 See Justin Worland, Trump’s NAFTA Replacement Largely Maintains Status
Quo on Free Trade, TIME (Oct. 1, 2018), https://time.com/5411444/nafta-trump-de
al-usmca/.
57 Id.
58 In contrast to the CPTPP, the new agreement replaces risk analysis with risk
assessment and risk management, although the title of the provision remains
unchanged. The move may indicate the USMCA’s intent to reduce the mandate
of risk communication. Agreement between the United States of America, the
United Mexican States, and Canada art. 9.6, U.S.-Mex.-Can., Nov. 30, 2018; see
also CPTPP, supra note 18, art. 7.1.
59 Id. art. 7.1.
60 FAO & WHO GUIDE, supra note 2, at 7; see also European General Food Law,
supra note 3, art. 3, paras. 11-13.
61 CPTPP, supra note 18, art. 7.9.
62 Id. footnote 4 to art. 7.9, ¶ 4(b).
63 Article 3.2 of the SPS Agreement provides that national SPS measures that
conform to international standards enjoy the presumption of consistency with the
SPS Agreement. SPS Agreement, supra note 5, at 2.
64 Observing the Appellate Body’s jurisprudence has led to the conclusion that
“[t]he Appellate Body’s interpretation . . . has turned the course of subsequent SPS
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The WTO case law has not fully recognized a principle of
deference to certain international standards and their setting. In
Hormones II, the Appellate Body departed from international
standard-setting in two main aspects. First, the Appellate Body
opined that experts involved in standard-setting may lack
independence and not be suitable to provide objective opinions,
especially if they were not in agreement with members who sought
a higher level of protection than that of an international regime. 65
Second, it also rejected the idea that an existing international
standard can justify the sufficiency of scientific evidence that may
disqualify a provisional measure. 66
By contrast, the TPP negotiators managed to bring the SPS
Chapter closer to international standard-setting and demonstrated
an intent to further the mandate of harmonization by, inter alia,
including the encouragement of “the development and adoption of
international standards, guidelines and recommendations” and the
promotion of “their implementation by the Parties” as one of the
objectives of the SPS Chapter. 67 The text was aimed at making
enforceable the relevant international arrangements on risk analysis
that are usually voluntary. As the WTO/SPS Committee and other
international standard-setting regimes, including the WHO and
FAO, have provided useful references for building a risk analysis
regime, the CPTPP parties are required to take into account their
works in designing their regulations. 68 In effect, the CPTPP SPS
Chapter bluntly reinforces the relevance of international soft law
with the establishment of a national risk analysis regime.

jurisprudence away from the assessment of national SPS measures against
international benchmark standards.” See JACQUELINE PEEL, SCIENCE AND RISK
REGULATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, 178–81(2010).
65 Appellate Body Report, United States – Continued Suspension of Obligations in
the EC – Hormones Dispute, ¶ 481, WTO Doc. WT/DS320/AB/R (adopted Oct. 16,
2008) [hereinafter Appellate Body Report, U.S. – Continued Suspension]; see also
KUEI-JUNG NI, Does Science Speak Clearly and Fairly in Trade and Food Safety
Disputes? The Search for an Optimal Response of WTO Adjudication to
Problematic International Standard-Making, 68 FOOD & DRUG L. J. 97, 111–13
(2013) (observing the tendency of the Appellate Body of not entirely endorsing
international standard-setting).
66 The Appellate Body also denied that an existing international standard can
entail and prove sufficiency of scientific evidence in order to disqualify a
provisional measure. Appellate Body Report, U.S. – Continued Suspension, supra
note 65, ¶¶ 695,733.
67 CPTPP, supra note 18, art. 7.2, ¶ (f).
68 Id. art. 7.9, ¶ 6(a).
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Scientific Principles and Risk Assessment

The SPS Chapter does not provide a new definition of risk
assessment as the WTO/SPS Agreement has defined the term
clearly. 69 To justify the results of a risk assessment and gain
public confidence, many national practices have adhered to certain
core values and principles when completing the assessment. For
example, the European General Food Law specifies that “[r]isk
assessment shall be based on the available scientific evidence and
undertaken in an independent, objective and transparent manner.” 70
The Japan Food Safety Basic Law 71 details similar requirements. 72
The WTO/SPS Agreement has yet to add further mandates
such as those of the EU and Japan. In addition to requiring a
science-based approach to risk assessment, it may be desirable for
the SPS Chapter to incorporate objectives compatible with higher
values such as democracy and fairness. The CPTPP context has
not explicitly recognized the principles of independence and
transparency. However, as mentioned, the CPTPP parties shall
take into account international standards, guidelines, and
recommendations in the execution of risk analysis. 73 Thus, the
WHO and FAO’s guidance that recognizes the characteristics of
objectivity and transparency in risk assessment 74 may help shape
the progress of national risk analysis regimes, although it is of a
less obligatory nature.
Article 2.2 of the WTO/SPS Agreement specifies the
science-based principle as one of its controlling mandates. 75
According to Article 5.1 of the Agreement, WTO members shall
base their trade measures on an assessment of risks. 76 In the
assessment of risks, they are required to take into account
“available” scientific evidence. 77
In EC—Hormones, the
Appellate Body stated that these two provisions should be read
together. 78 The difference between the WTO/SPS and the
SPS Agreement, supra note 5, Annex A, ¶ 4.
The European General Food Law, supra note 3, art. 6, ¶ (2) (emphasis added).
71 Japan Food Safety Basic Act, Act No. 48, arts. 13(emphasis added) of May 23,
2003, http://www.fsc.go.jp/english/basic_act/fs_basic_act.pdf.
72 Id. arts. 13, 32.
73 CPTPP, supra note 18, art.7.9, ¶ 6 (a) (emphasis added).
74 FAO & WHO GUIDE, supra note 2, at 48, 49.
75 SPS Agreement, supra note 5, art. 2.2.
76 Id. art. 5.1.
77 Id. art. 5.2.
78 Appellate Body Report, EC – Hormones, supra note 46, ¶¶ 177, 180.
69
70
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CPTPP/SPS context lies in the benchmark that they set for the
eligibility of scientific evidence. The main addition of the
SPS-plus in this regard is a focus on making the scientific approach
more stringent. A careful reading of the SPS Chapter suggests that
it adds criteria of what constitutes “sound science” as opposed to
“junk science.”
First, regarding the quality of scientific evidence, the SPS
Agreement does not classify the type of science that can satisfy the
requirement to support a given measure. 79 However, WTO
jurisprudence appears to value the significance of scientific
robustness. 80
In US/Canada—Continued Suspension, the
Appellate Body stated that the standard of review exercised by a
Panel on a party’s risk assessment should involve examining
“whether that risk assessment is supported by coherent reasoning
and respectable scientific evidence and is, in this sense, objectively
justifiable.” 81 Thus, such science should be examined by a test of
whether it “comes from a respected and qualified source” and
meets “the necessary scientific and methodological rigor.” 82 The
SPS Chapter adds an element by emphasizing the “objectiveness”
of the science to justify an SPS measure in question. 83 The further
elaboration and incorporation of the WTO’s judicial rulings on
qualified science by the CPTPP tighten the admissibility of science
for legitimate use in risk assessment. Indeed, the reinforced
threshold of requiring legitimate science squarely fulfills the
original objective of the TPP negotiations to pursue high standards.
Second, with respect to the form of the scientific evidence
in question, neither the WTO/SPS context nor its case law requires
any certain format. The CPTPP Chapter states that such scientific
evidence must be documented. 84 This requirement raises the
threshold of compliance. Nevertheless, given the lack of a clear
definition of documentation, it remains unclear how stringent the
element should be. An argument that scientific evidence must be
published in journals could be too restrictive, given many studies
and surveys have yet to be published. 85
SPS Agreement, supra note 5, art. 5.2.
See PEEL, supra note 64, at 190–230 (discussing the WTO’s treatment of
scientific principles).
81 Appellate Body Report, US – Continued Suspension, supra note 65, ¶ 590.
82 Id. ¶ 591.
83 CPTPP, supra note 18, art. 7.9, ¶ 2.
84 Id. art. 7.9, ¶ 4(b).
85 FAO & WHO GUIDE, supra note 2, Box 3.9, at 50 (noting that certain
79
80
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Third, regarding the scope of scientific evidence, the
WTO/SPS Agreement simply provides that members are required to
apply scientific evidence that is available to them. 86 Given that
countries possess various levels of scientific and technological
development, the alleged “availability” of the evidence in question
may differ. The negotiators of the CPTPP SPS Chapter would
likely not be satisfied with the WTO mandate because this approach
may, to some extent, exempt members from using the best science
that exists worldwide but may not be available in the country under
complaint. The SPS Chapter limits the scope of the science in
question. It first states that the availability of science to parties
shall be “reasonably” available. 87 The additional requirement of
reasonableness may impose burdens on parties to perform more
searches and surveys for further evidence if to do so would be
reasonable. Moreover, parties are required to take into account
data that is “relevant.” 88 Thus, the limitation could further
constrain nations’ discretion in data collection.
On the other hand, the CPTPP’s approach is also a
manifestation of the incorporation of the WTO case law. In EC—
Hormones, the Appellate Body ruled that the methodology for
performing scientific risk assessment is not limited to the usual
model of quantitative usage, as a qualitative approach would also
be acceptable. 89 Thus, the SPS Chapter aligns with the approach
by explicitly covering these two methods. 90
As expected, the justification for formulating a relatively
rigid mandate for the quality of science is not without objections or
open questions. The introduction of the idea of “documented and
objective science” could narrow down the flexibility of parties to
select and apply applicable science.
Concerns have been
expressed regarding whether the flexibility of using “minority
information and data produced by industry may not be published, which
nevertheless can be relied on for risk assessment).
86 SPS Agreement, supra note 5, arts. 5.2, 5.7.
87 CPTPP, supra note 18, art. 7.9, ¶ 5.
88 Id.
89 The broad understanding was also confirmed by the subsequent rulings.
See
Appellate Body Report, Australia – Measures Affecting the Importation of Salmon,
WTO Doc. WT/DS18/AB/R, ¶ 124 (Oct. 20, 1998) [hereinafter Appellate Body
Report, Australia – Salmon]; Appellate Body Report, U.S. – Continued Suspension,
supra note 65, ¶ 530; Appellate Body Report, Australia – Measures Affecting the
Importation of Apples from New Zealand, WTO Doc. WT/DS367/AB/R, ¶ 208
(Nov. 29, 2010) [hereinafter Appellate Body Report, Australia – Apples].
90 CPTPP, supra note 18, art. 7.9, ¶ 5.
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science” as recognized by WTO jurisprudence could be undermined
by the rigid approach. 91 According to the Appellate Body’s
rulings, WTO members are permitted to use minority views of the
scientific community as the basis for decision-making as long as
such views originated from qualified and respected sources. 92 The
question thus becomes whether a minority opinion that, despite
being reputable, was not formally published or is just the result of
“a small number of peer-reviewed studies” 93 could be permissive
under the high standard. This may depend on the interpretations
of “documentation” for science.
iii.

Risk Management

As mentioned, risk management is not explicitly
recognized in the WTO/SPS Agreement. 94 Nevertheless, the
Agreement reflects certain elements of risk management in the
allocation of the rights and obligations of WTO members. 95 For
example, Article 5.4 of the SPS Agreement recognizes the right of
countries to decide their appropriate level of protection (ALOP), 96
which constitutes a preliminary process of risk management. 97
The Agreement further includes the mandates of necessity and
non-discrimination in applying SPS measures. 98 Of course,
reflecting a precautionary principle or approach, the Agreement
recognizes members’ discretion to adopt provisional SPS measures
where scientific evidence is insufficient. 99

Wagner, supra note 29, at 454.
Appellate Body Report, U.S. – Suspension, supra note 65, ¶ 591; Appellate
Body Report, Australia – Apples, supra note 89, ¶ 214; Appellate Body Report, EC
– Hormones, supra note 46, ¶ 194.
93 Wagner, supra note 29, at 454–55.
94 Appellate Body Report, EC – Hormones, supra note 46, ¶ 181.
95 E.g. MATSUSHITA ET AL., supra note 20, at 475–76.
96 See Australia – Salmon, supra note 89, ¶ 199.
The Appellate Body also
considered that the SPS Agreement also implied an “obligation” of WTO members
to disclose their ALOP precisely. Id. ¶ 206. The WHO and FAO Guide
specifies that the determination of an ALOP is critical when the selection of a risk
management option is undertaken. See FAO & WHO GUIDE, supra note 2, at 29–
31.
97 MATSUSHITA ET AL., supra note 20, at 486 (citing Appellate Body’s ruling on
Australian Salmon).
98 SPS Agreement, supra note 5, arts. 5.5, 5.6.
99 See Appellate Body Report, EC – Hormones, supra note 46, ¶ 124 (recognizing
that Article 5.7 reflects the idea of precaution without confirming whether it is a
principle or an approach).
91
92
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The CPTPP/SPS Chapter continues to extend certain
regulatory autonomy to parties relating to risk management. It
affirms the right of parties to establish their ALOP 100 and preserves
the right to implement SPS measures on a provisional basis. 101
Concerning the obligations of parties conducting risk management,
apart from reiterating the non-discrimination principle, the SPS
adds, most notably, a procedural mandate requiring that risk
management be conducted in a documented manner.
The SPS Chapter defines risk management as “the
weighing of policy alternatives in light of the results of risk
assessment and, if required, selecting and implementing appropriate
control options, including regulatory measures.” 102 This definition
is quite similar to the general understanding of risk management
found in the European General Food Law 103 and WHO/FAO
documents alike. 104
The SPS Chapter contributes to the legalization of risk
management by incorporating international institutions’ efforts
relating to risk management. For example, the WHO and FAO
produced a guidance document for helping national food safety
This
authorities to establish their risk analysis regime. 105
document provides a generic four-step framework for risk
management: (i) preliminary risk management activities; (ii)
identification and selection of risk management options; (iii)
implementation; and (iv) monitoring and review. 106 The CPTPP
parties are required to “take into account” such arrangements. 107
The framework remains non-binding on parties, 108 but its
incorporation to some extent may compel the revamping of national
regulatory structures. Building a regime and framework not only
requires rule-making and legislative efforts but also demands
substantial expertise, management skills, financial resources, and
capacity-building. The attempt to push the modernization of risk
CPTPP, supra note 18, art. 7.9, ¶ 3(a).
Id. art. 7.9, ¶ 3(c).
102 Id. art. 7.9, ¶ 2.
103 European General Food Law, supra note 3, art. 3, ¶ 12.
104 FAO & WHO GUIDE, supra note 2, at 7.
105 See id.
106 Id. at 11, 15–35.
107 CPTPP, supra note 18, art. 7.9, ¶ 6(a) (emphasis added).
108 See FAO & WHO GUIDE, supra note 2, at xii (The Guide “provides essential
background information, guidance and practical examples of ways to apply food
safety risk analysis.”) Since the Guide is not of treaty format, it is not binding on
nations per se.
100
101
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management systems is indicative of the CPTPP’s ambition to set a
new model for RTAs.
The SPS Chapter also requires parties to “consider” and
“select” risk management options that are not more trade restrictive
than necessary to achieve their ALOP and SPS objectives. 109 The
CPTPP text seems quite similar to that of WTO/SPS 110 and
reaffirms the principles of necessity and proportionality. 111
Nonetheless, the arrangement literally reflects the WHO and FAO’s
procedure for deciding among risk management options, which
involves a dynamic process of identification, evaluation, and
selection of risk management options. 112 As mentioned, the SPS
Chapter, like the WTO SPS Agreement, reaffirms the right of
parties to determine their ALOP; however, both texts fail to clearly
describe how ALOP can fairly function. By requiring the CPTPP
parties to consider international guidelines, the WHO and FAO’s
arrangements may help optimize competent national regimes.
When considering and selecting policy options, national
authorities are normally expected to determine which level of
protection is ideal and suitable for addressing specific food safety
issues and risks. The work of the WHO and FAO has helped to
clarify the status of ALOP by underscoring that “[t]he concept of
ALOP . . . is essential in establishing the linkage between risk
management actions and the level of consumer health protection
achieved.” 113 It also provides that “[a] range of tools or
approaches are available to the risk manager in bridging between
practical control measures and [the] level of consumer health
protection.” 114 With the availability of a clearer road map on
which regulatory regimes can be based, the predictability and
transparency of the process can be enhanced.
Overall, the influence of the international guidelines over
the establishment of national regimes cannot be overemphasized.
The original voluntary nature of these guidelines has to some extent
CPTPP, supra note 18, art. 7.9, ¶ 6(b),(c) (emphasis added).
SPS Agreement, supra note 5, art. 5.6.
111 Id.
112 FAO & WHO GUIDE, supra note 2, at 24–33 (“Harmonized and transparent
application of a RMF to identify and select risk management options in different
countries should significantly advance the goal of preventing unjustified and unfair
restrictions in the international trading of food.”)
113 Id. at 30.
114 Id.
109
110
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been hardened by the CPTPP. However, it remains to be seen
whether the requirements will limit the parties’ regulatory space in
constructing their own best regimes per respective risk perceptions.
Thus, the one-size-fits-all approach may continue to be of concern
for its legitimacy.
iv.

Risk Communication

The SPS Chapter defines risk communication as “the
exchange of information and opinions concerning risk and
risk-related factors between risk assessors, risk managers,
consumers and other interested parties,” which is also in line with
the widely recognized concept. 115 In contrast to its provisions on
risk assessment and risk management, the Chapter does not provide
any specific requirements or obligations for parties to observe in
doing risk communication. 116 Nevertheless, as mentioned, the
SPS Chapter mandates that relevant international documents play a
major role in guiding national risk analysis. 117 According to the
WHO and FAO guidelines, the subject of risk communication
involves multiple stakeholders, including risk assessors, risk
managers, and external participants. 118 Food authorities expect to
form a unit with specialists responsible for communication, which
could be integrated into “all phases of risk analysis” by their
regulations. 119 Indeed, many developed countries, including the
CPTPP parties, have already implemented this task by setting up a
specialized team for communication. 120
The WTO/SPS Agreement did not explicitly stipulate risk
communication nor any requirements for the process. However,
Article 7 of the Agreement concerning transparency is a major
mechanism by which the communication mandate can be
fulfilled. 121 WTO members are required to notify other members
of their SPS measures and to keep them updated concerning

CPTPP, supra note 18, art, 7.1, ¶ 2; see also FAO & WHO GUIDE, supra note 2,
at 66; see also European General Food Law, supra note 3, art. 3, ¶ 13.
116 See CPTPP, supra note 18.
117 Id. art. 7.9, ¶¶ 2, 6(a).
118 FAO & WHO GUIDE, supra note 2, at 66.
119 Id. (emphasis added).
120 For example, the Japan Food Safety Commission is composed of seven
commissioners, including one who has expertise in risk communication. See, e.g.,
FOOD SAFETY COMMISSION OF JAPAN, fsc.go.jp/english/aboutus/members_com.html
(last visited Oct. 25, 2019).
121 SPS Agreement, supra note 5, art. 7.
115
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newly-implemented regulations. 122
Annex B, regarding
transparency in the WTO/SPS Agreement, provides a more detailed
process for communicating information. 123
Achieving greater transparency in the decision-making
process has become a commonly-pursued agenda in current
RTA/FTA negotiations. Both the CETA 124 and EPA 125 aimed to
improve the quality of transparency for SPS measures. In terms of
trade in agricultural products, the deficiency of transparency that
constitutes a type of NTB has more direct and stronger effects than
a tariff does. 126 Thus, the efforts of the RTA were acclaimed
because they were credited with “introducing new obligations that
strengthen the ex-ante and ex-post transparency requirements
related to the design and application of standards and establishing
improved web-based information systems and consultation
processes that include interested foreign parties.” 127
In line with the developments, the CPTPP SPS Chapter
elaborates and enhances the level and contingency of
transparency. 128 An apparent discrepancy between the WTO SPS
arrangement and that of the CPTPP is that the former largely entails
one-way communication from national authorities to other
members, whereas the latter strengthens mutual understanding and
information exchange among governments and relevant
stakeholders.
The CPTPP Chapter also endeavors to improve the notice
and comment procedure, which may strengthen the input of
outward advice. The attempt reflects the administrative practice 129
of the U.S. and was one of the main negotiation pieces put forward
The Chapter provides more stringent
by the country. 130
requirements on the time for comments and how the parties
proposing SPS measures shall interact with their counter-parties.
122
123
124
125

17.

See id.
See id. Annex B.
CETA, supra note 8, ch. 5, arts. 5.11–5.12.
Economic Partnership Agreement, supra note 8, ch. 6, arts. 6.11, 6.12, 6.15; ch.

See Ash & Lejarraga, supra note 22, at 80–81.
Id. at 80.
128 CPTPP, supra note 18, art. 7.13.
129 Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 553 (2016); see also Wagner, supra
note 29, at 464–65 (discussing the merits and problems of incorporating such a
practice).
130 See JOHNSON, supra note 28.
126
127
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The WTO/SPS Agreement only requires a “reasonable” time for
members to make comments. 131 By contrast, the SPS Chapter
specifies a fixed time of at least 60 days. 132
The methods of discussion and communication among
parties under the CPTPP arrangements are relatively more proactive
than reactive. 133 The required exchanges are more comprehensive
and meaningful. WTO members must “discuss these comments
upon request, and take the comments and the results of the
discussions into account.” 134 The SPS Chapter strengthens the
interaction by adding that “on request of another Party, the Party
shall respond to the written comments of the other Party in an
Because the SPS Agreement only
appropriate manner.” 135
requires members to exchange opinions on “comments,” the
content of the discussion has also been elaborated in the Chapter to
include “any scientific or trade concerns” raised by other parties
and “the availability of alternative, less trade-restrictive approaches
for achieving the objectives of the measure.” 136
If parties’ SPS measures are not in conformance with
international standards, the SPS Chapter furthers the scope and
content of the notification. These countries are obliged to provide
more thorough information, which has not been specified under the
WTO agreement, such as documented and objective scientific
evidence. 137
The SPS Agreement only suggests that WTO “members”
can benefit from the merit of transparency. 138 The CPTPP in
particular aims to ensure that the general public is entitled to access
the information in question, including the proposed measure, the
legal basis for the measure, and the written comments received by
the party. 139 Therefore, if implemented appropriately, the design
may help promote the realization of democratic decision-making by
SPS Agreement, supra note 5, Annex B, ¶ 5(d).
CPTPP, supra note 18, art. 7.13, ¶ 4.
133 Ragnar E. Lofstedt, Risk versus Hazard—How to Regulate in the 21st Century,
2 EUR. J. RISK REG. 149, 166-67 (2011) (describing how proactive risk
communication can achieve better public trust compared to reactive
communication).
134 SPS Agreement, supra note 5, Annex B, ¶ 5(d).
135 CPTPP, supra note 18, art. 7.13, ¶ 4 (emphasis added).
136 Id. art. 7.13, ¶¶ 4, 7.
137 Id. art. 7.13, ¶ 6.
138 SPS Agreement, supra note 5, Annex B, ¶¶ 5, 6.
139 CPTPP, supra note 18, art. 7.13, ¶ 5.
131
132
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bound parties.
The CPTPP’s approach is not entirely novel, but rather,
reflects international and certain national practices. Nevertheless,
its progressiveness distinctive from the WTO SPS Agreement is
quite obvious and meaningful. The policy that places parties’
trading partners, interested persons, and the general public in
beneficial positions may result in a more open, reasonable,
non-arbitrary, and democratic decision-making process.
IV.

Problems and Challenges with Implementing the
SPS-Plus Requirements

The SPS Chapter exhibits a strong intent to incorporate a
risk analysis regime into national SPS regulations. Requiring the
provision of solid scientific evidence to justify their measures could
impose considerable burdens on less developed countries. Some
of them may face difficulties in accessing the necessary science and
technology. They may not be able to comprehend recent relevant
data. It seems too onerous to expect them to have the same level
of science and technology rigor as those CPTPP-developed parties.
Given these scientific gaps, the implementation problem cannot be
ignored.
Many CPTPP parties that are strong in agricultural exports,
such as New Zealand, Canada, and Australia, would benefit from
importing countries making a real commitment to and enforcing
science-based SPS measures. These developed countries have
already established relatively sound risk analysis regimes 140 and
may have no trouble implementing the mandate. 141 Japan, which
For example, Health Canada’s Food Directorate has a mandated responsibility
to perform health risk assessments in response to requests from the Canadian Food
Inspection Agency as laid out in the Memoranda of Understanding and Agreements
between Health Canada and the Canadian Food Inspection Agency. See, e.g.,
About Health Canada, GOV’T OF CANADA, https://www.canada.ca/en/health-canad
a/corporate/about-health-canada/branches-agencies/health-products-food-branch/fo
od-directorate.html.
141 The New Zealand government stated that “nothing in the SPS Chapter would
require New Zealand to change our approach to protecting human health,
maintaining food safety, and protecting New Zealand’s animal and plant health
status from pests and diseases. As a result, there are no disadvantages to New
Zealand entering CPTPP from an SPS perspective.” See, e.g., N.Z. FOREIGN
AFFAIRS & TRADE, COMPREHENSIVE AND PROGRESSIVE AGREEMENT FOR
TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP NATIONAL INTEREST ANALYSIS 33 (2018),
https://www.mfat.govt.nz/assets/CPTPP/CPTPP-Final-National-Interest-Analysis8-March.pdf.
140
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has tended to fill the leadership vacuum caused by the departure of
the U.S., has confidence in ensuring compliance with the risk
analysis standards. 142
Achieving the sound operation of a risk analysis regime
always involves a costly and time-consuming process of capacity
building. Many less developed countries in this region may face
hurdles in overcoming the challenges. Moreover, some competent
national food safety regimes have yet to mature. 143 If little or no
sound science can be produced to justify trade restrictions, these
importing countries have little choice but to adhere to international
standards 144 that may not always accommodate their specific
public health concerns. The high standard of the CPTPP may also
dissuade countries from seeking accession to the agreement if the
cost of compromising their policy freedom proves unaffordable. 145
All parties should work together to mitigate the problem of
“technoimperialism,” that seeks to impose the high standards of
developed countries upon less developed countries without
meaningful input from the latter. 146 Assisting these countries in
adapting to the stricter regulatory requirements is also indispensable.
International regulatory cooperation can play a critical role in
promoting coherence and harmonization of regulations and
practices among parties. 147 Regarding risk assessment, regulatory
cooperation can cover “dialogue, information sharing, and scientific
fact-finding” and be fulfilled “by examining the science behind
various regulatory approaches and determining which approach
aligns with prevailing scientific knowledge.” 148 Given that risk
management is a relatively subjective process involving
Interview with Japanese officials responsible for food safety on September 6,
2016 (on file with the author).
143 According to the USDA’s study, Vietnam’s “regulatory and food safety regime
is still in its infancy and testing agencies are limited, leading to inconsistent
enforcement which adds to uncertainty for foreign producers.” See U.S. DEP’T OF
AGRIC., VIETNAM’S AGRI-FOOD SECTOR AND THE TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP 14
(2014), https://www.ers.usda.gov/webdocs/publications/43899/49392_eib130.pdf?
v=0.
144 See CPTPP, supra note 18, art. 7.9, ¶ 2.
145 Despite having signed the CPTPP, it remains unclear whether Malaysia may
eventually ratify the agreement, and this is because the high standards may
constrain its regulatory autonomy. See Martin Khor, Should Malaysia Ratify the
CPTPP Deal?, THE STRAITS TIMES, (Aug. 13, 2018), https://www.straitstimes.com/
asia/se-asia/should-malaysia-ratify-the-cptpp-deal-the-star-columnist?.
146 Marks, supra note 47, at 62–63 (illustrating that TPP may have fostered
technoimperialism).
147 Id. at 14–15.
148 Id. at 45–46.
142
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policy-making, regulatory cooperation may not necessarily be
feasible. 149
The CPTPP does provide mechanisms to facilitate
regulatory cooperation.
The SPS Chapter requires the
establishment of a Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary
Measures. 150 Apart from enhancing the implementation of the
Chapter, this Committee is tasked with promoting cooperation
between parties through which information exchange can occur.
However, the task of engaging in technical assistance and
cooperation projects remains optional. 151 Additionally, the CPTPP
creates a new chapter on regulatory coherence in which regulatory
cooperation and capacity building are given as mandates. 152 A
Committee on Regulatory Coherence will be established 153 to
supervise regulatory cooperation 154 that “may” include
“information exchanges, dialogues or meetings with other Parties
and interested persons, training programmes and relevant assistance,
and other activities between regulatory agencies.” 155 It remains to
be seen whether the soft commitment to technical and other
substantial support can effectively relieve the less developed
countries’ burden.
Overall, the CPTPP’s ambition to optimize national SPS
regulations cannot be fulfilled without genuine collaboration,
experience-sharing, and technological and financial assistance. 156
The full realization of the SPS-plus goals will, to some extent,
depend on the goodwill and actions of the CPTPP parties that
possess sufficient capacities.
V.

Concluding Remarks

The requirement for building a sound risk analysis regime
is indicative of the CPTPP’s pursuit of high standards in food safety
Id. at 45–47.
CPTPP, supra note 18, art. 7.5, ¶ 1.
151 Id. art. 7.5, ¶ 3(e).
152 CPTPP, supra note 18, art. 25.2, ¶¶ 1, 2(e); see also Marks, supra note 47, at
58 (stating that the CPTPP is the first trade agreement to include regulatory
coherence).
153 CPTPP, supra note 18, art. 25.6, ¶ 1.
154 Id. art. 25.6, ¶¶ 2, 4; art. 25.9, ¶¶ 1, 4.
155 Id. art. 25.7, ¶ 1 (emphasis added).
156 See, e.g., Phoenix X. F. Cai, Regulatory Coherence and Standardization
Mechanisms in the Trans-Pacific Partnership, 5 BR. J. AM. LEG. STUDIES 505,
537-38 (2016) (observing that the efforts of capacity building can ensure the
success of regulatory coherence and cooperation).
149
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regulations. The substance of the risk analysis is a blend of WTO
jurisprudence, international standards, and national practices,
especially those of the U.S. Observing how this RTA’s proposed
mechanism may interact with the relevant law-making of the WTO
and thus enable the multilateralization of RTA-plus is appealing. 157
The influence of CPTPP’s model of risk analysis could be strong
upon the parties’ will to cooperate and act in good faith.
This lofty regulatory requirement may not be difficult to
meet for some parties, such as Japan, Australia, and Canada.
However, given the complexity of the system and the necessity for
major capacity building and interdisciplinary professions, it would
be undesirable for less developed countries to be required to attain
the same level as countries that have substantial experience and
practice in this regard.
The requirement of scientific risk assessment does raise the
level for admissible scientific evidence. It would place the science
used by the parties under scrutiny. Nonetheless, the credibility of
scientific findings would not be subject to dispute settlement under
the CPTPP, which can thus reduce the pressure on the parties,
leaving them some leeway vis-à-vis regulatory space and autonomy.
Many Asian countries face the challenge of balancing the
promotion of food trade with the protection of citizens from the
risks engendered by imported food. For example, Korea and
Taiwan have prohibited the import of potentially radioactive foods
from Fukushima, Japan, for many years. Although the food risks
have gradually decreased, those countries are still hesitant to lift the
ban, and this is not necessarily only because of health concerns but
also for social or political reasons. However, if the risk analysis
system can fairly be incorporated into domestic regimes, it may
allow countries to construct a better mechanism that streamlines
decision-making based on scientific evidence and public
participation rather than yields to political interests.
The CPTPP risk analysis approach may provide momentum
to rationalize and democratize national food safety regulatory
regimes. However, it may also restrict importing countries’
autonomy for food regulations, forcing them to stick to mainstream
science-based standards normally evidenced in international
agreements and practice. This article has argued that the extension
See Ash & Lejarraga, supra note 22, at 76–77, 81 (arguing that the trend of
RTA-plus, especially in the agricultural sector, is expected to be multilteralized,
but conceding that it may be subject to political will).

157

2019]

SCIENCE & RISK ANALYSIS IN CPTPP/SPS-PLUS

47

of good faith technical and capacity-building support from
developed parties and full commitments to regulatory cooperation
may alleviate difficulties in compliance.

The Marketing of Self-Care and Alternative Therapies in
the U.S. in 2019: How Industry Stakeholders Appeal to
Consumers’ Perceptions of Novel Food Products and
Additives
Melanie Marie Glover*
Abstract
This article examines the current marketing techniques of
food products and additives in the growing self-care industry in print
and digital formats. It assesses how well consumers understand such
advertising tactics, and what the industry and federal government
agencies are doing (or not doing) to help consumers be mindful and
savvy about their purchase choices. The discussion further
showcases hot-topic food products and additives including CBD,
Kratom, and plant-based meat as examples of both regulatory risk
and opportunity. Lastly, the article advocates a collaborative effort
among federal government agencies (FDA, FTC, USDA, etc.),
industry stakeholders, and the public to help accurately define not
only the risks of food products and additives in the self-care space,
but also the necessary regulations to keep consumers informed and
empowered both in stores and online.
I. Introduction
How consumers understand the messaging around a
consumer good is not a novel issue. 1 For decades, not only the
United States (U.S.) federal and state governments, but also private
industry stakeholders have toiled to protect the consumer from
misleading product messaging. 2 However, given the rise in certain
“natural,” self-care products containing food and other ingestible
* Melanie Glover is in-house legal counsel at a large multinational self-care
consumer goods company in Michigan. Her work focuses on contracts, intellectual
property, advertising, and promotions in the food, beverage, and drug space. B.A.,
Michigan State University; University Degree, Universidad Complutense de
Madrid; J.D., Western Michigan University Thomas M. Cooley Law School; LL.M.
(expected May 2020), Global Food Law, Michigan State University College of Law.
1
See, e.g., Kordel v. United States, 335 U.S. 345, 349 (1948) (deciding issues
surrounding advertising and labeling of consumer goods). See generally Ivan L.
Preston, Reasonable Consumer or Ignorant Consumer? How the FTC Decides, 8 J.
CONSUMER AFF. 131 (1974) (discussing various consumer protection standards).
2
See, e.g., Kordel, 335 U.S. 345 (consumer protection case); see also Jonathan
Stempel, Five More U.S. States sue OxyContin Maker Purdue Pharma Over Opioid
Epidemic, REUTERS (May 16, 2019), https://www.reuters.com (search article title
and select first result); see also Lenny Bernstein, Five More States Take Legal Action
Against Purdue Pharma for Opioid Crisis, WASH. POST, (May 16, 2019),
https://www.washingtonpost.com (search article title and select first result).
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ingredients, that messaging is growing more complex, less
understood, and more easily misconstrued.
Advertising and marketing strategies have hinged for years
on the emotional and social value of food and food-related products,
and their tactics have worked. Devour Tours, a Spanish start-up
company, promotes itself with its values of connecting people to
local culture (Spain, France, Portugal, and Italy) through the
experiences of seeing, tasting, smelling, touching, and devouring
foods and beverages. 3 The Culinaria book series and The Food
Lover’s Handbook are other modern examples of food sold through
authentic cultural lessons and culinary experiences. 4
Even
Starbucks’ business model rests on connecting the consumer to his
or her cup of joe along with comforting encounters with plush sofas
and chairs. 5 Similarly, by helping the consumer understand the
emotional connection between a product and a desirable experience,
marketers of self-care products are testing the waters by adapting
their strategies to remain relevant and competitive, 6 and they are just
getting warmed up.
II. What is the “Self-Care” Industry, and Why is it
Exploding?
The self-care industry is booming. 7 In a time of everincreasing healthcare costs, 8 consumers prefer more options and
3
Devour Tours, The Story Behind Devour Tours, YOUTUBE (Mar. 1, 2017),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ycoy68dwYls.
4
See generally MARION TRUTTER, CULINARIA SPAIN: A CELEBRATION OF FOOD AND
TRADITION (2015) (a unique cookbook that offers cultural lessons with glimpses into
various Spanish cooks’ recipes and meal preparations through their personal and
family stories in Spain); JODI ETTENBERG, THE FOOD TRAVELER’S HANDBOOK (Full
Flight Press, 2012) (a former lawyer and current food guru’s journey into Asian
cuisine through travel, tourism, and curiosity).
5
Mitch Free, Apple, Starbucks Sell Experiences, Not Products, THE STREET (May
20, 2010), https://www.thestreet.com/story/12806098/1/apple-starbucks-sell-experi
ences-not-products.html.
6
IRi, Taking Charge: Consumers Grabbing Hold of their Health and Wellness
Drives $450-Billion Opportunity, 9 (Nov. 2018), https://www.iriworldwide.com/IR
I/Media/Library/Publications/IRI_Self_Care_POV.pdf;
Michele
Parmelee,
Deloitte’s Global Millennial Survey: Exploring a “Generation Disrupted,” FORBES
(May 20, 2019), https://www.forbes.com/sites/deloitte/2019/05/20/deloitte-globalsmillennial-survey-is-full-of-surprises-not-necessarily-the-good-kind/#64d15874bc
6a.
7
See e.g., IRi, supra note 6, at 9; Erik Sherman, U.S. Health Care Costs Skyrocketed
to $3.65 Trillion in 2018, FORTUNE, (Feb. 21, 2019), https://fortune.com/2019/02/2
1/us-health-care-costs-2/; Neil Lister Interview: Self Care Champion, PAGB (June
17, 2019), https://www.pagb.co.uk/about-pagb/self-care-champion-p3-lister/.
8
Christopher Cheney, Analysis: Doctor’s Prescriptions for America’s Broken
Healthcare System, HEALTHLEADERS, (July 18, 2019), https://www.healthleadersm
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alternatives to manage their own health. 9 “Self-care” means those
“decisions people make or activities they participate in to ensure
health and wellness for themselves and their families.” 10 Self-care
refers to the accumulated habits, benefits, and solutions that
consumers implement themselves over time; in this way, self-care is
preventive medicine, and it can cost less than prescription drugs for
treatment. 11 Over-the-counter remedies are chief examples of such
self-care products that consumers can control for themselves.
“Alternative therapy,” the use of homeopathic products and other athome remedies that tout themselves as being gentler for the human
body, is another such example. 12
Consumers nowadays also have access to more information
than ever, and they are using it to explore self-care and alternative
therapies to better control their well-being. Examples of trendy selfcare consumer goods include: products marketed as “natural,”
“chemical free,” lifestyle products, probiotics, vaping technologies,
cannabidiol (“CBD”), food additives, dietary supplements, vitamins,
nasal sprays, personal hygiene products, sleep remedies, body
scrubs, skin care and other topical remedies, suntan products, oral
care products, etc. 13 The plethora of self-care, over-the-counter
edia.com/clinical-care/doctors-prescriptions-americas-broken-healthcare-system;
see also Steven Porter, Analysis: Azar and Verma: Competition, Value-Based
Models Needed to Fix Our Cost Problem, HEALTHLEADERS, (July 23, 2019),
https://www.healthleadersmedia.com/strategy/azar-and-verma-competition-valuebased-models-needed-fix-our-cost-problem.
9
IRi, supra note 6, at 2.
10
Id. at 1.
11
Id. at 3.
12
Id. at 2.
13
See IRi, supra note 6, at 6–7. A few examples of self-care consumer goods
marketed in these ways include products found at the following websites: FOREST
CENTER HERBS, https://forestcenterherbs.com (last visited Nov. 8, 2019); THRIVE
MARKET, https://www.thrivemarket.com (last visited Nov. 8, 2019); SWANSON
VITAMINS, https://www.swansonvitamins.com (last visited Nov. 8, 2019). Other
“natural” self-care product examples include Land O’Lakes All-Natural Eggs, JIF
Natural Creamy Peanut Butter, Seventh Generation Natural Laundry Detergent,
Frito Lay Natural Cheetos White Cheddar Cheese Puffs, Neutrogena Naturals
skincare products, Aveeno Active Naturals skincare products, Orville
Redenbacher’s Naturals–Simply Salted Popcorn, and Hillshire Farm Naturals No
Antibiotics Ever Slow Roasted Turkey Breast.
See LAND O’LAKES,
https://www.landolakes.com/products/eggs/ (last visited Nov. 10, 2019); THE J.M.
SMUCKER COMPANY, https://www.jif.com/products/peanut-butter/natural-creamypeanut-butter (last visited Nov. 10, 2019); SEVENTH GENERATION,
https://www.seventhgeneration.com/laundry-detergent-free-clear (last visited Nov.
10, 2019); FRITO LAY, https://www.fritolay.com/products/simply-cheetos-puffswhite-cheddar-cheese-flavored-snacks (last visited Nov. 10, 2019); NEUTROGENA,
https://www.neutrogena.com/naturals.html (last visited Nov. 10, 2019); AVEENO,
https://www.aveeno.com (last visited Nov. 10, 2019); ORVILLE REDENBACHER,
https://www.orville.com/naturals-simply-salted (last visited Nov. 10, 2019);
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options available is giving consumers a lot of reasons not to visit the
doctor for a prescription. 14
Digital health resources, online medical advice and e-visits,
and personalized electronic marketing strategies are also emerging
offerings in the self-care space due to consumer demand for
convenience and the rise in online retailers marketing specialty,
“more natural” consumables that are easily accessible for
consumers. 15 Burt’s Bees, the Honest Company, and other wellness
companies are convincing consumers that their more “natural”
products will help consumers feel better in their daily lives. 16 The
social media marketing of food and food-related products is also a
hot topic among lawyers and legal professionals attempting to
understand the current advertising landscape for such products. 17
The rising self-care industry has developed slogans such as “Gen
Well,” 18 “better for me” products and therapies, 19 and “free from
[insert a chemical or ingredient].” Self-care and alternative therapies
are available anytime to consumers digitally or over-the-counter in
retail stores. Moving forward, the industry may develop even further
HILLSHIRE FARM, https://www.hillshirefarm.com/products/deli-meat/naturals-slowroasted-turkey-breast (last visited Nov. 10, 2019).
14
IRi, supra note 6, at 1 (stating that 47% of millennials and 41% of Gen Xers avoid
visiting the doctor).
15
See, e.g., Digital Health Research Resources, UNIV. OF CAL. SAN FRANCISCO RES.
CONSULTATION, CLINICAL & TRANSITIONAL SCIENCE INSTITUTE, https://consult.ucsf
.edu/guidance/digital-health (last visited Nov. 3, 2019); IRi, supra note 6, at 1; see
also Serra J. Schlanger & Rachael E. Hunt, Telemedicine, Understanding the FDA’s
Role in Recent Regulatory and Enforcement Actions, COMPLIANCE TODAY (July
2019), https://compliancecosmos.org/telemedicine-understanding-fdas-role-recentregulatory-and-enforcement-actions?authkey=410f81ecc4545f0d3d381cf44ac4529
e69301e2ed123864ba2e129e2c38feec.
16
See BURT’S BEES, https://www.burtsbees.com/content/ingredients-1/ (last visited
Nov. 5, 2019) (stating on each individual ingredient page that the ingredient is
“[g]ood for you, naturally”); Ahiza Garcia, The Skincare Industry Is Booming,
Fueled by Informed Consumers and Social Media, CNN (May 10, 2019, 11:30 AM),
https://www.cnn.com/2019/05/10/business/skincare-industry-trends-beauty-socialmedia/index.html; see also A ‘Natural’ Rise in Sustainability Around the World,
NIELSEN (Jan. 10, 2019), https://www.nielsen.com/us/en/insights/article/2019/anatural-rise-in-sustainability-around-the-world/.
17
For example, the Food and Drug Law Institute hosted a conference in September,
2019 about label claims and substantiation, plant-based food products, and social
media marketing. FOOD AND DRUG LAW INST., https://www.fdli.org/2019/09/foodadvertising-labeling-and-litigation-conference/ (last visited Nov. 10, 2019).
18
See Katie Nermoe, Millenials: The ‘Wellness Generation’ (Sept. 12, 2018),
https://news.sanfordhealth.org (when you access the site, search “Wellness
Generation” in the search bar at the top right where it says, “What can we help you
find?”; the first option will be the article by Katie Nermoe); GENWELL PROJECT,
https://genwellproject.org/ (last visited Nov. 7, 2019).
19
IRi, supra note 6, at 2.
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ways to access these products. Still further, there has been an
increase in recent years in the use of smart phone applications and
personal counting devices, which range from watches to fitness
bracelets, constantly measuring and storing data about an
individual’s state of health. 20
Despite the interrelated yet competing interests and novelty
of this social, business, and medical phenomenon, self-care and
alternative therapies may genuinely help provide wellness solutions
for consumers’ health issues. 21 Consumers are seriously interested
in greater self-management of their health conditions using products
that empower them to proactively prevent or help treat health
conditions. 22
Even given their growing enthusiasm for the self-care
industry, however, consumers should be skeptical because many
questions remain unanswered. These questions include but are not
limited to: what does the product regulatory/consumer goods
industry understand to be a “self-care” remedy or product; what is
the “reasonable consumer” standard for understanding the marketing
around a product;23 are food products, dietary supplements, and other
alternative therapies marketed differently nowadays than their
counterparts were a decade or more ago; and what impact does this
have on consumers’ purchases? Additional industry-specific
questions include: do industry stakeholders/food producers/dietary
supplement manufacturers need to market differently new food, food
additives, dietary supplements, and alternative therapies consumed
Id; Christopher Lane, Digital Health and the Rise of Mental Health Apps,
PSYCHOLOGY TODAY (Aug. 11, 2018), https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/s
ide-effects/201808/digital-health-and-the-rise-mental-health-apps.
21
See, e.g., Douglas Mann, et al., Integrating Complementary & Alternative
Therapies with Conventional Care, in THE CONVERGENCE OF COMPLEMENTARY,
ALTERNATIVE, & CONVENTIONAL HEALTH CARE: EDUCATIONAL RESOURCES FOR
HEALTH PROFESSIONALS, 8–10 (Sheila N. Thomas ed., 2004), https://www.med.unc
.edu/phyrehab/pim/files/2018/03/Integrating.pdf.
22
See, e.g., The Reis Group, Survey Finds Patients Want More Guidance from
Physicians on Self-Care, EUREKALERT! (July 23, 2019), https://www.eurekalert.org
/pub_releases/2019-07/trg-sfp072219.php; GRAND VIEW RESEARCH, U.S. NATURAL
PERSONAL CARE MARKET SIZE, SHARE & TRENDS ANALYSIS REPORT BY PRODUCT
(SKIN CARE, HAIR CARE, ORAL CARE), BY DEMOGRAPHY (BABY, MIDDLE-AGED
ADULTS, YOUNG ADULTS), AND SEGMENT FORECASTS, 2019-2025 (Feb. 2019),
https://www.grandviewresearch.com/industry-analysis/us-natural-personal-care-m
arket.
23
FED. TRADE COMM’N, ADVERTISING FAQ’S: A GUIDE FOR SMALL BUSINESS,
https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/business-center/guidance/advertising-faqs-guidesmall-business (last visited Nov. 7, 2019) (stating that the “reasonable consumer” is
the “typical person looking at the ad” and that the ad will be viewed “in context–
words, phrases, and pictures–to determine what it conveys to consumers”).
20
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by humans (given the novel and nuanced nature of these products,
the rising self-care and wellness industry, and the online selling of
consumable food products and dietary supplements);24 does online
selling and consumers’ increased access to food products, dietary
supplements, and other alternative therapies present increased risks
to consumers such that the marketing of these products needs to use
more careful, precise, and transparent messaging and positioning;
and do consumers understand the health risks and benefits of food
products, food additives, dietary supplements, and alternative
therapies sold online as well as they understand the same storebought or traditional retailer-sold products? 25 Finally, what is the
role of technology in relation to these self-care products (e.g. digital
health, artificial intelligence, and online selling of self-care products)
(e.g. public accessibility to food products and product descriptions
and reviews as advertisements), and is the product for sale a food or
a drug, and if both, how should it be regulated? 26 These questions
See generally Vivekanand Sharma et al., Identifying Complementary and
Alternative Medicine Usage Information from Internet Resources: A Systematic
Review, 5 METHODS INF. MED. 322–332, (2016), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc
/articles/PMC4975632 (providing a broad overview of research relating to such
concerns).
25
See Why Are Complementary and Alternative Therapies Harder to Evaluate? The
Treatments Are Assumed to Be Safe, AMERICAN CANCER SOCIETY,
https://www.cancer.org/treatment/treatments-and-side-effects/complementary-andalternative-medicine/complementary-and-alternative-methods-and-cancer/why-ca
m-is-hard-to-evaluate.html (last visited Nov. 7, 2019) (describing the problems that
arise when alternative therapies such as herbal remedies advertise a product
untruthfully, which poses the question of how companies offering legitimate
alternative therapy options will verify and market their products to consumers); see
also Integrative Medicine: Find Out What Works, MAYO CLINIC,
https://www.mayoclinic.org/tests-procedures/complementary-alternativemedicine/in-depth/alternative-medicine/art-20046087 (last visited Nov. 9, 2019)
(giving guidance to consumers considering the use of alternative therapies and
medicines and warning of potential pitfalls); NAT’L CTR. FOR COMPLEMENTARY AND
INTEGRATIVE HEALTH, DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., FINDING AND
EVALUATING ONLINE RESOURCES, https://nccih.nih.gov/health/webresources#hed2
(last visited Nov. 8, 2019) (addressing the concern that consumers searching for
alternative therapies online may not be able to discern the good from the bad and
offering particular advice for navigating the Internet for alternative therapies).
26
Food and Drug Admin., Scientific Data and Information About Products
Containing Cannabis or Cannabis-Derived Compounds; Public Hearing; Request
for Comments, REGULATIONS.GOV (Apr. 3, 2019), https://www.regulations.gov/doc
ument?D=FDA-2019-N-1482-0001 (explaining that where manufacturers have
added CBD to food products, such products violate the FD&C Act because FDA has
approved CBD as an active ingredient in a drug; this reality highlights the main FDA
concern about how to regulate food products that contain active ingredients in
approved drugs); FDA Warns Company Marketing Unapproved Cannabidiol
Products with Unsubstantiated Claims to Treat Cancer, Alzheimer’s Disease,
Opioid Withdrawal, Pain and Pet Anxiety, FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN. (July 23, 2019),
https://www.fda.gov/news-events/press-announcements/fda-warns-company-mark
24
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help shape the scope of the trending and lingering debate about
government regulation over certain food-drug hybrid products, and
the evaluation is just beginning.
III. Is There a Standard Level of Understanding that
May Apply to All Consumers?
The Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) is the leading
authority on the reasonable consumer standard. 27 According to the
FTC, a reasonable consumer is a typical one.28 In cases of
advertising uncertainty, the FTC focuses its analysis on whether the
advertisement would have misled or deceived a reasonable,
unsophisticated consumer. 29 For example, in the context of the
FTC’s recent enforcement action against Amazon for misleading inapp purchases directed at children, the FTC reminded advertisers that
“under the FTC Act, it’s wise to view your transactions from the
perspective of a reasonable consumer, not a customer already
familiar with your products and billing practices.” 30
One consumer-friendly marketing technique that self-care
companies are using involves creating product packaging that
resembles a food or beverage product to demonstrate more natural,
less-processed benefits to human health. 31 A second marketing
technique is personalization and customization to comply with
consumers’ preferences by using consumer insights research. 32 Still
another technique “embrace[s] wellness-focused lifestyles” or
experiences (e.g. rock-climbing and dancing, eating whole foods,
etc.). 33 Finally, there is the convenience and efficiency of online
nutritional counseling and medical and health-related advice. 34 These
eting-unapproved-cannabidiol-products-unsubstantiated-claims-treat-cancer; FDA
Warns 15 Companies for Illegally Selling Various Products Containing Cannabidiol
as Agency Details Safety Concerns, FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN. (Nov. 25, 2019),
https://www.fda.gov/news-events/press-announcements/fda-warns-15-companiesillegally-selling-various-products-containing-cannabidiol-agency-details
(announcing that FDA sent warning letters to 15 companies challenging their sales
of CBD-infused dietary supplements and human and animal foods).
27
Preston, supra note 1.
28
Down…But Not Out: Advert. and Labeling of Feather Down, FED. TRADE
COMM’N (Mar. 2019), https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/business-center/guidance/do
wnbut-not-out-advertising-labeling-feather-down-0.
29
Id.
30
Lesley Fair, 7 Quotes of Note from the Amazon Decision, FED. TRADE COMM’N
(May 3, 2016, 12:23 PM), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/blogs/business-blog/20
16/05/7-quotes-note-amazon-decision.
31
IRi, supra note 6, at 8–9.
32
Id. at 10–11.
33
Id. at 5, 7.
34
Id. at 11.
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techniques are among the more positive, less misleading ones. The
deception, however, lies in the claims–both explicit and implicit–of
health-related consumer goods products.
IV. What is the Regulatory Framework for FoodRelated Health Claims?
The Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) regulates three
types of health claims. 35 The first is nutrient content claims, which
characterize the level of nutrients in a food (e.g. “high,” “low,” or
“free of” fats, sodium, and other nutrients). 36 The second type of
claims the FDA regulates are “structure-function” claims, which tell
a consumer how beneficial a product could be for their health (e.g.
“calcium builds strong bones”). 37 The third type of claims are
qualified health claims. 38 Qualified health claims include statements
about how certain food products may reduce the risk of disease or
other health-related conditions (e.g. products claiming they can
lower the consumer’s chance of heart disease or cholesterol levels). 39
The issue with food products and additives today is that their
accompanying claims may fall into two or more of these areas. This
reality challenges the FDA’s current framework of regulating drug
messaging or drugs positioned as foods because: what if the product
is or could be both?
V. What are Today’s Popular Food Products and
Additives, and How are they Advertised?
The current commercial landscape for food-related products
includes novel products such as plant-based food and food additives
(e.g. meat, milk, mayonnaise, CBD, and other plant-infused
products) that appeal to environment and human health-conscious
consumers whose interests include weight and pain reduction and
management. 40 Marketers for food manufacturers are selling these
products as a healthy, self-care, or euphoric experience by creating a
Label Claims for Conventional Foods and Dietary Supplements FOOD AND DRUG
ADMIN. (June 19, 2018), https://www.fda.gov/food/food-labeling-nutrition/label-cla
ims-conventional-foods-and-dietary-supplements.
36
Id.
37
Id.
38
Id.
39
Id.
40
Heather Kelly, Can the New Vegan Impossible Burger Fool Meat Lovers, CNN
BUS. (Jan. 8, 2019), https://www.cnn.com/2019/01/08/tech/impossible-burger-newrecipe/index.html (quoting David Lipman, Impossible Foods’ Chief Science
Officer); Jordan Valinsky, Tim Horton Will Start Selling Beyond Meat Sandwiches
Across Canada, CNN BUS. (June 12, 2019), https://www.cnn.com/2019/06/12/busi
ness/beyond-meat-tim-hortons/index.html.
35
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message that encourages an emotional or social response from using
or interacting with the product. 41 There is also a market trend toward
inserting plant-based food additives into food or dietary supplements
and using them as an attractive, eye-catching ingredient in other
consumable products. 42 This discussion focuses on these product
categories, but the marketplace is ripe with several other types of
food products and dietary supplements with similar claims issues of
which consumers should beware.
Plant-based products currently in the public and regulatory
eye include CBD, Kratom, and plant-based meat. 43 This paper
discusses how manufacturers and retailers market these plantderived foods and food additives, how consumers understand such
advertisements, and the potential health risks involved. This
discussion ends with a glimpse into the regulatory framework (or
lack thereof) for advertising these products. Finally, the paper sets
forth potential solutions that industry stakeholders, the U.S. federal
government, and consumers can advocate for and implement in the
near future and in the long-term.
A. CBD
Regulatory concern is most prominent in the CBD arena
because CBD is popping up everywhere. 44 Convenience stores,
pharmacies, and even strip malls increasingly boast CBD

Sonia Thompson, 2 Lessons In Inclusive Marketing From KFC and Burger King’s
Popular Launches of Plant Based ‘Meat’, FORBES (Aug 31, 2019, 01:45 PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/soniathompson/2019/08/31/2-lessons-in-inclusive-m
arketing-from-kfc-and-burger-kings-popular-launches-of-plant-based-meat/#57755
b152822.
42
July through August 2019, a drive down Highway I-131 near the downtown Grand
Rapids, Michigan area revealed a large display sponsored by Harvest Health Foods,
a local grocery store chain, with “CBD” displayed in big, bold letters across the
billboard, broadcasting the benefits of CBD. CBD Oil, HARVEST HEALTH FOODS,
https://harvesthealthfoods.com/tags/cbd-oil (last visited Nov. 26, 2019).
43
See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., FDA REGULATION OF CANNABIS AND CANNABISDERIVED PRODUCTS, INCLUDING CANNABIDIOL (CBD) (Oct. 16. 2019),
https://www.fda.gov/news-events/public-health-focus/fda-regulation-cannabis-and
-cannabis-derived-products-including-cannabidiol-cbd [hereinafter U.S. FOOD &
DRUG ADMIN., FDA REGULATION OF CANNABIS]; see also U.S. FOOD & DRUG
ADMIN., FDA AND KRATOM (Sept. 11, 2019), https://www.fda.gov/newsevents/public-health-focus/fda-and-kratom; see also U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
STATEMENT OF POLICY – FOODS DERIVED FROM NEW PLANT VARIETIES (Apr. 29,
2019), https://www.fda.gov/regulatory-information/search-fda-guidance-document
s/statement-policy-foods-derived-new-plant-varieties.
44
See Parija Kavilanz, Suddenly CBD is Everywhere. Here’s What’s Next, CNN
BUS. (Mar. 26, 2019), https://www.cnn.com/2019/03/26/success/cbd-entrepreneurs
/index.html.
41
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inventory. 45 To start, the Cannabis sativa plant comes from the
Cannabaceae plant family, and it contains active chemical
compounds such as delta-9-tetrahydrocannabinol (“THC”) and
CBD. 46 The Federal Controlled Substances Act (“CSA”) has
controlled parts of the plant since 1970 under the drug class
“Marihuana.” 47 “Marihuana” is listed in Schedule I of the CSA
because of the psychoactive effects of THC, and the federal
definition of “Marihuana” is “all parts of the plant Cannabis sativa
L.” 48 The Farm Bill of 2018 legalized the sale of hemp-derived
products while directing the U.S. Department of Agriculture
(“USDA”) to develop regulations clarifying hemp use on a federal
level. 49 The gap, however, arose when Congress stayed silent on the
FDA’s role in regulating products derived from cannabis or hemp
under the Food Drug and Cosmetics Act (“FD&C Act”). Some
industry stakeholders have advocated for Congress to consider
carving out an exception under the “Marihuana” definition to exclude
cannabidiol from its definition like hemp. 50
The wide availability of CBD—evidenced by its various
advertising forms—leads consumers to believe that it is lawful to
purchase and consume. The following photos depict real-life
advertisements of CBD for sale in the West Michigan area.

See Sean Williams, CBD: Coming to Chevron, Shell, ARCO, BP, Sunoco, or 76
Station Near You, FOOL (June 14, 2019), https://www.fool.com/investing/2019/06/1
4/cbd-coming-to-a-chevron-shell-arco-bp-sunoco-or-76.aspx; see also Sean
Williams, This CBD Stock is Quietly Becoming a Retail Giant, FOOL (July 13, 2019),
https://www.fool.com/investing/2019/07/13/this-cbd-stock-is-quietly-becoming-aretail-giant.aspx.
46
See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., FDA REGULATION OF CANNABIS, supra note 43.
47
21 U.S.C. § 802(16)(A) (2019).
48
Id.
49
7 U.S.C § 5940 (2019).
50
21 U.S.C. § 802(16)(B)(i) (2019); Sarah Sorscher, Deputy Dir. of Regulatory
Affairs, Ctr. for Sci. in the Pub. Interest, Presentation at the FDLI Annual
Conference: Marijuana, CBD, and Hemp: Understanding the Current Regulatory
Landscape and How it Might Change (May 3, 2019).
45
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Figure 1. CBD Advertisement in a Big Rapids, Michigan Strip
Mall, June 30, 2019. 51

Figure 2. CBD ReThink Display in Allegan, Michigan,
Allegan Community Pharmacy, May 15, 2019.
51
The advertisement disappeared on Sunday, July 7, 2019. Similarly, an online
retailer, Thrive Market, pulled CBD products in June 2019 after its merchant
processor expressed concern over the products’ legal status. In addition, Curaleaf
Inc., a cannabis company, removed health claims about CBD products from its
website after receiving a warning letter from the FDA in July 2019.
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The FDA is focused on the cumulative exposure to CBD
across a broad range of products. This is because edibles may have
a longer delay in onset than inhaled products, difficult to control
dosage, and higher risk of poisoning. 52 The pricing, direct, and
implied claims on a product may also cause confusion for a
consumer. 53 For example, does putting a premium price on a CBD
product suggest or imply a claim that it is valuable for some
specific—albeit unspoken—purpose?
What claims might a
company be making by not saying anything?
The images below represent a fictional advertisement
(although inspired by a real website and company) 54 of CBD claims
to further illustrate regulatory concerns about its widespread sale.
This exercise demonstrates the expansive range of legal issues
related to explicit and implicit claims involved in the marketing of
an emerging self-care health product like CBD-infused nasal spray.

Figure 3. Fictional CBD Product.
Daniel G. Barrus et al., Tasty THC: Promises and Challenges of Cannabis
Edibles, METHODS REP RTI PRESS (2016), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/artic
les/PMC5260817.
53
Riëtte van Laack, FDA Encourages Food Industry to Use “Best if Used by” Date
for Self-Stable Foods, FDA LAW BLOG (June 4, 2019), http://www.fdalawblog.net/
(search “FDA Encourages Food Industry”).
54
The inspiration for the product can be found at the following website, however,
all claims and copy on the images included in this research paper were created for
educational and discussion purposes: https://hhoutlet.com/products/hemp-cbd-nasal
-spray-new. Graphics by Theresa Fernández, http://www.theresafernandez.com/.
52
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Figure 4. Advertisement of Fictional CBD Product.

The advertisement in Figure 4 showcases a multitude of the
FDA’s concerns about the presence, labeling, and marketing of CBD
as an ingredient in food products, dietary supplements, and
cosmetics. The sale of these products over the Internet adds to the
FDA’s concern for consumers who have little to no opportunity to
interact with a knowledgeable salesperson or health professional;
there is oftentimes no pharmacist available to answer questions
digitally (yet). Unfortunately, the rise in digital health mixed with
novel products means more room for misdiagnoses and human error
in the mismanagement of treatments, prescriptions, and medicine
consumption. The electronic marketing mediums also carry their
own risks inherent to advertising products on the Internet or through
applications;55 the risk for misinterpretation and lack of information
due to the speed at which consumers browse the Internet and scroll
and click through their smart phones increase the likelihood of a
misinformed or underinformed consumer. 56
This product demonstrates the numerous issues that the FDA
and FTC can and should regulate. First, the claim, “Healthy HempMiranda Brookins, Disadvantages of Online Advertising Options, CHRON (Feb. 5,
2019), https://smallbusiness.chron.com/disadvantages-online-advertising-options-1
0212.html.
56
U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., VAPEJOOSE INC. WARNING LETTER, MARCS-CMS
585917 (June 18, 2019), https://www.fda.gov/inspections-compliance-enforcemen
t-and-criminal-investigations/warning-letters/vapejoose-inc-585917-06182019
[hereinafter US. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., VAPEJOOSE LETTER] (explaining that it is the
responsibility of the manufacturer or distributor of the food, drug, or cosmetic “to
ensure that [its] tobacco products and all related labeling and/or advertising on [its]
website[s], on any other websites (including e-commerce, social networking, or
search engine websites), in any other media in which [it] advertise[s], and in any
retail establishments comply with each applicable provision of the FD&C Act and
FDA’s implementing regulations”).
55
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CBD Lavender-Scented Nasal Spray,” is misleading because hemp
and CBD are now regulated differently after the passage of the Farm
Bill of 2018. 57 Likewise, the meaning of “healthy” has not yet been
(re)determined on a federal level despite receiving FDA enforcement
attention;58 therefore, there exists risk of consumer confusion in
using this term. Second, the claims that the CBD can “manage pain,
treat seizures, and prevent the early onset of dementia” are
unapproved drug claims because they convey that the product’s
intended use is to treat or prevent dementia and seizures and
otherwise affect the structure and function of the human body, and
therefore the sentence is misleading. 59 Third, the suggested dose

Scientific Data and Information About Products Containing Cannabis or
Cannabis-Derived Compounds; Public Hearing; Request for Comments, 84 Fed.
Reg. 12, 969 (Apr. 3, 2019) (to be codified at 21 CFR pt. 15) (explaining that the
Farm Bill of 2018 removed hemp from the United States Controlled Substances Act,
which means that cannabis plants and their derivatives with no more than 0.3 percent
delta-9 tetrahydrocannabinol concentration (“THC”) are no longer controlled
substances under United States Federal Law); U.S. FED. TRADE COMM’N, FTC
POL’Y STAREMENT ON DECEPTION, (Oct. 14, 1983), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files
/documents/public_statements/410531/831014deceptionstmt.pdf; U.S. FOOD &
DRUG ADMIN., USE OF THE TERM HEALTHY ON FOOD LABELING (Oct. 22, 2018),
https://www.fda.gov/food/food-labeling-nutrition/use-term-healthy-food-labeling;
U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., WARNING LETTER TO CURALEAF INC., MARCS-CMS
579289 (July 22, 2019), https://www.fda.gov/inspections-compliance-enforcement
-and-criminal-investigations/warning-letters/curaleaf-inc-579289-07222019
(explaining the FDA’s concerns that Curaleaf Inc’s “CBD Lotion,” “CBD PainRelief Patch,” “CBD Tincture,” and “CBD Disposable Vape Pen” products are
unapproved new drugs sold and misbranded in violation of the FD&C Act because
the company included unapproved claims in the advertising related to these products
on its website, and such claims were intended for use in the diagnosis, cure,
mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease and/or intended to affect the structure
or any function of the body); Anna Edney & Craig Giammona, FDA Targets U.S.
Marijuana Leader in CBD Marketing Crackdown, BLOOMBERG (July 23, 2019),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-07-23/fda-targets-u-s-marijuana-l
eader-in-crackdown-on-cbd-marketing.
58
U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., WARNING LETTER TO KIND, LLC (Mar. 17, 2015),
https://www.fda.gov/inspections-compliance-enforcement-and-criminal-investigati
ons/warning-letters/kind-llc-03172015; Angelica LaVito, FDA to Consider What
‘Healthy’ Means and Other Claims Food Companies Can Make, CNBC (Mar. 29,
2018), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/03/29/fda-to-consider-updating-health-claimsfood-manufacturers-can-make.html; Deena Shanker & Anna Edney, FDA to Update
Its Definition of ‘Healthy’ This Summer, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 29, 2019),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-03-29/fda-will-give-definition-ofhealthy-this-summer-gottlieb-says.
59
21 § U.S.C. 321(g)(1) (2012) (stating the definition of “drugs” as intended for use
in the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease and/or because
they are intended to affect the structure or any function of the body); see also Kordel,
335 U.S. 345 (discussing the scope of the Act’s “labeling” definition); see also U.S.
FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., WARNING LETTER TO NUTRAPURE LLC (2019),
https://www.fda.gov/inspections-compliance-enforcement-and-criminal-investigati
57
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states “take as needed.” This statement raises the FDA’s well-known
concern about the efficacy of CBD: how much spray is needed for
the product to “work?” 60 Fourth, the optics of the marijuana leaves
on the nasal spray bottle packaging with lavender accent colors may
make implied claims; in other words, consumers may interpret these
graphics to mean that the nasal spray product contains a
pharmacologically active ingredient or THC, or that it produces some
other psychotropic effect. 61 Fifth, the claim that “nasal delivery
means quick absorption; gummies and capsules can take up to an
hour!” lacks supporting research as of the time of writing this paper.
The FDA’s concerns are with dosage levels due to the various forms
that CBD can be ingested. What if a person consumes both gummies
and a nasal spray within a limited amount of time? How will the
FDA regulate such dosages? Currently, there is no warning about
the effect on the human body of taking CBD in multiple forms, and
the FDA has invited industry stakeholders to conduct and share this
research for increased understanding about CBD’s effects when
combined in various ingestible products. 62 Sixth, the language “read
about our blog post on the therapeutic effects of Healthy Hemp-CBD
Lavender-Scented Nasal Spray HERE” is problematic because the
blog post may contain additional unapproved drug claims or other
misleading language that encourage a consumer to purchase the CBD
product. The question becomes whether the content on the blog
contains additional advertising or labeling about the product due to
the proximity of the link to the product (on the product packaging). 63
ons/warning-letters/nutra-pure-llc-567714-03282019 (demonstrating the FDA’s
enforcement action against a dietary supplements company where the FDA
criticized the company’s claims that CBD could help treat Alzheimer’s disease and
anxiety-related disorders). As of the writing of this paper, FDA has only approved
one cannabis-derived and three cannabis-related drug products. See U.S. FOOD &
DRUG ADMIN., FDA REGULATION OF CANNABIS, supra note 43.
60
Sorscher, supra note 50.
61
Leslie Lake, New Research on CBD Highlights Immense Consumer Confusion
(Oct. 28, 2019),
and Erroneous Assumptions, GROCERY MFRS. ASS’N
https://www.gmaonline.org/news-events/newsroom/new-research-on-cbdhighlights-immense-consumer-confusion-and-erroneous/ (Thirty-nine percent of
Americans “incorrectly believe CBD is just another name for marijuana and more
than half mistakenly think it can get you ‘high.’”).
62
The FDA established a docket for public comment for a notice published on April
3, 2019 to receive comments from industry stakeholders about CBD production,
distribution, and sale. Scientific Data and Information About Products Containing
Cannabis or Cannabis-Derived Compounds; Public Hearing; Request for
Comments, 84 Fed. Reg. 12, 969 (Apr. 3, 2019) (to be codified at 21 CFR pt. 15).
63
The cases, Kordel v. U.S. and U.S. v. 24 Bottles Sterling Vinegar & Honey,
demonstrate the distinction between when material is considered advertising (under
FTC jurisdiction) and when material is considered a label or labelling (under FDA
jurisdiction). Kordel, 335 U.S. at 347–51; U.S. v. 24 Bottles Sterling Vinegar &
Honey, F.2d 157, 158–59 (1964).
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Sellers of such products must be aware that related advertising
material such as a blog post or an online article may be interpreted to
be part of the product labeling and, therefore, subject to FDA
regulations just like traditional product labels. 64 Finally, the “try
other Healthy Hemp products” section featuring other CBD-infused
products creates concerns that (1) these products may have
unapproved drug claim issues, and that (2) the lack of warnings about
the effects on the human body when taking two or more
simultaneously may harm consumers. To address this, in the spring
of 2019, the FDA invited industry stakeholders to submit their
research findings on the effect of various CBD-infused products to
help the FDA begin to understand how these CBD-infused products
may affect humans if ingested together depending on the dosage.
The issue of food fraud, as it relates to the Cannabis plant
and children, is also a risk to consumers that concerns the FDA. 65 A
recent case involving THC-infused gummies (“Stoney Kids,” a
candy in packaging eerily resembling that of the popular candy,
“Sour Patch Kids”) reveals growing anxiety over the marketing of
edibles to children by mimicking common snacks and candies.66
Mondeléz Canada has not only sued the manufacturer of the THCinfused gummies for trademark infringement and dilution; the Sour
Patch Kids manufacturer also alleges that Stoney Kids violates
California’s Medicinal and Adult-Use Cannabis Regulation and
Safety Act because Stoney Kids directly targets children with its
striking resemblance to Sour Patch Kids. 67 The timing of the Stoney
Kids suit is particularly concerning considering the national and
state-level debates occurring over CBD, THC, and related plantderived food additives.
B. Kratom
Yet another ingestible self-care product is Kratom. 68 While
not as much of a household name as CBD arguably is, Kratom is
See Kordel, 335 U.S. at 351; 24 Bottles of Sterling Vinegar & Honey, 338 F.2d at
159.
65
Corinne Gretler, Baby Food Has Too Much Sugar and Is Marketed Wrongly,
WHO Says, BLOOMBERG (July 15, 2019), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles
/2019-07-15/baby-food-has-too-much-sugar-and-is-marketed-wrongly-who-says.
66
Elaine Watson, ‘Virtual knockoff’: Mondelez Canada Warns of Growing Trend
Towards Marketing Edibles by Ripping Off Popular Snacks and Candies, FOOD
NAVIGATOR USA (July 26, 2019), https://www.foodnavigator-usa.com/Article/2019
/07/26/Virtual-knockoff-Mondelez-warns-of-growing-trend-towards-marketing-edi
bles-by-ripping-off-popular-snacks-and-candies.
67
Id.
68
Schedules of Controlled Substances: Temporary Placement of Mitragynine and 7Hydroxmitragynine Into Schedule 1, 81 Fed. Reg. 59,929, 59,930 (proposed Aug.
31, 2016) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 1308).
64
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similar to CBD in that it is underregulated, is for sale online and overthe-counter, 69 has alleged psychotropic and therapeutic effects,
comes from a plant, and can be added to food. Kratom’s scientific
name is Mitragyna Speciosa, derived from a tropical tree indigenous
to Southeast Asia. 70 While Kratom and CBD have different
regulatory histories (as of the writing of this paper, the U.S. Drug
Enforcement Agency has announced its intent to schedule Kratom as
a controlled substance), 71 their similarities are significant. This
means that market and consumer interest in Kratom are just as
concerning as CBD for many of the same reasons. However, Kratom
may deserve more immediate attention from regulators based on
allegations that it can produce euphoric or psychotropic effects
comparable to those that opioids produce in humans. 72 While
consumer-facing efficacy claims about Kratom range from mild to
effective for managing pain, the regulatory dust is far from settling
on Kratom. In an interview with Michigan Public Radio on July 17,
2019, University of Michigan Addiction Treatment Services
psychiatrist, Edward Jouney, warned consumers to “scrutinize the
source” from which Kratom is coming because “this is something
that has the potential to be very powerful” for vulnerable populations
who tend toward addictive behavior. 73 The FDA has also publicly
denounced Kratom, warning consumers that its health impact is not
yet well understood. 74 Like CBD, dosages for Kratom are not yet
well-researched, leaving consumers precariously exposed to likely
unjustified claims.
C. Plant-Based Meat, Mayonnaise, and Milk
CBD and Kratom are not the only products on the market
that concern the FDA and FTC. Plant-based food options—and their
advertising claims—are growing in popularity among healthconscious consumers who are interested in plant-based products due
See, e.g., KRAKEN KRATOM, https://krakenkratom.com/.
Schedules of Controlled Substances, 81 Fed. Reg. at 59,930.
71
Id., at 59,933; DRUG ENF’T ADMIN., DEA Announces Intent to Schedule Kratom,
Press Release (August 30, 2016).
72
See Jennifer Clopton, Regulations Are on Hold as Kratom Debate Rages, WEBMD
(Feb. 11, 2019), https://www.webmd.com/mental-health/addiction/news/20190211/
regulations-are-on-hold-as-kratom-debate-rages.
73
You can buy it in gas stations, but experts warn that the drug Kratom is
unregulated and under-researched. MICH. RADIO NPR (July 17, 2019),
https://michigan.drupal.publicbroadcasting.net/post/stateside-funding-roads-localtaxes-risks-kratom-mi-astronaut-apollo-11s-legacy.
74
Nick Wing, Feds Prepare for a New War on Kratom, an Herbal Drug Many Swear
By, HUFFPOST (Nov. 14, 2017), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/fda-kratom-regulat
ion_n_5a0b465be4b00a6eece4c9e0; FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN., Statement from FDA
Commissioner Scott Gottlieb, M.D. on FDA advisory about deadly risks associated
with kratom, Press Release (Nov. 14, 2017).
69
70
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to their uneasiness with an overreliance on animal food products as
a main source of protein. Consumers are also interested in more
environmentally sustainable practices that use fewer resources, and
plant-based product manufacturers proudly acknowledge this.75
Impossible Foods, Inc. (“Impossible Foods”) is one example of a
company focused on “eliminat[ing] the need for animals in the food
system.”76 To get there, the company has dedicated itself to
“com[ing] up with a plant-based meat that people will actually
choose.” 77
Food labels are also changing, and plant-based meat is a
prime example of this. 78 Changing food labels speak to consumers’
changing attitudes toward food and its ingredients, which are
consistent with their interests in the self-care industry. Consumers
are choosier about their ingredients as they search for “dairy free,”
“gluten free,” “egg free,” “cruelty free,” “fat free,” “hormone free,”
and similar labels. 79 Consumers want to know what is and is not in
their food, but not at the expense of quality and an authentic user
experience. The growing number of “healthy” restaurant options and
food brands demonstrate that consumers continue to care about what
their food looks, smells, and tastes like. 80 Consumers do not want to
75
Impact Report 2019, IMPOSSIBLE FOODS (2019), https://impossiblefoods.com/miss
ion/2019impact/.
76
Kelly, supra note 40 (quoting David Lipman, Impossible Foods’ Chief Science
Officer).
77
Id.
78
See Julia Horowitz, Meatless Farm Breaks into Booming US Market with Whole
Foods Deal, CNN BUS. (June 24, 2019), https://edition.cnn.com/2019/06/24/busines
s/meatless-farm-whole-foods/index.html (explaining via a video, titled “Fake Meat
is the Future. Here’s Why,” that the packaging for plant-based meat is more akin to
that of their real meat counterparts than packaging geared toward vegan or
vegetarian consumers, as well as some concerns around grocery store placement of
plant-based meats); see also Jordan Valinsky & Danielle Wiener-Bronner, America
is Running Out of Impossible Burgers, CNN BUS. (Apr. 30, 2019, 2:47 PM),
https://www.cnn.com/2019/04/30/business/impossible-meat-shortage/index.html;
see also Neil Vigdor, Mission Impossible? Maker of Plant-Based Burger Struggles
to Meet Chains’ Demand, N. Y. TIMES (June 15, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2
019/06/15/business/impossible-foods-burger-demand.html.
79
See Brandon McFadden, ‘Gluten-Free Water’ Shows Absurdity of Trend in
Labeling What’s Absent, OBSERVER (Aug. 31, 2018, 11:29 AM), https://observer.co
m/2017/08/gluten-free-water-shows-absurdity-of-trend-in-labeling-whats-absent-f
ood-safety-regulations-consumers/. A recent example is Palazzolo’s Artisan Dairy
Slushie product, which bears a label containing the words, “No Fake Anything,”
“No Trans Fat,” “No Gluten,” “No Added Hormones,” “No Corn Syrup,” and “No
Dairy or Fake Flavorings.” See Artisan Fruit Slushies, PALAZZOLO’S ARTISAN
DAIRY (2019), https://www.palazzolosdairy.com/products/artisan-fruit-slushies/.
80
See Gary Stern, CoreLife Eatery: A Vegetarian Restaurant Chain That Has
Doubled Its Revenue in One Year, FORBES (Mar. 25, 2019, 12:32 PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/garystern/2019/03/25/corelife-eatery-a-vegetarianrestaurant-chain-whose-revenue-doubled-in-one-year/#2acc04b07bbf.
CoreLife
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ingest red meat, but they still want the experience of eating it. A
recent example is the color additive petition that Impossible Foods
filed and the FDA granted, allowing Impossible Foods to apply soy
leghemoglobin—“plant blood”—to plant-based beef. 81 Despite this,
the FDA and the public are still very much concerned with the
potential impact to human health that plant-based products may
have. 82
Despite market interest, the FDA, USDA, and various food
industry stakeholders have expressed their concerns regarding the
marketing claims surrounding alternative protein food options. 83
The various parties’ interests have culminated in a complex and
sensitive regulatory and commercial framework that supports cellbased meat production: the FDA regulates cell collection and growth
Eatery, Panera Bread, Qdoba, and other food chains are examples of restaurants
advertising “healthier” and “cleaner” food options. See 100% of our food is 100%
clean., PANERA BREAD (2019), https://www.panerabread.com/en-us/articles/100percent-of-our-food-is-100-percent-clean.html; Why Qdoba, QDOBA MEXICAN EATS
(2019), https://www.qdobafranchise.com/why-qdoba.
See generally Leanna
Garfield, 10 Up-and-Coming Healthy Fast Food Chains that Should Scare
McDonald’s, BUS. INSIDER (Feb. 19, 2018, 7:38 AM), https://www.businessinsider.c
om/new-healthy-fast-food-chains-better-than-mcdonalds-2017-2 (listing ten upand-coming food chains advertising as healthy, cleaner food options).
81
Listing of Color Additives Exempt From Certification; Soy Leghemoglobin, 84
Fed. Reg. 37,573, 37,573-74 (Aug. 1, 2019) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 73)
(explaining that Impossible Foods, Inc. filed and the FDA approved a color additive
petition seeking permission for the FDA to consider soy leghemoglobin safe as a
color additive, which would allow Impossible Foods to sell raw imitation beef in
grocery stores); H. Claire Brown, After Plant Blood Gets FDA Approval, the
Impossible Burger is Set to Hit Supermarket Shelves, THE NEW FOOD ECON. (July
31, 2019), https://newfoodeconomy.org/plant-blood-heme-fda-approval-impossible
-burger/.
82
Chase Purdy, Plant-Based Meats Sound Healthy, but They’re Still Processed
Foods, QUARTZ (July 1, 2019), https://qz.com/1655309/beyond-meat-needs-to-com
municate-how-it-makes-its-plant-based-burger; see Press Release, Scott Gottlieb,
Food and Drug Admin. Comm’r, Statement from FDA Commissioner Scott
Gottlieb, M.D., on modernizing standards of identity and the use of dairy names for
plant-based substitutes (Sept. 27, 2018), https://www.fda.gov/news-events/pressannouncements/statement-fda-commissioner-scott-gottlieb-md-modernizing-stand
ards-identity-and-use-dairy-names.
83
Beyond Meat Breaks Down After Consumer Group Warns of Chemicals in Fake
Meat, CNBC (June 21, 2019, 5:37 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/video/2019/06/21/b
eyond-meat-down-after-consumer-group-warns-of-chemicals-in-fake-meat.html?_
source=sharebar%7Ctwitter&par=sharebar (explaining via video one consumer
groups concerns about the health claims from plant-based meat producers); see
Lydia Mulvany & Deena Shanker, Why the ‘Bloody’ Impossible Burger Faces
Another FDA Hurdle, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 26, 2018, 3:00 AM), https://www.bloomb
erg.com/news/articles/2018-12-26/why-the-bloody-impossible-burger-faces-anothe
r-fda-hurdle (discussing the concerns of interested parties about alternative meat
producers’ lack of transparency when applying for FDA approval of “heme,” an
additive in Impossible Foods’ plant-based meat).
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during laboratory processing; the USDA manages the production and
labeling of cell-based meat products developed from livestock and
poultry cells; and food companies market the cell-based meat
products for sale thereafter. 84 One recent news article notes that,
“[w]hile plant-based meat companies are ultimately making
processed foods, their marketing is more in line with natural, organic
offerings.” 85 Indeed, more processing may not equate to being
better-for-you, and in fact, some of these “meatless” products have
come under attack in recent years due to alleged risks associated with
the processing of their products. 86 For example, a consumer
advocacy group, “Moms Across America,” recently attacked
Impossible Foods for allegedly high levels of the herbicide
glyphosate in the burgers. 87
The question present in these marketing efforts is whether
advertising the very food that the product is replacing is misleading
to consumers. 88 A highly-processed food product by its nature is not
grown in the earth, so does it really deserve the title “natural” or
“healthy”? In this way, are consumers really getting the bargain for
their buck with plant-based foods? In the “Just Mayo” case, the FDA
voiced its concerns about misbranding involving Hampton Creek’s
advertising mayonnaise with an image of an egg on the label when
the product was egg-free. 89 The issue was why an egg-free product

See Press Release, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., FDA News Release: USDA and
FDA Announce a Formal Agreement to Regulate Cell-Cultured Food Products from
Cell Lines of Livestock and Poultry (Mar. 7, 2019), https://www.fda.gov/newsevents/press-announcements/usda-and-fda-announce-formal-agreement-regulatecell-cultured-food-products-cell-lines-livestock-and.
85
Purdy, supra note 82.
86
Joseph Mercola, Impossible Burger Attacks Moms for Publishing Pesticide
Results, MERCOLA (June 4, 2019), https://articles.mercola.com/sites/articles/archive
/2019/06/04/impossible-burger-glyphosate-residues.aspx; Tuttie Dedvukaj, Plantbased Burgers May Not Be As Healthy As You Think, FOX BUS. (Aug. 2, 2019),
https://www.foxbusiness.com/personal-finance/plant-based-burgers-may-not-be-as
-healthy-as-you-think.
87
Mercola, supra note 86; see generally Impossible Foods, Inc., The Unofficial
Correction of “Moms Across America” (May 18, 2019), https://assets.ctfassets.net/
hhv516v5f7sj/77NQsg1qDb6d9Hi4PBQA6y/93b2af7c3f12ce2e4050e03a6e0345e
7/Unofficial_Correction_Moms_Across_America_05202019.pdf (responding to
the claims of Moms Across America).
88
Amelia Lucas, Plant-Based Eggs Land Their First Major Fast Food Deal, CNBC
(2019), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/07/25/plant-based-eggs-land-their-first-majorfast-food-deal.html (explaining that plant-based eggs are now showing up at fastfood establishments); Impossible Foods, Inc., What Are the Ingredients? (2019),
https://faq.impossiblefoods.com/hc/en-us/articles/360018937494-What-are-the-ing
redients.
89
Letter from Center for Food Safety and Applied Nutrition, U.S. Food & Drug
Admin., to Joshua Tetrick, Founder and Chief, Hampton Creek Foods, Inc. (Aug.
84
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has an egg on the picture of the label and whether this was confusing
to consumers. 90 Just Mayo subsequently relabeled its packaging by
clarifying that the product was egg-free, and that the product
packaging no longer displays an egg. 91 Similarly, Muscle Milk
revised its labeling to address allegations that arose in private
litigation that its product was misbranded because it did not fit the
standard of milk as consumers understood it, as it contained milk
protein instead of cow’s milk. 92 These cases demonstrate that
consumers should think critically about the advertisements that they
perceive related to certain self-care, plant-based products until the
FDA determines the meaning of certain terms or decides whether to
allow replacement products to advertise the very product that they
are substituting.
VI. How Can Manufacturers, Consumers, and the U.S.
Federal and State Governments Help?
A. Manufacturers
The lack of research, a growing self-care industry,
consumers’ interest in self-treatment, and the rise of alternative
therapies, including food and other ingestible ingredients, strongly
suggest that the FDA has wide latitude to regulate in these spaces and
should provide guidance to industry stakeholders and education and
warnings to consumers. The FDA should also regulate in these fooddrug hybrid spaces in the interest of consumers’ present and future
health. So, what can industry stakeholders do to help ensure that
neither legislative nor executive action creates precedent against
their interests in this space?
Companies promoting novel products do not always follow
the golden rule of advertising, 93 especially in the e-commerce
12, 2015), https://www.fda.gov/inspections-compliance-enforcement-and-criminalinvestigations/warning-letters/hampton-creek-foods-08122015.
90
“Just Mayo” Just Isn’t Warns FDA, FED’N OF AMERICAN SCIENTISTS, (Sept. 14,
2015, 1:10 PM), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/mayo.pdf.
91
Just Mayo, Non-GMO, 12 oz, WALMART (2019), https://www.walmart.com
(search “Just Mayo” and click on 12-oz offering).
92
See generally Andrew Adam Newman, Got Milk? For Sports Drink Maker, Nestlé
Says No, N.Y. TIMES (July 26, 2009), https://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/27/busines
s/media/27adco.html, (giving a brief overview of the petition filed by Nestle in
regards to the labeling of Muscle Milk); see also Muscle Milk Pro Series 40 Protein
Shake, Go Bananas, 14 Oz, WALMART, https://www.walmart.com (search “Muscle
Milk Pro Series 40 Protein Shake”) (showing the Muscle Milk label as now saying
“CONTAINS NO MILK”).
93
Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2012) (stating in Section 5 that
unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce are prohibited and
stating in Section 12 that false advertising that is likely to induce the purchase of
foods, drugs, devices, services, or cosmetics is also prohibited).
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space. 94 Sometimes marketers appear to forget that all advertising
claims must be truthful, accurate, and not misleading or deceptive. 95
They continue to push the envelope with even the most basic of
claims and marketing tactics. Companies can help combat
misleading marketing by not making un- or under-substantiated
claims about their products; they can continue to manufacture their
products according to current good manufacturing practices
(“GMPs”); and they can err on the side of caution when making
claims related to human health to avoid misleading consumers about
products that various stakeholders (the self-help industry, the
government, and consumers) across the country are still getting to
know.
The food and beverage, drug, and cosmetics industries have
a great opportunity to research the health impacts on the human body
of the various alternative therapies and products hitting the market
today, to present scientific-based research studies to the FDA and
industry stakeholders to substantiate their claims and advertisements,
and to advocate for the safest, most effective alternative therapies
and products that emerge from their research. 96 Well-researched
health benefits are far more likely to lead to well-founded product
claims and advertisements than a blank slate of regulatory fear and
inaction. 97 Hybrid food-drug products thus present enormous
opportunity for industry stakeholders to play a role in not only
changing law and policy, but also influencing consumers’
perspectives.
Novel consumer goods products present more risk of
misleading consumers because they fall into areas of regulatory
uncertainty. The FDA’s comfort zones are and have been food,
drugs, and cosmetics, but, as hybrid products have emerged, the FDA
grows weary of–and at times paralyzed over–how crossover products
may interact with each other on the human body and in what
amounts. 98 If consumers do not know what a food or other
consumable product is, how can they make an informed choice
whether to purchase and ingest it? If the U.S. federal and state
governments allow food and other consumable products to be
marketed with names that are potentially misleading about what the
product is, how can consumers know what is good for them?
US. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., VAPEJOOSE LETTER, supra note 56.
Id.
96
Comment Notice, 74 Fed. Reg. 3059 (Jan. 16, 2009).
97
See id.
98
Presentation at the FDLI Annual Conference: Marijuana, CBD, and Hemp:
Understanding the Current Regulatory Landscape and How it Might Change (May
3, 2019).
94
95
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Plentiful options at grocery and convenience stores already daunt
consumers. How much more daunting is grocery shopping when
advertisements for CBD and other un- or under-regulated plantbased products line the aisles and counters with less-than-truthful
claims enticing consumers to “try” a new product? What should
consumers do amid the exploding self-care industry, rising
healthcare costs, and unregulated claims pertaining to ingestible selfcare products? These questions, of course, may not yet have an
answer, but they are worth asking as technology drives consumers
toward more food and related self-care options.
B. Consumers
Consumers must remain vigilant in their analysis. They
should not stop reading labels, researching product manufacturers,
and thinking critically about the print and digital advertising (1) on
product packaging and labels and (2) on websites and in social
media, respectively. The CBD, Kratom, and plant-based product
debates present the lingering question of how much risk it will take
to change the law. Will it take a child eating several CBD-infused
gummies, or something more or less? Underregulated products like
CBD and Kratom pose the risk of food fraud to consumers where the
integrity of the product has not yet been proved. Ms. Fritz warns:
Anyone using CBD should make serious inquiries
into the quality and purity of the product . . .
[S]tudies have shown that many of the CBD oils out
there consist mostly of olive oil or another
alternative oil besides true CBD. Therefore,
consumers should question the quality of the
products they elect to purchase and use. 99
Consumers should be wary of the new ease of click-topurchase transactions. They should continue to do their homework
by consulting multiple reputable sources about such novel self-care
products including food and food additives.

Interview with Koral Fritz, Attorney, Innovative Law Group (July 15, 2019). Ms.
Fritz is a licensed attorney practicing in West Michigan. Her current practice
focuses on providing guidance to business clients on contracts, real estate,
environmental, and litigation matters. Along with a law degree, she also earned her
Master’s degree in Food and Agriculture Law and Policy from the Vermont Law
School. Her experience ranges from working for national nonprofits on food policy
to counseling clients retailing CBD and others interested in growing and marketing
cannabis.
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C. Government
While the FD&C Act widely covers the regulation of food,
drugs, and cosmetics, the FDA has struggled for years with how to
regulate hybrid products that straddle two or more of these
categories. The best, most illustrative example of an opportunity for
industry stakeholders to influence U.S. food and drug law currently
rests with the debate over hemp and hemp-derived products since the
Farm Bill of 2018. 100 This area is ripe for stakeholder discussion and
thought leadership because of manufacturers’ ability to create
products that contain various parts of the plant at varying levels.
Examples are plentiful of manufacturers using CBD as an
ingredient in their food products, dietary supplements, and drugs.101
Examples include CBD-infused gummies, dietary supplements
containing CBD, topical creams and oils containing CBD, CBDinfused nasal sprays, CBD brownies and cookies, etc. 102 The same
is true with Kratom. Due to its powder-like form, Kratom can easily
be added to other products. 103 There is no better time to impact U.S.
food and drug law than now with the rise of these spaces adjacent to
typical food products and dietary supplements. The FDA is begging
the industry to take charge with science-based evidence to
demonstrate substantiated risks and benefits before the FDA will take
a position on CBD, Kratom, and other plant-based ingredients in
food products, dietary supplements, and consumer goods that dip into
both worlds. 104 As in the case of CBD, influencing U.S. food and
drug law is not that difficult. The FDA comment process is all
inclusive and inviting.
However, government indecision has contributed to
marketplace and consumer confusion over CBD. 105 Medical doctor
Peter Grinspoon explains that “the government’s position on CBD is
See Amy Abernethy & Lowell Schiller, FDA Is Committed to Sound, ScienceBased Policy on CBD, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (July 7, 2019), https://www.fda.gov/
news-events/fda-voices-perspectives-fda-leadership-and-experts/fda-committed-so
und-science-based-policy-cbd.
101
There are currently over 9,000 “Health & Household” items listed for sale on
Amazon containing CBD. See AMAZON, https://www.amazon.com/ (type “CBD” in
search bar; then narrow search results to “Health & Household” under
“Department”) (last visited Nov. 10, 2019).
102
Id.
103
Lileana Pearson, Dietary Substitute Kratom Stays in Legal Gray Area, WWOT
NBC 6 OMAHA (July 17, 2019, 5:27 PM), https://www.wowt.com/content/news/Di
etary-substitute-Kratom-stays-in-legal-gray-area-512854091.html.
104
See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., FDA REGULATION OF CANNABIS, supra note 43.
105
See Establishment of a New Drug Code for Marihuana Extract, 81 Fed. Reg.
90194, 90194–96 (Dec. 14, 2016) (responding to public comments of confusion on
the legality of CBD when not combined with cannabinols).
100
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confusing, and depends in part on whether the CBD comes from
hemp or marijuana.” 106 The wide disparity in how law firms and
other legal and compliance professionals and stakeholders position
information about the Farm Bills of 2014 and 2018 and their effect
on hemp and CBD further demonstrates the likelihood for consumer
confusion. Attorney Koral Fritz explains:
The recent popularity of CBD has forced the FDA
to play catch up. As often happens, the market is
ahead of the law . . . [T]he new supply and demand
for these products has led to the FDA holding
hearings with industry stakeholders to develop a
regulatory framework for CBD . . . [M]onths ago[,]
the FDA reiterated the clear position that CBD is not
approved for use in food, however, the agency
basically told the market that it will not be focusing
on enforcement except for when a CBD product
bares a health claim that goes too far. The FDA
seems the most concerned currently with any CBD
product making a qualified health claim. The FDA
has taken enforcement action against companies that
make unfounded, egregious claims about their
products' ability to limit, treat, or cure cancer or
diseases. 107
The FDA has made decisions on hemp seed, hemp oil, and
hemp protein. 108 However, the path forward for the cannabis and
hemp industries depends on the USDA’s and the FDA’s ongoing
efforts to issue guidance and rules for implementation of the 2018
Farm Bill.
Despite the need for FDA guidance with input from the
industry on CBD, Kratom, and other emerging plant-based products,
the FDA could also launch an education campaign to warn
consumers about the dangers of ingesting these products that still
lack research and regulation. 109 While the FDA continues to
Peter Grinspoon, Cannabidiol (CBD) – What We Know And What We Don’t,
HARVARD HEALTH BLOG (Aug. 24, 2018, 6:30 AM), https://www.health.harvard.ed
u/blog/cannabidiol-cbd-what-we-know-and-what-we-dont-2018082414476.
107
Interview with Koral Fritz, supra note 99.
108
U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., FDA RESPONDS TO THREE GRAS NOTICES FOR HEMP
SEED-DERIVED INGREDIENTS FOR USE IN HUMAN FOOD (Dec. 20, 2018),
https://www.fda.gov/food/cfsan-constituent-updates/fda-responds-three-gras-notic
es-hemp-seed-derived-ingredients-use-human-food.
109
To the FDA’s credit, the FDA has issued several public statements about CBD,
warning consumers about its potential effects and promising an industry update in
the near future. See Abernethy & Schiller, supra note 100.
106
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determine the health risks involved with these types of products,
FDA warnings and educational messages could help consumers think
critically about these products before ingesting them. FDA public
statements are helpful, but the FDA should more closely meet
consumers where they are—in the marketplace—to help ensure that
they understand the health risks of not only the plant-based food
additives discussed in this paper, but also those yet to come.
VII. Conclusion
The self-care industry will not slow down to accommodate
for regulatory concern, consumer confusion, or manufacturers’
perfection of their products or processes. The unknown or
misunderstood lurking health risks associated with products
containing un-regulated or under-regulated ingredients will require a
village rather than a single government or consumer advocacy group
to help shield consumers from deceptive advertisements. Where the
marketplace has revealed consumers’ interests, it has also exposed
the need for increased scrutiny from industry, the public, and
government to help ensure that risks to human health are minimal as
such self-care products come available for sale.
Industry influence is at an incredible high to shape the U.S.
legal and regulatory framework for food and drug policy in the selfcare space. The bright spot remains the industry’s opportunity to
influence how the U.S. federal and state governments decide to
regulate the products that entice consumers due to their potential
therapeutic effects as well as consumers’ ability to experience
managing their own health. The FDA and consumers are listening
as well, and each party has a significant role to play. By each stating
and justifying their interests and through their collaborative efforts,
the three actors can help the U.S. expedite its journey towards
increased government regulation that fits both the industry’s and
consumers’ appetites for guidance while remaining flexible enough
to allow for innovative self-care food products and food additives to
develop for years to come.

Going Hemp Wild: Understanding the Challenges and
Opportunities for FDA Regulation of CBD in Food
Products 1
Hannah Catt*
Abstract
After the passage of the 2018 Farm Bill, champions of hemp
began to tout opportunities for farmers and businesses involved with
the crop. The industry has rallied around one of hemp’s major
byproducts, cannabidiol, or CBD. However, the demand for CBD
has left the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) playing catchup. This article explains what CBD is, how it is derived, current
FDA-approved uses, and a current path forward for the FDA in
creating guidance for industry and consumers.
I. Introduction
It is difficult today to read the news, browse social media, or
even shop in some stores without encountering people extolling the
virtues of cannabidiol (“CBD”) or questioning its therapeutic value. 2
The Food and Drug Administration has been challenged by the
proliferation of CBD in many markets. The hype has not escaped the
FDA’s notice, but a federal agency is not poised to quickly respond
to trends like these, therefore, the agency has yet to promulgate a full
set of regulations.
The production and use of CBD involve competing interests,
from the pharmaceutical sector, food producers, farmers, and
consumers. Each of these parties has an interest in regulations being
developed sooner rather than later, in part because there is currently
significant market opportunity for CBD products. This article
explores the following issues relating to CBD: what CBD is; how it
is different from other cannabis products; what CBD is being used
for; and how the federal government can appropriately regulate the
production and use of the product. Due to the limited existing
research on the effects of CBD, the best option may be for the FDA

* Hannah Catt holds a J.D. with certificates in Environmental and Health Law from
the University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law, as well as an LL.M.
in Agricultural & Food Law from the University of Arkansas School of Law.
1
Some companies that market CBD products are mentioned by name in this article.
No mention of a specific company serves as an endorsement; it is purely for
illustrative purposes.
2
See, e.g., Alex Williams, Why is CBD Everywhere?, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 7, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/27/style/cbd-benefits.html.
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to allow CBD to be sold as a supplement in limited concentrations
while also working towards new drug approvals.
II. Hemp and Cannabinoids
In recent years, many states have legalized medicinal and/or
recreational marijuana use. 3 Recent legislation expanding programs
for legal hemp production has increased interest in by-products of
the plant beyond traditional, industrial uses. 4 Despite the differences
in the use and availability of marijuana and hemp, the two are
inextricably linked, usually under the banner of “cannabis.” While
confusing, this is not a mistake. Marijuana and hemp are both
products of Cannabis sativa, however, they are distinguishable based
on their relative concentration of tetrahydrocannabinol (“THC”). 5
The plants can also be distinguished by their physical features when
growing, as explained in Section II.
Marijuana is often consumed for the psychoactive effects of
THC, which is present in varying amounts based on the plant variety
or cultivar. 6 CBD is commonly considered non-psychoactive
because it does not produce the “high” associated with consuming
marijuana. 7 In his work, prominent cannabis researcher Dr. Ernest
Small has clarified that this common usage of the term nonpsychoactive for describing CBD is not proper because any
significant change in mental state, including anxiety changes, should
be considered a psychoactive effect. 8
CBD and THC are also both cannabinoids, a chemical
component of the cannabis sativa plant. 9 While cannabinoids have
been found in other plants, CBD is noted as the “principal
cannabinoid of hemp.” 10 There have been over 100 cannabinoids
identified in cannabis. 11 The cannabinoids act by binding to

3
NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES, MARIJUANA OVERVIEW (2019),
http://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/marijuana-overview.aspx.
4
7 U.S.C. § 5940 (2018).
5
CONG. RES. SERV., Defining Hemp: A Fact Sheet 1 (March 22, 2019), https://fas.org
/sgp/crs/misc/R44742.pdf.
6
Variety is technically used to note the plant types that are found in nature, while
cultivars are bred for specific characteristics. Id. (citing Cindy Haynes, Cultivar
Versus Variety, IOWA ST. UNIV. HORTICULTURE & HOME PEST NEWS (Feb. 6, 2008),
https://hortnews.extension.iastate.edu/2008/2-6/CultivarOrVariety.html).
7
ERNEST SMALL, CANNABIS: A COMPLETE GUIDE 204 (2016).
8
Id.
9
Id. at 205.
10
Id.
11
Genevieve Lafaye, et al., Cannabis, Cannabinoids, and Health, 19 DIALOGUES IN
CLINICAL NEUROSCIENCE 3, 309 (2017).
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receptors in the body’s endocannabinoid system. 12 This system and
the resulting effects of cannabinoids in the body were not discovered
until the late twentieth century. 13
CB1 and CB2 are both found in the central nervous system
and various organs throughout the body. 14 Because of the relatively
recent discovery of the endocannabinoid system and the many
restrictions around research related to cannabis, a full understanding
of the effects of cannabinoids is still developing. The different
receptor locations where the binding takes place can impact the
ultimate effects of cannabis consumption, the potency of the product,
and how CBD and THC will impact the body. 15
An additional area of study is how different cannabinoids
work together. Those involved in the illicit trade or consumption of
marijuana are seeking out a higher THC content, which will increase
the psychoactive effects. New strains of cannabis have been bred to
have a higher THC content at the expense of the CBD content. In
the reverse, cannabis bred for fiber or oilseed has high CBD content
and minimal THC. 16 Further, manufacturers of marijuana edibles do
not currently have an incentive to add CBD to the final product. 17
This may change as more is discovered about the combined effects
of THC and CBD, referred to as “entourage” or “ensemble” effects. 18
Consumption of THC and CBD has been shown to lessen some of
the psychoactive symptoms of THC. 19 The reason for this is not
immediately clear, but researchers have noticed this in patients who
take approved drugs with THC, such as Marinol, an appetite
stimulant primarily prescribed for patients with AIDS.20
CBD is produced through an extraction process which
should be highly monitored to ensure there is no THC present. To
Pál Pacher, et al., The Endocannabinoid System as an Emerging Target of
Pharmacotherapy, 58 PHARMACOL REV. 3, 389 (2006).
13
Matt Simon, THC! CBD! Terpenoids! Cannabis Science is Getting Hairy, WIRED
(Nov. 6, 2018), https://www.wired.com/story/cannabis-science-entourage-effect/.
14
Id.
15
SMALL, supra note 7, at 304–06.
16
Id. at 208.
17
Simon, supra note 13.
18
Some researchers prefer the term “ensemble effect” because it does not suggest
that THC is the most important cannabinoid for the endocannabinoid system
response. Simon, supra note 13.
19
Ethan B. Russo, Taming THC: Potential Cannabis Synergy and Phtocannabinoid
Terpenoid Entourage Effects, 163 BRIT. J. PHARMACOLOGY 1344, 1354 (2011).
20
Simon, supra note 13; Pácher, et al., supra note 12, at Table 1 (reporting that
patients taking Marinol experienced improvement in the areas of “spasticity, pain,
and sleep quality” and “was found to suppress otherwise intractable cholestatic
pruritus in a case report”).
12
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extract the CBD, hemp plants are harvested and then left to cure for
a few weeks. 21 The flower of the plant is then removed and sent to a
processor. 22 The processor grinds the flowers, then steeps them to
remove some terpenoids. 23 After a cold treatment, it is distilled,
sometimes twice, to achieve the right color and purity. 24 Many
brands have their products tested to guarantee purity and low or no
THC content. 25
III. Examining Hemp Production
The revenue that states and businesses have generated from
selling recreational marijuana is frequently labeled as a “Green
Rush.”26 The value of the CBD market could be a second wave in
this rush because it is worth around half a billion dollars today and
has the potential to reach twenty billion dollars by 2020. 27 However,
hemp has a long history of use for other industrial purposes and has
proven to be a versatile crop. 28 Hemp uses less inputs than a more
traditional crop like corn. 29 Once out of the initial development time,
producers use less water, pesticides, and fertilizers. 30 The terpenoids
Eric Hurlock, Harvesting, Drying, Trimming, & Curing Industrial Hemp Flower,
LANCASTER FARMING (Sep. 3, 2019), https://www.lancasterfarming.com (search
article name) (discussing measures a farm takes to monitor CBD and THC levels in
hemp flowers prior to harvest); Rajul Punjabi, There’s CBD in Everything so We
Found Out How It’s Made, VICE (Oct. 23, 2018), http://www.vice.com/en_us/article
/wj9knb/i-visited-a-cannabis-farm-to-find-out-how-cbd-oil-is-made.
22
Punjabi, supra note 21.
23
Id.
24
Id.
25
Medterra is an example of this. This company sources all of its hemp from
products grown as a part of the Kentucky Department of Agriculture Pilot Program.
Frequently Asked Questions, MEDTERRA, https://medterracbd.com/faq (last visited
Nov. 9, 2019) (linking interested consumers to the third-party lab test results of the
company’s CBD products).
26
See, e.g., Nick Kovacevich, Green Rush: How Legal Hemp Opens the Door for
Cannabis Investment, FORBES (Aug. 8, 2019), https://www.forbes.com (search
article title).
27
Brian Barth, The Rise and Rise of the Artisanal Hemp Farm. From Seed-to-CBD,
Our Writer Doses Up Then Files This Report, MODERN FARMER (Feb. 25, 2019),
https://modernfarmer.com/2019/02/the-rise-and-rise-of-the-artisanal-hemp-farm-fr
om-seed-to-cbd-our-writer-doses-up-then-files-this-report/.
28
Ernest Small & David Marcus, Hemp: A New Crop with New Uses for North
America, in TRENDS IN NEW CROPS AND NEW USES 284-326 (J. Janick & A Whipkey
eds., 2002), https://www.hort.purdue.edu/newcrop/ncnu02/v5-284.html (describing
some of the historical uses of hemp in industry).
29
Logan Yonavjak, Industrial Hemp: A Win-Win For the Economy and the
Environment, FORBES (May 29, 2013), https://www.forbes.com/ (search “Industrial
Hemp Win Win” and select the first result); Brian Barth, So, You Want to Be a Hemp
Farmer?, MODERN FARMER (July 9, 2018), https://www.modernfarmer.com/2018/0
7/so-you-want-to-be-a-hemp-farmer/.
30
Id.
21

78

JOURNAL OF FOOD LAW & POLICY

[Vol.15

that give cannabis its unique smell have also been found in other
plants as a method of insect deterrent. 31 Hemp plants grow tall,
occasionally up to sixteen feet. 32 Plant height is one way to easily
distinguish hemp from marijuana, with the latter usually being short
and stubby. 33
Once harvested, hemp can be made into almost 25,000
different products in categories including: textiles, automotive parts,
food and beverages, and personal care products. 34 Most of the hemp
going into these products had to be imported though, due to
restrictions on growing hemp. 35 China accounts for the largest share
of production, growing roughly one-fifth of the world supply and
importing the most to the United States (“U.S.”). 36 Hemp fiber and
seeds can have returns of up to $700 per acre or $1,200 per acre,
respectively. 37 The total market value is approaching one billion
dollars. 38 The opportunity to grow hemp for use in American
industry and processing is an attractive one, and it presents a valuable
market opportunity for potential hemp farmers. 39 The history of
hemp production shows that there are many uses for the crop beyond
focusing exclusively on CBD. The CBD market could collapse at
any time or be severely restricted if the FDA takes a more aggressive
stance on non-prescribed uses of the compound.
China has historically produced large volumes of hemp, and
evidence suggests that they have been growing it for anywhere from
six to ten thousand years. 40 Hemp was spread from China to Western
Asia and Egypt, and then to Europe. 41 The crop did not arrive in
North America until the seventeenth century. 42 From approximately
that time until the nineteenth century, hemp was at its peak, being
used for textiles, paper, and even sails for ships. 43 Many reasons are
suggested for its decline in popularity, including the labor involved
Russo, supra note 19, at 349.
Cheryl Thayer et al., Industrial Hemp: From Seed to Market, HARVEST N.Y.,
(2017), http://putknowledgetowork.org/resources/industrial-hemp-from-seed-to-ma
rket.
33
Id.
34
Id.
35
Id.
36
Id.
37
CONG. RES. SERV., supra note 5, at 8.
38
The U.S. Hemp Industry Grows to $820mm in Sales in 2017, HEMP BUS. J., (2017),
hempbizjournal.com/size-of-us-hemp-industry-2017/.
39
Comparing it to grain, Brian Barth asserts that fifty acres should be a minimum
for growing hemp to retain profitability. Barth, supra note 29.
40
SMALL, supra note 7, at 91.
41
Id. at 92.
42
Id.
43
Id. at 93–94.
31
32
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with cultivation, cheaper fibers becoming available during the
Industrial Revolution, and the decreased use of sailing ships in favor
of fuel-powered ships. 44
Until the 2014 Farm Bill hemp provisions, hemp was
regulated along with marijuana. 45 Hemp was listed as a Schedule I
substance under the Controlled Substances Act (“CSA”), and the
Drug Enforcement Administration (“DEA”) provided oversight. 46
This classification required anyone who wanted to grow hemp to get
approval from the DEA, but applications were usually not
approved. 47 One early university research plot was approved in
North Dakota, but it involved significant costs. 48 Similar to states
choosing to allow recreational marijuana consumption while it is
restricted federally, states could create their own policies to allow
hemp cultivation if a DEA license was granted.
Hemp provisions found in the 2014 Farm Bill created an
agricultural pilot program “to study the growth, cultivation, or
marketing of industrial hemp.” 49 While states are allowed to create
their own regulations for programs, growing sites have to be
registered with and certified by the state’s department of agriculture,
and the growing is limited to research purposes of agriculture
departments or colleges and universities. 50 “Industrial hemp” is
defined as cannabis sativa with less than 0.3% THC on a dry weight
basis. 51 This figure is widely used to distinguish hemp from
marijuana. The THC amount was proposed by Ernest Small, who
indicated that, at 1% THC presence, marijuana begins to have
“intoxicating potential.”52 In addition to the U.S., Canada and
portions of Europe and Australia use the same threshold.53 Small is
quick to note this is a low threshold but contends that this makes it

Id. at 94.
CONG. RES. SERV., supra note 5, at 3–4.
46
21 U.S.C § 812 (b)(1) (2018) (providing that Schedule I substances have “a high
potential for abuse,” “no currently accepted medical use in treatment in the United
States,” and a “lack of accepted safety for use of the drug or other substance under
medical supervision.”)
47
Christine A. Kolosov, Evaluating the Public Interest: Regulation of Industrial
Hemp Under the Controlled Substances Act, 57 UCLA L. REV. 237, 247 (2009)
(providing an overview of the legal status of hemp cultivation over time in the U.S.
and explaining how state programs to allow cultivation are limited by DEA
approval).
48
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7 U.S.C. § 5940.
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Id. § 5940(A)–(B).
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53
Id.
44
45

80

JOURNAL OF FOOD LAW & POLICY

[Vol.15

highly unlikely that hemp would be repurposed for illegal
consumption. 54
The 2018 Farm Bill loosened the restrictions on hemp
further, officially removing it from the federal schedule of controlled
substances. 55 Because it was removed from the schedule, the DEA
also cannot interfere with the passage of hemp across state lines.56
Growers still have to operate under a state pilot program, of which
there are currently forty-one. 57
Kentucky was an early leader in the U.S. hemp market after
pilot program rules were released in the 2014 Farm Bill. State law
requires producers, handlers, processers, and marketers to obtain a
license from the Kentucky Department of Agriculture. 58 Violation
of the licensing requirements is penalized by the same provisions for
violations of state rules relating to marijuana. 59 These penalties are
found in state statutes for controlled substances. 60 The state
publishes a list of licensees, which can help facilitate the market for
hemp. 61 There are over one hundred processors and handlers
licensed, and, in 2018, farmers were paid over $17 million for hemp,
and over $50 million of gross products were sold.62 The acreage in
use is also rapidly increasing, approaching 10,000 acres. 63 Kentucky
Commissioner of Agriculture Ryan Quarles has noted that these
54

Id.
KY. DEP’T OF AGRIC., 2018 FARM BILL AND WHAT IT MEANS FOR HEMP IN
KENTUCKY (2018), http://www.kyagr.com/marketing/program_id/70/documents/H
EMP_OV_2018FarmBillandKentuckyHemp.pdf.
56
Id.
57
INDIGENOUS FOOD & AGRIC. INITIATIVE, THE 2018 FARM BILL AND THE LEGAL
LANDSCAPE FOR INDUSTRIAL HEMP PRODUCTION IN INDIAN COUNTRY 3, UNIV. OF
ARK. (2019), https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5aaaa2bd4611a0a9a6f8353d/t/5
c996196104c7b647468f5da/1553555912189/Final+IFAI+Hemp+Analysis.pdf
(showing that the nine states that still outlaw hemp are Idaho, Georgia, South
Dakota, Texas, Iowa, Louisiana, Mississippi, Ohio, and Connecticut); Fran Howard,
Hemp Producers Stuck Somewhere Between Two Farm Bills, AGRI PULSE (April 17,
2019), https://www.agri-pulse.com/articles/12104-regulatory-confusion-leaves-he
mp-producers-stuck-somewhere-between-two-farm-bills.
58
INDUSTRIAL HEMP RESEARCH PILOT OVERVIEW, KY. DEP’T OF AGRIC.,
https://www.kyagr.com/marketing/hemp-overview.html (last visited Nov. 27,
2019).
59
HEMP AND THE LAW, KY. DEP’T OF AGRIC., https://www.kyagr.com/marketing/he
mp-law.html (last visited Nov. 27, 2019).
60
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 218A.140 (West 2011).
61
2018 LICENSE HOLDER LIST (2018), KY. DEP’T OF AGRIC., https://www.kyagr.com/
marketing/documents/HEMP_OV_License-Holder-List_2018.pdf.
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Bruce Schreiner, Hemp is Growing Like Crazy in Kentucky. Just Look at Last
Year’s Sales, COURIER J. (March 18, 2019), https://www.courier-journal.com/story/
news/2019/03/18/kentucky-hemp-sales-surged-2018-ryan-quarles-says/320199500
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figures represent a small portion of the state’s total agricultural
production, but the program’s goal was to ensure that Kentucky
could gain a lead on the market when it became legal to start
production and interstate transport. 64
The hemp provisions found in the 2018 Farm Bill have not
yet been enacted by the United States Department of Agriculture
(“USDA”). Until enacted, the market needs to operate under the
rules from the 2014 bill. Growers have major questions about crop
insurance, organic certification, interstate transportation, and
banking access. 65 Secretary of Agriculture Sonny Perdue estimated
that there will not be rules in time for this season, but they will be
ready for 2020 planting. 66 Growers are also having trouble getting
access to seeds to purchase, because they may have to be imported,
and growers need to ensure they have varieties with THC levels
below the legal threshold. 67
Due to the natural resilience of hemp, it is well-suited to
organic growing methods. 68 The USDA, which oversees the
National Organic Program, has allowed organic certification for
hemp, but not marijuana. 69 Allowing organic certification for hemp
byproducts like CBD could be beneficial, particularly if it is being
utilized as an ingredient in pharmaceuticals. Organic textiles are also
specially marketed, often for clothing. 70 Kentucky is home to the
Kentucky Organic Hemp Cooperative, one of the country’s first,
which has brought together farmers with smaller-than-usual acreage
who want to get market access. 71 Many of these farmers are growing
on land that has not recently been used for conventional crops, so
they do not have to wait through the three-year transitional period
that conventional farms need for organic certification. 72 Most of
64
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Ryan McCrimmon, Washington Has Work to Do on CBD, Hemp, POLITICO (Feb.
26, 2019), https://www.politico.com/newsletters/morning-agriculture/2019/02/27/
washington-has-work-to-do-on-cbd-hemp-526036.
66
Ryan McCrimmon, Perdue, Senate Ag Talk Farm Bill Today, POLITICO (Feb. 28,
2019), https://www.politico.com/newsletters/morning-agriculture/2019/02/28/perd
ue-senate-ag-talk-farm-bill-today-528350.
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Howard, supra note 57.
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Seth Waggener, Organically Grown Hemp: Why Is It So Important?, PURE
SPECTRUM (Feb. 8, 2018), https://www.purespectrumcbd.com/organically-grownhemp-why-is-it-so-important/.
69
Barth, supra at note 29.
70
Does Organic Fabric Really Make a Difference?, HYDE YOGA BLOG (Aug. 1,
2019), https://yogahyde.com/yoga-wear-organic-vs-non-organic/.
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Austyn Gaffney, Kentucky Farmers Gamble on the South’s First Organic Hemp
Cooperative, SOUTHERLY (Mar. 13, 2019), https://southerlymag.org/2019/03/13/ken
tucky-farmers-gamble-on-the-souths-first-organic-hemp-cooperative/.
72
Id.
65

82

JOURNAL OF FOOD LAW & POLICY

[Vol.15

them are also growing hemp that will have CBD extracted because
as much as seventy percent of the state’s hemp is sold to the CBD
market. 73
IV. Current FDA Stance
A. Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act Rules
At its core, the primary concern with the regulation of CBD
products is about consumer safety. The FDA does not want the
public taking products that have not been tested for purity or because
a company has made a wild claim about CBD’s ability to cure an
ailment.74 Concerns about the safety of food and drugs have existed
since time immemorial, but the first major U.S. legislation on the
subject was the 1906 Food and Drugs Act, passed by President
Theodore Roosevelt. 75 This Act cracked down on adulterated and
misbranded food and drugs. 76 The enactment was motivated by
problems in the industry, including a 1902 tragedy in St. Louis, when
thirteen children died after taking a contaminated drug. 77 The
children were administered a diphtheria antitoxin, but it was
contaminated with tetanus spores. 78
The Act was updated under the administration of President
Franklin Roosevelt, with the 1938 Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act (“FDCA”). 79 Although the FDCA has been amended since its
inception, it remains the key starting point for understanding food
and drug regulation.

73
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WHAT YOU NEED TO KNOW (AND WHAT WE’RE WORKING TO FIND OUT) ABOUT
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CBD, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (July 17, 2019), https://www.fda.gov/consumers/
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76
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FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Mar. 28, 2018), https://www.fda.gov/about-fda/fda-basics/h
ow-did-federal-food-drug-and-cosmetic-act-come-about.
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Biologics Regulation, FDA CONSUMER MAG. 1 (Jan.-Feb. 2016), https://www.fda.go
v/files/about%20fda/published/The-Road-to-the-Biotech-Revolution--Highlights-o
f-100-Years-of-Biologics-Regulation.pdf.
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4th ed. 2014).
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The FDCA defines drugs as “articles intended for use in the
diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease in
man or other animals and articles (other than food) intended to affect
the structure or any function of the body of man or other animals.”80
Before any drug can be sold, manufacturers submit an application to
the FDA Center for Drug Evaluation and Research (CDER). 81 New
products are submitted under a new drug application; however, there
are many other types of approval processes, including for
investigational new drugs, therapeutic biologics, and over-thecounter drugs. 82 All of this application information will help the
FDA make a decision about approved doses, potential interactions
with other drugs, side effects that require warnings, and whether a
drug can be used continuously. 83
Although the 2018 Farm Bill removed hemp from DEA
oversight, it did not modify the FDA’s authority on cannabis
products or compounds. 84 Cannabis remains a Schedule I drug
according to the DEA, indicating no accepted medical use. 85
However, the FDA has approved one cannabis-derived drug and
three “cannabis-related” drugs. 86 The only approved drug with CBD
as an active ingredient is Epidiolex, and it was approved to treat
seizures in children suffering from Lennox-Gastaut or Dravet
syndrome. 87 The cannabis-derived drugs rely on synthetic THC,
either dronabinol or nabilone. The drugs are Marinol, Syndros, and
Cesamet. 88 The first two have been useful in combatting appetite
loss in AIDS patients. 89 Cesamet was approved for chemotherapy
patients to reduce nausea and vomiting from the treatment. 90

Federal Food, Drug, And Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 321 (2016).
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The trial conducted for epilepsy, which led to the approval
of Epidiolex, was supported by the drug manufacturer GW
Pharmaceuticals. 91 This presents a challenge for drug development–
large pharmaceutical companies have significant resources to pour
into research and development, go through the lengthy
administrative process to get a drug approved by the FDA, and
conduct testing to ensure they have a pure and safe product. Once
hemp research is less restricted, it is possible that these large
companies may try to get in on the market for legal drugs first,
capturing most of the revenue. However, an increase in the number
of approved hemp-derived drugs could create a stable market for
farmers. 92
The FDA approval of CBD as an active ingredient in
Epidiolex was a victory for the patients it will help. The market for
CBD supplements and food products was hindered, however,
because of FDCA rules which restrict the use of active ingredients in
FDA-approved drugs for food and dietary supplements. A dietary
supplement can contain an herb or botanical, but because it is an
active ingredient in a drug, CBD cannot be marketed as a dietary
supplement. 93 The FDA does have the discretion to go through the
notice and comment process to create a regulation allowing the sale
of dietary supplements with an approved-drug active ingredient. 94
However, the FDA has not chosen to exercise that discretion at this
time. 95
The same restriction outlaws the introduction of CBDcontaining products into interstate commerce. Section 331 of the
FDCA prohibits “[t]he introduction or delivery for introduction into
interstate commerce of any food to which has been added a drug
approved under section 355 of this title.” 96 Similar to the rules on
supplements, the FDA Secretary can use his discretion to issue a
regulation that allows the use of the drug in food. 97 There are already
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foods derived from hemp, and some, like hempseed, are easy to
find. 98
The interest in CBD for food products is not limited to
humans, either. Martha Stewart has formed a partnership with the
Canadian company “Canopy Growth” to launch a line of pet products
with CBD. 99 Another celebrity getting in on the market is rock star
Gene Simmons, who recently announced a CBD soda. 100 There are
many other edible products, topical products, and cosmetics that are
available, creating a lot of work for anyone attempting to enforce the
FDCA provisions, whether by preventing products from being
shipped in interstate commerce or completely stopping their sale. 101
An additional and interesting component of the market for
CBD products is how they move in commerce, either inter- or
intrastate. Earlier this year, the U.S. Postal Service (USPS) issued
an advisory about the mailing of CBD products. 102 Specifying that
these rules are temporary until the 2018 Farm Bill can be fully
implemented, the USPS is allowing shipment of CBD products under
certain circumstances. 103 In connection with the permitted research
production of hemp, mailers have to sign a statement certifying that
they have a valid license from the state department of agriculture in
the mail piece’s originating state.104

Cathy Siegner, Now That Hemp and CBD are Legal, What Comes Next for Food
and Beverage?, FOOD DIVE (Dec. 20, 2018), https://www.fooddive.com/news/nowthat-hemp-and-cbd-are-legal-what-comes-next-for-food-and-beverage/544354.
99
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2019, 6:36 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/02/28/martha-stewart-to-join-marijua
na-grower-canopy-growth.html. The regulation of pet food and the potential
implications for CBD is a topic deserving of its own article, particularly because of
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But There’s Very Little Animal Research., THE WASHINGTON POST (Feb. 18, 2019,
1:00 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com (search “CBD for pets ailments” and
select the first result).
100
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The FDA has been proactive in releasing information about
CBD and ensuring that the public can find and understand the
agency’s position. However, the momentum was stalled when FDA
Commissioner Scott Gottlieb announced in March that he would be
stepping down from his post in April. Gottlieb surprised many
people with his progressive work during his two years at the agency,
and he commented frequently on CBD in particular. 105 Because of
the limits of agency rulemaking, he suggested that Congress make
rules for the use of CBD in food products, because Congress could
act more quickly. 106 Gottlieb has since left the FDA, but the agency
moved ahead with a public hearing on May 31, 2019, with the
purpose to “obtain scientific data and information about the safety,
manufacturing, product quality, marketing, labeling, and sale of
products containing cannabis or cannabis-derived compounds.”107
At the hearing, presentations were made on topics ranging
from prescription interactions with cannabidiol to the use of hempderived ingredients in animal feed. 108 There were representatives
from consumer groups, state departments of agriculture, and
academia, among others. 109 The breadth of representation is a good
indication of the interest in creating regulations for cannabinoids and
creating a path for researchers to understand them. In a letter
addressed to Ned Sharpless, the acting commissioner of the FDA
after Gottlieb’s departure, a bipartisan group of Congressional

See Kyle Jaeger, FDA Is Exploring ‘Alternative Approaches’ to CBD Regulation,
Commissioner Says, MARIJUANA MOMENT (Feb. 26, 2019), https://www.marijuana
moment.net/fda-is-exploring-alternative-approaches-to-cbd-regulation-commission
er-says/; see also Helena Bottemiller Evich (@hbottemiller), Twitter (Feb. 26, 2019,
11:21 AM), https://twitter.com/hbottemiller/status/1100476071252758528.
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Food Safety (Feb. 26, 2019), https://www.fda.gov/news-events/speeches-fda-officia
ls/new-steps-promote-food-safety-02262019.
107
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Cannabis-Derived Compounds; Public Hearing; Request for Comments, 84 Fed.
Reg. 12,969, 12,969 (Apr. 3, 2019) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 15).
108
See Presentations: FDA’s Scientific Data and Information about Products
Containing Cannabis or Cannabis-Derived Compounds Public Hearing, U.S. FOOD
& DRUG ADMIN. (last updated July 3, 2019), https://www.fda.gov/news-events/fdameetings-conferences-and-workshops/presentations-fdas-scientific-data-and-infor
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Gidal on drug interactions with cannabis-derived products).
109
See id. (listing the various representatives present at the FDA public hearing on
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representatives addressed the issue of CBD in food products.110 They
specifically proposed that the agency create an interim final rule for
the use of CBD in food products and dietary supplements in addition
to creating enforcement guidance and standards evaluating the safety
and accuracy of labeling. 111
The agency rulemaking process has many layers and can
seem quite complex, but every step is designed to ensure interested
parties can make their voice heard and that the agency can gather
appropriate technical information before promulgating a new rule.
Agencies publish a proposed rule or Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
(“NPRM”) in the Federal Register.112 Comment periods are typically
thirty to sixty days, but can be longer if the rule is particularly
complicated. 113 The upcoming public meeting on CBD will allow
people to share comments and information with the FDA, and the
agency is also taking written comments. A final rule should be based
on the entire rulemaking record, including these public comments.
Former Commissioner Gottlieb expanded on the potential of
rulemaking for CBD in an interview with the Brookings Institution
in March. 114 He stated that a standard rule takes “two to three years,”
and that he didn’t believe he could have accomplished rule formation
during his tenure, nor will the person who succeeds him. 115 Gottlieb
considers a rule for CBD in food to be novel and complex, because
it has already been used in a drug and was not previously approved
for use in food. 116 He also described the imminent creation of a
workgroup that would consider methods for Congress to create a
legal route, noting that this was done for human growth hormone and
fish oil. 117
The FDA has less control over dietary supplements than it
does over prescription drugs. Premarket approval or notification to
the FDA is limited, and the labeling rules are more expansive than
110
See Letter from Cong. of the United States to Ned Sharpless, Acting Comm’r,
U.S. Food & Drug Admin. 1 (Sept. 19, 2019), https://pingree.house.gov/uploadedfil
es/pingree_comer_cbd_letter_to_fda_9.19.19.pdf.
111
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112
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those for prescription drugs. 118 Presently, there are companies that
market CBD and label it as supplements.119 Medterra, the company
that sources hemp from Kentucky, labels its products as
supplements. 120 The company does list a disclaimer at the bottom of
every web page that reads: “[r]epresentations regarding the efficacy
and safety of Medterra have not been evaluated by the Food and Drug
Administration. These products are not intended to diagnose,
prevent, treat, or cure any disease.”121 This has not stopped many
reviews from extolling the uses of the product for joint paint, anxiety,
hearing loss, and other issues. 122 The company ships to every state
in the U.S. and internationally.
Other companies advertising CBD supplements are easy to
find. The FDA has issued warning letters to numerous companies,
most of them for making unsubstantiated therapeutic claims about
the products for sale. 123 Warning letters give businesses time to take
corrective action before more serious consequences are imposed,
including product seizures or injunctions to halt the sale of items. 124
At the local and state level, health departments are cutting
into the sales of CBD in food. The Los Angeles County Health
Department issued its own guidance for restaurants, noting that
beginning in July 2019, points would be deducted on inspections for
selling food products adulterated with CBD. 125 One reason that
health officials are concerned is their belief that it can be difficult for
customers to differentiate products with and without CBD and the
Rahi Azizi, “Supplementing” the DSHEA: Congress Must Invest the FDA with
Greater Regulatory Authority over Nutraceutical Manufacturers by Amending the
Dietary Supplement Health and Education Act, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 439, 440 (2010).
119
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CLOCK TOWER INSIGHT, (Apr. 20, 2019), http://clocktowerinsight.com/cbd-oil-howdo-you-successfully-market-a-product-with-no-standards/.
120
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122
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2019).
123
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U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/news-events/public-health-focus/
warning-letters-and-test-results-cannabidiol-related-products (last visited Nov. 7,
2019).
124
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125
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visited Nov. 7, 2019).
118

2019]

GOING HEMP WILD

89

relative dosage in each product. 126 Acting under rules created for the
state’s medical marijuana program, officials from the Ohio
Department of Agriculture, Health Departments, and Policy have
visited stores and instructed them to stop selling CBD products or
risk having them seized. 127 The state’s law prohibits the sale of CBD
except in a licensed dispensary.128
Despite the de-scheduling of hemp, there can still be a stigma
associated with the consumption of hemp products. Consumers of
untested products also run the risk of testing positively for THC if
they are drug-tested, which can lead to serious consequences,
especially for work-related drug testing. 129 Some evidence shows
that consuming large amounts of CBD can yield a false positive.130
One expert in cannabis testing has clarified that most drug tests are
designed for finding THC, not other cannabinoids. 131 This is an
extremely discrete issue related to CBD consumption, so most people
would be better off locating information related to their specific
situation rather than relying on anecdotal information online.
V. Why should the FDA make rules for CBD?
The CBD market is not slowing down, and full
implementation of the 2018 Farm Bill is likely to expand it. The
FDA needs to make rules for consumer safety and to allow the
regulated creation of new drugs. The FDA can create rules for testing
products, creating a guarantee that a product is CBD, verifying the
levels of THC, and confirming product purity. 132 Access to quality
CBD products will also assist researchers, who can conduct approved
trials for new drugs and therapies that use CBD. Researchers at

126
Amanda Mull, The CBD Crackdown Has Begun, THE ATLANTIC (Feb. 6, 2019),
https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2019/02/new-york-city-cbd-crack-dow
n/582193/.
127
Randy Tucker, Officials in Ohio Raid CBD Sellers, Order Products Removed,
CINCINNATI ENQUIRER (Feb. 4, 2019, 6:26 PM), https://www.cincinnati.com/story/m
oney/2019/02/04/local-cbd-products-under-scrutiny-for-food-safety/2766115002/.
128
Id.
129
Mike Adams, Marijuana Madness: This is How CBD Oil Can Cause a Failed
Drug Test, FORBES (Oct. 18, 2018, 3:38 PM), https://www.forbes.com (search
“Mike Adams Marijuana Madness”).
130
Id.
131
Elizabeth Brico, We Looked Into Whether CBD Would Show Up in a Drug Test,
VICE (Dec. 14, 2018, 12:40 PM), https://tonic.vice.com/en_us/article/xwjmpj/cbddrug-test.
132
Helena Bottemiller Evich, Gottlieb Suggests ‘Alternative Approaches’ for CBD
to Discuss in Congress, POLITICO, (Feb. 26, 2019, 1:34 PM), https://politicopro.com
(search “Gottlieb suggests alternative”).
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Johns Hopkins University are planning a clinical trial that will test
the potential benefits of CBD for smoking cessation. 133
Many potential benefits have been advertised, but not as
much focus has been put on the side effects. The listed side effects
of Epidiolex can include: decreased appetite, diarrhea, rashes, and
lower sleep quality. 134 Consumers also need guidance on dosing and
the variety of ingestion methods that could change the effectiveness
of a CBD drug. Research into CBD could also yield information
about other cannabinoids and a new understanding of the ensemble
effect in cannabinoids.
It is possible for research to be conducted with synthetic
cannabinoids. 135 The FDA-approved, cannabis-related drugs rely on
synthetic cannabinoids. 136 More recently, yeast has been used to
produce synthetic THC and CBD. 137 The obvious benefits are for
companies that want to begin research without cultivating hemp and
also ensure that the CBD is uncontaminated by THC. There is also
an opportunity to produce other synthetic cannabinoids and begin to
understand how many there actually are, potentially with more
benefits than what we are already aware of. 138 If synthetic CBD were
marketed, though, regulators would do right by consumers by
requiring a new name for the synthetic chemical, or a clear label that
indicates it is not a naturally-derived product.
VI. How should CBD be treated?
Regulators have many options for designing CBD rules. The
most formal process, and what would allow the most public input,
would be agency rulemaking. However, the agency could, through
rulemaking, use its discretion to allow the use of CBD in food
products and supplements, despite it not being used in either of these
products prior to the approval of Epidiolex. It also seems likely that

Roni Caryn Rabin, CBD is Everywhere, but Scientists Still Don’t Know Much
About It, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 25, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/25/well/liv
e/cbd-cannabidiol-marijuana-medical-treatment-therapy.html.
134
See Greenwich Biosciences, Inc., Highlights of Prescribing Information,
https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda_docs/label/2018/210365lbl.pdf (listing
common “Adverse Reactions” from the drug Epidiolex) (last visited Nov. 10, 2019).
135
See e.g., Devinksy et al., supra note 91, at 2011 (noting the research trials
conducted before Epidiolex was FDA-approved).
136
See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., REGULATION OF CANNABIS, supra note 84
(discussing approved medical products).
137
Matt Simon, Forget Growing Weed – Make Yeast Spit Out CBD and THC
Instead, WIRED (Feb. 27, 2019, 1:00 PM), https://www.wired.com/story/yeast-cbdand-thc/.
138
Id.
133
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there will be more research on the therapeutic value of CBD, so
Epidiolex will not be the only drug on the market for very long.
In addition to his comments supporting Congressional action
on the regulation, Gottlieb envisioned it as a tier or schedule of
concentrations for different products containing CBD, in part
because the side effects at different concentrations are not yet studied
and understood. 139 Congress could authorize the use in food and
supplements and then direct the FDA to establish the acceptable
thresholds for each product. 140 The collaboration between Congress
and the agency is not uncommon and would be the fastest way to
reach at least a temporary resolution until the FDA can solidify rules.
Gottlieb also believes that the committee will have recommendations
by the summer, 141 which would be prior to the full 2018 Farm Bill
implementation. If producers of CBD products have a better idea of
their legality, it will also give farmers some clarity on the market for
hemp.
VII. Conclusion
CBD has captured the interest of many different groups and
created a headache for federal and state agencies. This is an exciting
product, simply because of its untapped potential. It is, of course,
added to the long list of useful hemp products, providing farmers
with a new way to use their crops. The FDA and Congress should
work together to create rules that allow food and drug producers to
each have a piece of the market and provide consumers with tools for
health and overall wellness.

Interview with Scott Gottlieb, supra note 114.
Id.; see also Evich, supra note 132.
141
Interview with Scott Gottlieb, supra note 114.
139
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Agricultural Exceptionalism and Industrial Animal Food
Production: Exploring the Human Rights Nexus*
Charlotte E. Blattner** & Odile Ammann***
Abstract
The host of negative effects of animal agriculture on the
immediate environment, workers, and local communities are welldocumented, yet little is known about the global repercussions of
animal agriculture, especially on human rights guarantees. This
contribution attempts to begin filling this soaring gap. It examines
the nexus between industrial animal agriculture (with a focus on
concentrated animal feeding operations (CAFOs)) on the one hand,
and specific international human rights violations on the other hand.
Our emphasis is on the role of government in producing these
violations, rather than on the agribusiness itself. Laws originally
designed to govern small family farms—so-called “farmers’ rights”
laws, including right-to-farm laws and exemptions from
environmental and animal law—now protect corporate giants, many
of which are multinationals. Governments enacting and upholding
farmers’ rights shield agribusiness activities that are damaging to the
environment and humans’ livelihoods from regulation. While they
are prima facie at liberty to do so under domestic law, their laws are
subject to the scrutiny of international law, particularly the human
rights regime that promises to put a halt to the ongoing insulation of
animal agriculture. The human rights perspective adds valuable
dynamics to the ongoing debate, is novel in application to the issue,
and opens new pathways for academic inquiries and legal strategies
because—unlike nuisance laws, environmental laws, and animal
protection laws, which de facto exempt the issue from judicial
scrutiny—these laws can be used to hold governments accountable.
The human rights discourse also gives rise to community
empowerment and innovative forms of advocacy and forges
connections between the different social justice issues implicated in
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editorial assistance.
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animal agriculture. Finally, we show how scholars, researchers,
stakeholders, and the public concerned about human rights issues can
bring animal agriculture into the conversation and prompt their
governments to address the issue proactively.
Key words: Animal Agriculture, Human Rights, Right to Food,
Right to Water, Right to a Safe Environment, Right to Land,
Farming, Food Security, Animal Protection, Food Sovereignty,
CAFO
I. North Carolina, the Front Line
Violet Branch, seventy-one, is one of innumerable residents
of North Carolina that have an acrid odor of rotting eggs fill their
homes at least twice per week, causing them nausea and heavy
vomiting. 1 Branch flees to the nearby supermarket, where she “paces
the aisles until her breathing returns to normal.”2 The odor is a toxic
slurry that comes from nearby factory farms, known as CAFOs, 3 that
confine animals by the thousands, spray manure over nearby fields
and houses, and store it in uncovered cesspools. In North Carolina
alone, about nine million pigs are raised on 2,300 factories,
producing ten billion pounds of wet animal waste per year. 4
Research shows that the fecal bacteria finds its way into open water,
ground water, the air, and homes, and causes hepatitis, typhoid,
dysentery, and other diseases. 5 Long-term health hazards include
higher risks of cancer and spontaneous abortions. 6 Along with
Branch, over five hundred plaintiffs brought a total of twenty-six
suits against Murphy Brown, a subsidiary of Smithfield Foods, for
degrading their quality of life and reducing the value of their
property. 7 The smell drove away their customers; cookouts, playing
Lily Kuo, The World Eats Cheap Bacon at the Expense of North Carolina’s Rural
Poor, QUARTZ (July 14, 2015), https://qz.com/433750/the-world-eats-cheap-baconat-the-expense-of-north-carolinas-rural-poor/.
2
Id.
3
In the US, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) classifies concentrated
animal feeding operations into CAFOs and AFOs (under the NPDES Program).
AFO is a “medium-sized” CAFO with 200-699 dairy cows, 750-2499 pigs, 9,00029,000 laying hens, or 37,500 to 124,999 chickens. 40 C.F.R. § 122.23(b)(6) (2019).
Anything beyond that is considered a CAFO. 40 C.F.R. § 122.23(b)(4) (2019).
4
Zoë Schlanger, What Will Happen When Hurricane Florence Hits North
Carolina’s Massive Pig Manure Lagoons?, QUARTZ (Sept. 11, 2018), https://qz.com
/1386629/hurricane-florence-threatens-north-carolinas-pig-manure-lagoons/.
5
C.D. Heaney et al., Source Tracking Swine Fecal Waste in Surface Water Proximal
to Swine Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations, 511 SCI. TOTAL ENV’T 676,
676–77 (2015).
6
JoAnn Burkholder et al., Impacts of Waste from Concentrated Animal Feeding
Operations on Water Quality, 115 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 308, 310 (2007).
7
Kuo, supra note 1.
1
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in the yard, or just sitting on the porch became impossible; they could
not have friends over anymore; feces collected on their houses and
cars; swarms of flies followed them; and their children were teased
at school. 8 In this place where “the smell of excrement seeps into all
aspects of routine life,” 9 people are “held prisoners in their own
home.” 10
In spring 2018, juries awarded plaintiffs in five cases a total
of $574 million. 11 This is the first success for North Carolina
communities in a twenty-five-year series of public concern, outrage,
and sheer helplessness. Twenty-one of the twenty-six cases are still
outstanding—opening a window for an alternative future. 12 Yet, the
horrors people living near factory farms incur do not seem to bother
North Carolina lawmakers, who just passed new legal protections for
the companies, restricting suits over pollution, odor, and other
“nuisance” claims. 13 Following North Carolina, legislators in Utah,
Nebraska, Georgia, West Virginia, and Oklahoma have proposed
and, in some cases, passed legislation that will make similar lawsuits
impossible. 14 Republican Representatives Jimmy Dixon of Duplin
County, John Bell of Wayne County, and Tim Moore of Cleveland
County, the House speaker, issued a statement saying they “will
continue to fight for hardworking North Carolina farm families and
their communities by opposing any coordinated legal assault that
seeks to profit off their livelihoods and potentially shut down their
farms. . . . There is no right more fundamental than the right to feed
our families.”15 The spokesman for the North Carolina Pork Council,
Robert Brown, said that the lawsuits are just “another effort by fringe
groups” that lacks merit and that “farms and farmers take seriously
the obligation to feed people in a responsible way that protects our
communities.” 16

8

Id.
Schlanger, supra note 4.
10
Kuo, supra note 1.
11
The nature of these laws varies. Some reduce the damages (e.g., by banning
punitive damages), others limit the distance from the farm at which the neighbor
must live. Leah Douglas, Big Ag is Pushing Laws to Restrict Neighbors’ Ability to
Sue Farms, NPR (Apr. 12, 2019), https://www.npr.org/sections/thesalt/2019/04/12/
712227537/big-ag-is-pushing-laws-to-restrict-neighbors-ability-to-sue-farms.
12
Id.
13
Will Doran, After Smithfield Lost Millions in Lawsuits, NC Changed A Law. Was
It Constitutional?, THE COURIER-TRIBUNE (June 21, 2019), https://www.couriertribune.com/news/20190621/after-smithfield-lost-millions-in-lawsuits-nc-changedlaw-was-it-constitutional.
14
Id.
15
Id.
16
Id.
9

2019]

AGRICULTURAL EXCEPTIONALISM

95

What responsibility means in these circles is as little
discussed as the fact that the “hardworking North Carolina farm
families” are in fact a single $15 billion corporation.17 Another fact
kept under wraps by the industry is that black residents are 1.54 times
as likely to be affected by industrial pork operations than white
residents, American Indian residents 2.18 times as likely, and
Hispanic residents 1.39 times as likely. 18 Though Smithfield
pledged in 2000 to spend $17 million to research waste alternatives,
“environmentally superior technologies” were never adopted, for the
simple reason that they were “too costly.”19 In a place where pigs
outnumber humans thirty-two to one, the real concern of corporate
giants is their benefits of keeping the pork as low as $2.50 per
pound, 20 rather than the detriments to the community, animals, or the
environment.
With democratic processes and the law now being blocked,
communities are turning to extra-legal measures. In May 2019, the
documentary Right to Harm was released, shining light on how
people live (and die) for their battles for health, quality of life, and a
safe environment. 21 However, with climate change proceeding at an
astounding rate and extreme weather becoming more frequent, North
Carolina’s happy years of ignorance and denial are numbered.
Hurricanes Floyd (in 1999), Matthew (in 2016), and Florence (in
2018) hit North Carolina with storms, floods, and feces that haunted
the area for the past twenty-five years and washed ashore the many
human and animal bodies that fall victim to the industry on a daily
basis. 22
The topic brings to the fore a host of ethical, socio-political,
and economic issues that, as we argue, are not germane to North
17

Id.
Steve Wing & Jill Johnston, Industrial Hog Operations in North Carolina
Disproportionately Impact African-Americans, Hispanics and American Indians, U.
N.C. CHAPEL HILL (Aug. 29, 2014), http://www.ncpolicywatch.com/wp-content/upl
oads/2014/09/UNC-Report.pdf. This disparate impact is also witnessed with regard
to the enjoyment of specific human rights. See, e.g., U.N. Human Rights, Office of
the High Comm’r for Human Rights, The Right to Adequate Food: Fact Sheet No.
34, at 9–17 (Apr. 2010), https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/FactSheet
34en.pdf [hereinafter Fact Sheet No. 34].
19
Kuo, supra note 1.
20
Id.
21
See Lisa Held, New Film Captures the Brutal Reality of Living Near Factory
Farms, CIVIL EATS (May 2, 2019), https://civileats.com/2019/05/02/new-film-captu
res-the-brutal-reality-of-living-near-factory-farms/.
22
Schlanger, supra note 4; Emily Moon, North Carolina’s Hog Waste Problem Has
a Long History–Why Wasn’t It Solved in Time for Hurricane Florence?, PACIFIC
STANDARD (Sept. 16, 2018), https://psmag.com/environment/why-wasnt-north-caro
linas-hog-waste-problem-solved-before-hurricane-florence.
18
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Carolina, but that plague the world as a whole. Research has shown
the effects of animal agriculture on the environment, local
communities, and workers’ rights, but we have yet to uncover how
the growth and intensification of animal production have begun to
threaten and violate human rights more broadly, indirectly, and
pervasively. So while the most direct and short-term impacts of
agriculture are now well-documented, 23 its long-term impacts and
effects on environments and communities more distant are still
underexplored. Moreover, the North Carolina experience of
nuisance lawsuits and efforts to block them is part of a much larger,
worldwide topography in which animal agriculture enjoys quasiimmunity from the law.
In this paper, we analyze factory farming in connection with
the laws protecting these businesses under international human rights
law, a dimension yet unexamined by legal scholarship and largely
unaddressed in public and parliamentary deliberations. We show
how animal agriculture—and with it, the laws that insulate it—
compromise human rights guarantees such as the right to water, land,
food, and a safe environment, and how this must affect public
discourse about the legitimacy and continued support of the industry.
Our focus is on establishing how governments, by passing these laws
or failing to regulate, threaten these human rights, rather than on
showing whether agricultural enterprises, as non-state actors, can be
held accountable. 24 This is not to say that the activities of non-state
See discussion infra Section II.A.
In other words, we are focusing on the state duty to protect rather than the
corporate duty to respect human rights. Multiple sources discuss corporate
responsibility for human rights violations. See Human Rights Council, Protect,
Respect and Remedy: A Framework for Business and Human Rights, U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/8/5 (Apr. 7, 2008); John Ruggie (Special Representative of the SecretaryGeneral on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other
Business Enterprises), Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights:
Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework, U.N.
Doc. A/HRC/17/31 (Mar. 21, 2011); U.N. Human Rights, Office of the High
Comm’r for Human Rights, The Corporate Responsibility to Respect Human Rights:
An Interpretative Guide (United Nations 2012), https://www.ohchr.org/Documents
/Publications/HR.PUB.12.2_En.pdf. The Chiquita cases provide an example,
involving allegations of payments made by Chiquita to a paramilitary organization
that targeted and killed over four hundred Colombians. After bringing lawsuits in
domestic forums for over a decade, in May 2017, human rights organizations urged
the International Criminal Court to investigate actions of fourteen former and current
Chiquita executives and employees, suggesting they committed or were complicit in
crimes against humanity. Chiquita Lawsuits (re Colombia), BUS. & HUMAN RIGHTS
RES. CTR., https://www.business-humanrights.org/en/chiquita-lawsuits-re-colombia
(last visited Dec. 28, 2019); see Caleb Wheeler, Commentary: ICC Prosecution for
Crimes Committed by Chiquita Banana Employees in Columbia Will Most Likely
Fail, BUS. & HUMAN RIGHTS RESOURCE CTR. (Sept. 13, 2018),
https://www.business-humanrights.org/en/commentary-icc-prosecution-for-crimes23
24
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actors are not urgent or do not deserve our attention, but in this
article, we choose to first center the discussion on the role of states.
The rights we examine in this article are social, cultural, and
economic rights, which are typically more difficult to secure and
enforce than civil and political rights. 25 Hence, the violation of these
rights might (wrongly) be shrugged off by powerful corporate and
governmental actors. Despite these practical obstacles, the human
rights perspective adds valuable dynamics to the ongoing debate, is
novel in application to the issue, and may open new pathways for
academic inquiries and legal strategies. While to date, nuisance laws,
environmental laws, and animal protection laws have remained de
facto exempt from judicial scrutiny in numerous states, human rights
guarantees can be used to hold governments accountable. The
human rights discourse also gives rise to a community of
empowerment, new forms of advocacy, and the use of legal
instruments in defense of marginalized groups. 26 It offers new
avenues for providing help to vulnerable persons and forges
connections between the different social justice issues implicated in
animal agriculture. Finally, our aim is to show how scholars,
researchers, stakeholders, and the public concerned about human
rights issues can bring animal agriculture into the conversation, and
begin to use their power to hold their governments accountable and
prompt them to address the issue proactively.
We begin with a brief overview of the environmental and
social realities of agriculture, the role of law in producing them, and
new research uncovering its global ramifications (Part II). We then
identify and discuss the most invasive farmers’ rights—a broad term
that we define as encompassing right-to-farm laws and exemptions
from environmental and animal laws—and show how they have
come to primarily protect large corporations. We examine the
existence, scope, and form of these laws in comparative perspective
in the United States (US), Canada, and Australia. We also highlight
the situation at the level of the European Union (EU), which—due to
its limited competences—does not have comparable right-to-farm
laws (Part III). In a third step, we analyze whether and how farmers’
committed-by-chiquita-banana-employees-in-columbia-will-most-likely-fail
(providing a recent update).
25
See PAUL FARMER, PATHOLOGIES OF POWER: HEALTH, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE
NEW WAR ON THE POOR 29 (Univ. of Cal. Press 2005).
26
Morten Broberg & Hans-Otto Sano, Strengths and Weaknesses in a Human
Rights-Based Approach to International Development: An Analysis of a RightsBased Approach to Development Assistance Based on Practical Experiences, 22
INT’L J. OF HUM. RTS. 664, 668 (2018), https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.108
0/13642987.2017.1408591.
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rights threaten the enjoyment of international human rights law (Part
IV). We emphasize the right to food and the right to water and
sanitation, which are entwined with the right to land. 27 We also
examine whether farmers’ rights undermine the people’s right to a
safe environment and the emerging human right to animal protection.
Finally, we connect these developments to show that international
human rights law cannot afford to ignore animal agriculture and its
impacts on human rights any longer, and sketch the contours of an
emerging body of litigation and advocacy (Part V).
Throughout this article, we focus on the biggest contributors
to human rights violations in the area of animal agriculture, without
regard to corporate form and including sub-contractors. For reasons
of scope, we do not grapple with small-scale agriculture and its effect
on human rights. We do not deny that such violations take place or
deserve our attention, but given the novelty of this topic, we focus on
where we think attention is most needed. We also do not examine
the human rights implications of plant-based agriculture in this
paper. However, as we highlight the drawbacks of animal
agriculture, it is important to acknowledge that plant-based
agriculture engenders its own difficulties—though on a much lesser
scale—including with respect to international human rights law.28
Given the breadth of issues covered in this paper, scope precludes
offering an analysis of existing litigation and advocacy, but we do
point to different entry points for operationalizing our arguments.
II. Animal Agriculture, Farmers’ Rights, and Food
Sovereignty
A. The Realities of Agriculture
Since 1960, the global population has more than doubled,
increasing from three billion to over seven billion people. During
this period, meat production has tripled, and egg and dairy
production has quadrupled. 29 The high demand for animal products
is predominantly satisfied by intensifying production in CAFOs
where animals are housed in-doors in extreme confinement. 30
27
Olivier de Schutter, The Emerging Right to Land, 12 INT’L COMMUNITY L. REV.
303 (2010).
28
See, e.g., WWF, THE GROWTH OF SOY: IMPACTS AND SOLUTIONS (2014),
http://d2ouvy59p0dg6k.cloudfront.net/downloads/wwf_soy_report_final_feb_4_20
14.pdf.
29
PEW COMM’N, REPORT ON INDUSTRIAL FARM ANIMAL PRODUCTION, PUTTING
MEAT ON THE TABLE: INDUSTRIAL FARM ANIMAL PRODUCTION IN AMERICA 50
(2008).
30
Id.
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Due to its intensification and proliferation, the animal
industry has become one of the largest factors in environmental
degradation. It consumes 70% of the global freshwater, drains on
38% of the global land in use, and causes 14% of the world’s
greenhouse gas emissions, generating more methane (CH4), nitrous
oxide (N2O), and carbon dioxide (CO2) than the global transport
sector. 31 CAFOs release immense amounts of ammonia (NH3),
hydrogen sulfide (H2S), volatile organic compounds (VOCs), nitrous
oxide (N2O), and particulate matter (PM) that pollute air and water
surfaces. 32 CAFOs also produce disproportionate amounts of
manure that overwhelm environmental systems and prevent natural
cleansing or lead to overflow of manure lagoons. 33 Farmers’
widespread use of antibiotics and antimicrobials to increase
production has become a driving force in causing antimicrobial
Thereby, animal production has a much larger ecological footprint (or hoof print!)
than plant-based diets. Oxford researchers Poore and Nemecek were the first to
conduct a meta analysis of ∼38,000 farms producing forty different agricultural
goods around the world to assess the impacts of food production and consumption.
They found, specifically, that plant-based diets reduce food emissions by up to 73%
depending on where a person lives. Moreover, the impacts even of the lowest-impact
animal products typically exceed those of vegetable substitutes. J. Poore & T.
Nemecek, Reducing Food’s Environmental Impact Through Producers and
Consumers, 360 SCI. 987, 988 (2019); see also Camille Lacour et al., Environmental
Impacts of Plant-Based Diets: How Does Organic Food Consumption Contribute to
Environmental Sustainability?, FRONTIERS IN NUTRITION, Feb. 2018, at 4–5 (2018)
(finding that “a higher pro-vegetarian score was associated with lower environmental
impacts”); see also 2050: A Third More Mouths to Feed, FAO.ORG (Sept. 23, 2009),
http://www.fao.org/news/story/en/item/35571/icode/; UNEP, ASSESSING THE
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS OF CONSUMPTION AND PRODUCTION: PRIORITY PRODUCTS
AND MATERIALS 51, 79 (2010).
32
Susan M. Brehm, From Red Barn to Facility: Changing Environmental Liability
to Fit the Changing Structure of Livestock Production, 93 CAL. L. REV. 797, 813
(2005); Sarah C. Wilson, Hogwash! Why Industrial Animal Agriculture Is Not
Beyond the Scope of Clean Air Act Regulation, 24 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 439, 441,
444 (2007). To put this into perspective, in Oregon, 52,300 dairy cows at Threemile
Canyon Farms, LLC produce 5,675,500 pounds of ammonia per year, exceeding the
top manufacturing source of ammonia pollution in the US by 75,000 pounds. Id. at
439, 441, 456.
33
JIM MASON & PETER SINGER, ANIMAL FACTORIES 122 (Harmony Books 1990);
PEW COMM’N, supra note 29, at 50; FOOD & AGRIC. ORG., LIVESTOCK’S LONG
SHADOW, ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES AND OPTIONS 272 (2006); ORG. FOR ECON. AND
CO-OPERATION DEV., AGRICULTURE AND THE ENVIRONMENT: LESSONS LEARNED
FROM A DECADE OF OECD WORK (2004), http://www.oecd.org/greengrowth/sustain
able-agriculture/agri-environmentalindicatorsandpolicies/33913449.pdf. A CAFO
that holds 500,000 pigs produces 6.5 million pounds of waste per day, the equivalent
of waste produced per day by the city of Philadelphia with 6.2 million people. US
CENSUS BUREAU, POPULATION CHANGE AND DISTRIBUTION: 1990 TO 2000, at 6 (Apr.
2001), https://www.census.gov/prod/2001pubs/c2kbr01-2.pdf. In 1995, a lagoon
overflowed in North Carolina, spilling twenty-five million gallons of pig waste onto
land and rivers; the Exxon Valdez oil spill, by contrast, emitted half of the volume.
Brehm, supra note 32, at 812.
31
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resistance in bacteria. 34 For example, pork industry workers in many
countries are more often infected by streptococcus aureus than other
individuals who do not work in this sector. 35 The most common
bacterium is the ST 398 strain, which is multi-resistant to
antibiotics. 36 The resulting reservoirs of resistant bacteria are of
great concern from a public health and food security perspective. 37
Overuse of antimicrobials and antibiotics also increases the
probability of new treatment-resistant strains (“superbugs”) that
sometimes jump between species, and have been declared
epidemic. 38 Persons suffering from zoonoses such as A/H7N7,
AH5N1, AH1N1, and swine flu are chiefly industrial farm workers,
who often lack protection by either their employer or the state. 39
More and more organizations are documenting these human
rights violations in animal agriculture. Human Rights Watch, for
example, found that:
Employers put workers at predictable risk of serious
physical injury even though the means to avoid such
injury are known and feasible. They frustrate
workers’ efforts to obtain compensation for
workplace injuries when they occur. They crush
workers’ self-organizing efforts and rights of
association. They exploit the perceived vulnerability
Michael J. Martin et al., Antibiotics Overuse in Animal Agriculture: A Call to
Action for Health Care Providers, 105 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 2409 (2015); PEW
COMM’N, supra note 29, at 11. In 2017, the World Health Organization (WHO)
recommended that farmers and the food industry stop using antibiotics routinely to
promote growth and prevent disease in healthy animals. See Stop Using Antibiotics
in Healthy Animals to Prevent the Spread of Antibiotic Resistance, WORLD HEALTH
ORG. (Nov. 7, 2017), https://www.who.int/news-room/detail/07-11-2017-stopusing-antibiotics-in-healthy-animals-to-prevent-the-spread-of-antibiotic-resistance
(“WHO strongly recommends an overall reduction in the use of all classes of
medically important antibiotics in food-producing animals, including complete
restriction of these antibiotics for growth promotion and disease prevention without
diagnosis. Healthy animals should only receive antibiotics to prevent disease if it
has been diagnosed in other animals in the same flock, herd, or fish population.”).
35
Anne Oppliger et al., Antimicrobial Resistance of Staphylococcus Aureus Strains
Acquired by Pig Farmers from Pigs, 78 APPLIED AND ENVTL. MICROBIOLOGY 8010
(2012).
36
Id.
37
PEW COMM’N, REPORT ON ANTIMICROBIAL RESISTANCE AND HUMAN HEALTH 11
(2008); COMM’N ON GENETIC RES. FOR FOOD AND AGRIC., GLOBAL PLAN OF ACTION
FOR ANIMAL GENETIC RESOURCES AND THE INTERLAKEN DECLARATION (2007).
38
PEW COMM’N, supra note 29, at 15; WORLD HEALTH ORG., REPORT ON GLOBAL
SURVEILLANCE OF EPIDEMIC-PRONE INFECTIOUS DISEASES 25–31 (2000),
https://www.who.int/csr/resources/publications/surveillance/plague.pdf?ua=1.
39
JOCELYNE PORCHER, THE ETHICS OF ANIMAL LABOR: A COLLABORATIVE UTOPIA
57 (Palgrave Macmillan 2017).
34
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of a predominantly immigrant labor force in many
of their work sites. 40
B. Farmers’ Rights and Agricultural Exceptionalism
These inquiries and observations have brought issues to the
fore that have been plaguing animal agriculture for many years. A
key driver responsible for the ongoing proliferation of CAFO issues
are “farmers’ rights,” which denote laws and regulations set up with
the purpose of protecting farmers and their businesses by either
shielding them from lawsuits or exempting them from the law
altogether.
“Farmers’ rights” come in two forms: (i) right-to-farm laws
and (ii) exemptions from environmental and animal laws. Right-tofarm laws prevent nuisance lawsuits41 against farmers engaging in
“practices that are commonly or reasonably associated with
agricultural production.” 42 These laws declare such practices
indefeasible through statutory limitations for nuisance suits, through
exemptions from zoning and disclosure, by declaring void opposing
local ordinances, or by granting a fee recovery for the successful
defense of a nuisance lawsuit. 43 By 1992, all fifty states of the US
had enacted such laws, and equivalent legislation was passed in
Australia and Canada soon after. 44 Right-to-farm laws emerged from
an effort to preserve and promote small-scale farmers, to whom most
people have an emotional connection and who many think make a
valuable contribution to society. 45
Today, thanks to the
corporatization of animal agriculture, these laws have come to
benefit vertically integrated and monopolized corporations by
insulating their actions and giving them virtual standard-setting
authority. 46 Pointing to the host of environmental and social harms
that emerged from this blanket authorization, critics label these laws

HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, BLOOD, SWEAT, AND FEAR: WORKERS’ RIGHTS IN US
MEAT AND POULTRY PLANTS 1–2 (2004).
41
E.g., nuisance lawsuits regarding noise, odors, visual clutter, or cruelty inflicted
on animals.
42
See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 2-4-107(b)(1) (West 2009).
43
See, e.g., id.
44
Laura Alford & Sarah Berger Richardson, Right-to-Farm Legislation in Canada:
Exceptional Protection for Standard Farm Practices, 50 OTTAWA L. REV. 131, 136
(2018).
45
Id. at 150.
46
Id. at 151; David Pimentel, Ethical Issues of Global Corporatization: Agriculture
and Beyond, 83 POULTRY SCI. SYMP.: BIOETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS IN ANIMAL
PRODUCTION 321 (2004).
40

102

JOURNAL OF FOOD LAW & POLICY

[Vol.15

“right-to-harm bills.” 47 Parallel to the rise of right-to-farm laws,
agribusiness successfully lobbied for numerous exemptions from
laws seeking to protect water, land, soil, air, and, ultimately, human
health and life. 48
These exemptions and right-to-farm laws are the most
noteworthy farmers’ rights we examine herein, but they are only one
manifestation of a broader, and more pervasive problem, namely that
of agricultural exceptionalism. Agricultural exceptionalism is a
belief system that fuels a range of exemptions or laws protecting
agriculture from the purview of the public, including in the areas of
environmental law, animal law, and property law (as we examine in
this article), but also in trade law, employment law, and many other
areas. 49 Agricultural exceptionalism became “fully established as
part of the post-war welfare consensus” 50 and is today sustained by
widely held views among the public, legislators, and the judiciary
that farmers do us a service by providing the public with food. Even
with readily available evidence showing that large animal
agricultural business is often doing the opposite, as we will show in
this article, the industry has resisted substantial transformation. 51
Agricultural exceptionalism, by insulating agricultural producers
from regulation, remains the dominant paradigm.

47
Greg Stotelmyer, Right to Farm or Right to Harm?, PUB. NEWS SERV. (Apr. 3,
2015), http://www.publicnewsservice.org/2015-04-03/animal-welfare/right-to-farm
-or-right-to-harm/a45361-1.
48
See generally Alexandra Lizano & Elizabeth Rumley, States’ Right-To-Farm
Statutes, NAT‘L AGRIC. L. CTR., https://nationalaglawcenter.org/state-compilations/r
ight-to-farm/ (last updated June 11, 2019) (compilation of right-to-farm statutes for
all fifty states).
49
In the area of employment law, general health and safety regulations, minimum
wage, and overtime requirements are all subject to exceptions for agricultural
workers under the Fair Labor Standards Act. 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(6) (2006).
Regarding labor law, the most notable exemption is that the National Labor Relations
Act, the US’s primary legislation governing the rights of workers to bargain
collectively, excludes “agricultural laborers” from its definition of “employee” and
its attendant protections. 29 U.S.C. § 213(b)(12) (2006); see generally Guadalupe
T. Luna, An Infinite Distance?: Agricultural Exceptionalism and Agricultural Labor
1 U. OF PA. J. OF LAB. AND EMP. L. 487 (1998); Michael Trebilcock & Pue Kristen,
The Puzzle of Agricultural Exceptionalism in Trade Policy, 18 J. OF INT’L ECON. L.
233 (2015) (analyzing agricultural exceptionalism in trade law).
50
Carsten Daugbjerg & Peter Feindt, Post-Exceptionalism in Public Policy:
Transforming Food and Agricultural Policy, 24 J. OF EUR. PUB. POL’Y 1565, 1570
(2017).
51
CARSTEN DAUGBJERG & ALAN SWINBANK, IDEAS, INSTITUTIONS, AND TRADE: THE
WTO AND THE CURIOUS ROLE OF EU FARM POLICY IN TRADE LIBERALIZATION 12–14
(Oxford University Press 2009).
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C. North Carolina is Everywhere
The short-term impacts of animal agriculture (and, thus, the
laws exempting it) are now well-documented, 52 but the long-term
impacts and effects of these farming activities on the environments
and communities further apart are still underexplored, including their
contribution to global food shortages. 53 CAFOs remain the standard
method of generating animal products while being grossly
unsustainable from an ecological perspective and a driving cause of
food scarcity. The ever-increasing consumption of animal products
requires a significant portion of the world’s crop production, raises
cereal prices, and depletes grain available for direct human
consumption. Because meat-based diets use far more of the global
food and water resources than they provide, the high demand for
water and protein-rich plants to produce meat threatens agriculture
and drinking water supplies. 54 The inefficiency of animal agriculture
compared to plant agriculture is striking: CAFOs require ten times
the land and eleven times the fossil fuel-based energy that plant
farming uses. 55
The continuingly high contribution of animal agriculture to
food insecurity 56 has a disparate impact on the poor, locally and
internationally. Locally, agricultural business practices stifle lowincome communities, racial minorities, and migrant workers. 57
Animal agriculture is also contributing considerably to hunger and
death on foreign soil: “[e]ighty-two percent of the world’s starving
children live in countries where food is fed to animals, which are then
killed and eaten by wealthier individuals in developed countries like
See discussion infra Section II.A.
See discussion infra Sections IV.A, IV.D.
54
See FOOD & AGRIC. ORG., STATISTICAL POCKETBOOK WORLD FOOD AND
AGRICULTURE 30 (2015); UNEP, supra note 31, at 5; Felicity Carus, UN Urges
Global Move to Meat and Dairy-Free Diet, THE GUARDIAN (June 2, 2010),
https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2010/jun/02/un-report-meat-free-diet.
55
Claus Leitzmann, Nutrition Ecology: The Contribution of Vegetarian Diets, 78
AM. J. CLINICAL NUTRITION 657 (2003); David Pimentel & Marcia Pimentel,
Sustainability of Meat-Based and Plant-Based Diets and the Environment, 78 AM.
J. CLINAL NUTRITION 660S (2003).
56
FOOD & AGRIC. ORG., WORLD FOOD SUMMIT PLAN OF ACTION ¶ 1 (1996) (“Food
security exists when all people, at all times, have physical and economic access to
sufficient, safe and nutritious food to meet their dietary needs and food preferences
for an active and healthy life.”).
57
E.g., ROBERT D. BULLARD, DUMPING IN DIXIE: RACE, CLASS, AND
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY (Routledge 3d ed. 2000); Catarina Passidomo, Whose
Right to (Farm) the City? Race and Food Justice Activism Post-Katrina New
Orleans, 31 AGRIC. & HUM. VALUES 385 (2014); MARY JANE ANGELO, JASON J.
CZARNEZKI & WILLIAM S. EUBANKS II, FOOD, AGRICULTURE, AND ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW 90–91 (Envtl. Law Inst. 2013).
52
53
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the US, UK, and in Europe.” 58 As the Food and Agriculture
Organization (FAO) explains, due to the ongoing growth of CAFOs,
“Sub-Saharan Africa’s share in the global number of hungry people
could rise from 24 percent to between 40 and 50 percent” by 2050.59
In line with this prediction, in March 2017, the United Nations (UN)
announced that the world will soon witness the most severe famine
since 1945. 60 Twenty million people face the threat of starvation and
famine in Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan, and Yemen. 61
Civil society’s growing awareness of the threat of food
scarcity and dependence on foreign nations has sparked a global
movement for food sovereignty, mostly in majority world
countries. 62 In 2007, five hundred delegates from eighty countries
signed the Declaration of Nyéléni, a soft law instrument which
recognizes peoples’ right to define their own agriculture and food
Richard Oppenlander, Animal Agriculture, Hunger, and How to Feed a Growing
Global Population: Part One of Two, FORKS OVER KNIVES (Aug. 20, 2013),
https://www.forksoverknives.com/animal-agriculture-hunger-and-how-to-feed-a-gr
owing-global-population-part-one-of-two/#gs.nl6lav; see also ERIC HOLT-GIMÉNEZ,
POLICY BRIEF NO. 16: THE WORLD FOOD CRISIS: WHAT’S BEHIND IT AND WHAT CAN
WE DO ABOUT IT (Food First: Inst. for Food and Dev. Policy 2008).
59
FOOD & AGRIC. ORG., HOW TO FEED THE WORLD IN 2050, at 30 (2009).
60
See UN Aid Chief Urges Global Action as Starvation, Famine Loom for 20 Million
Across Four Countries, U.N. NEWS (Mar. 10, 2017), https://news.un.org/en/story/20
17/03/553152-un-aid-chief-urges-global-action-starvation-famine-loom-20-million
-across-four (stating “at the beginning of the year [2017] we are facing the largest
humanitarian crisis since the creation of the UN”).
61
U.N. NEWS, supra note 60. In the year 2017 alone, 1.4 million children were
expected to starve to death. UNICEF Warns That 1.4 Million Children Could Die
from Famine in Four Countries, DEUTSCHE WELLE (Feb. 21, 2017),
https://www.dw.com/en/unicef-warns-that-14-million-children-could-die-from-fam
ine-in-four-countries/a-37643854 (stating “[a]lmost 1.4 million children suffering
from severe malnutrition could die this year from famine in Nigeria, Somalia, South
Sudan and Yemen . . .”).
62
In international law, we typically speak of “developing states” or the “Third
World” to denote countries in juxtaposition to “developed countries.” These terms
imply that development is a standardized and linear process, and that certain
countries have finished developing while others are still striving to reach this form
of development. Because there are many ways in which states evolve over time, and
because nations should be recognized for their different strengths and challenges,
these terms seem both incorrect and inappropriate. In recognition thereof,
scholarship is increasingly using the terms “majority world” and “minority world.”
The former highlights the fact that the majority of the world’s population lives in
these parts of the world previously identified as “developing,“ and the latter refers
to those countries traditionally identified as “developed,” where a minority of the
world’s population resides. See, e.g., Shahidul Alam, Majority World: Challenging
the West’s Rhetoric of Democracy, 34 AMERASIA J. 87 (2008); Samantha Punch,
Exploring Children’s Agency Across Majority and Minority World Contexts, in
RECONCEPTUALISING AGENCY AND CHILDHOOD: NEW PERSPECTIVES IN CHILDHOOD
STUDIES 183 ff. (Florian Esser et al. eds., 2016).
58
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policies. 63 In the years following the declaration, Bolivia, Ecuador,
Egypt, Mali, Nepal, Senegal, Venezuela, and other states have
enshrined the right to food sovereignty in their constitutions, making
it a core aspiration of their policies to reclaim authority in decisionmaking and the production of food. 64 This movement strongly
resonates with the early motivations for right-to-farm laws, namely
to ensure that food can be produced locally and feeds the people.
Thanks to the appropriation of right-to-farm laws by corporate
giants, however, the two are now diametrically opposed: the Global
South struggles to regain security over food, while the Global North
claims a right to harm.
This brief overview of the most pressing issues that dominate
the intersections of animal agriculture, the environment, and human
rights paints a dire picture, yet a loosely connected one. In what
follows, we zoom in on the most invasive farmers’ rights in the US,
Canada, Australia, and the EU. We focus on existing laws and
regulations, but also discuss proposed bills. We show how these laws
have withstood judicial and public scrutiny even in the face of the
most flagrant pollutions and human rights violations, among others,
because they have come to protect primarily large corporations. As
we will argue, it is these farmers’ rights—forming part of the web of
agricultural exceptionalism—that make human rights violations
possible. After all, states are not only uncommitted to regulating the
issue, but they aim to declare legal grossly illegal practices. While
states are prima facie at liberty to do so under domestic law (when it
comes to environmental law, animal law, etc.), their laws are subject
to international scrutiny, particularly the international human rights
law regime, which can put a halt to the ongoing insulation of animal
agriculture.
III. The Rise of Farmers’ Rights
A. United States
Under the long-standing US common law nuisance rule,
agricultural operations could not unreasonably interfere with other
landowners’ use and enjoyment of land or cause them personal or
emotional harm. 65 In 1980, due to the rapid demographic expansion
See, e.g., Declaration of Nyéléni, NYELENI.ORG (Feb. 27, 2007), https://nyeleni.org
/spip.php?article290.
64
Adam Payne & Stanka Becheva, Food Sovereignty from the Ground Up, ILEIA
(Apr. 18, 2017), https://www.ileia.org/2017/04/18/editorial-food-sovereignty-fromthe-ground-up/.
65
Jason Jordan, A Pig in the Parlor or Food on the Table: Is Texas’ Right to Farm
Act an Unconstitutional Mechanism to Perpetuate Nuisances or Sound Public Policy
63
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and urbanization witnessed in the US, the country was estimated to
lose close to three million acres of land previously used for
agricultural purposes per year. 66 In reaction to the growing urban
sprawl, Iowa, Louisiana, and Wyoming passed the first right-to-farm
statutes in 1978. 67 The goals of these laws were to shield farmers
from nuisance suits and to prevent further loss of agricultural land. 68
Starting in the 1980s, all fifty states began to enact right-to-farm
laws, 69 a development pushed by strong agricultural lobbying and
spurred by Congressional plans to exempt farms from federal
environmental laws. 70
While US right-to-farm laws widely differ in terms of scope
and applicability, they all protect agricultural practices through one
or several of the following means:
•

The “Coming to the Nuisance Doctrine”: Nuisance
lawsuits aimed at halting disproportionate noise,
odors, visual clutter, or cruelty inflicted on animals
cannot be brought against operations that preexisted
surrounding land uses. 71

•

Statutes of Limitations: Plaintiffs can introduce a
lawsuit during a limited period of time only (usually
one year) after the beginning of a harmful activity. US

Ensuring Sustainable Growth?, 42 TEX. TECH L. REV. 943, 951 (2010); see, e.g.,
Pendoley v. Ferreira, 187 N.E.2d 143, 146–47 (Mass. 1963) (providing an example
in which a pig producer had to liquidate his business as he expanded his pig
production, due to nuisance suits by the nearby village).
66
NAT’L AGRIC. LANDS STUDY, FINAL REPORT 1981, at 8, 35 (1981) (stating “the
United States has been converting agricultural land to nonagricultural uses at the rate
of about three million acres per year . . .”). In Oakland County, for example, 50.8%
of the land area constituted farmland in 1950, while in 1978, this proportion had
shrunk to 13.9%. 1 BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, UNITED
STATES CENSUS OF AGRICULTURE: 1950, pt. 6, at 46 (1952); 1 BUREAU OF THE
CENSUS, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, 1978 CENSUS OF AGRICULTURE 1978, pt. 22, at
504 (1981).
67
Jeffry R. Gittins, Bormann Revisited: Using the Penn Central Test To Determine
the Constitutionality of Right-To-Farm Statutes, 2006 BYU L. REV. 1381, 1383.
68
Id.
69
Ross H. Pifer, Right to Farm Statutes and the Changing State of Modern
Architecture, 46 CREIGHTON L. REV. 707, 710 (2013).
70
David N. Cassuto, THE CAFO HOTHOUSE: CLIMATE CHANGE, INDUSTRIAL
AGRICULTURE AND THE LAW 8 (Animals & Soc’y Inst., 2010).
71
Terence J. Centner, Governments and Unconstitutional Takings: When Do Rightto-Farm Laws Go Too Far? 33 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. Rev. 87, 95 (2006).
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states that have adopted this rule include Minnesota,72
Mississippi, 73 Pennsylvania, 74 and Texas. 75
•

Immunity for Agricultural Startups or Business
Expansion: When agribusiness expands, or when a
new agricultural business may pose a new
environmental threat or nuisance to its neighbors,
some states, such as Georgia, deny a new running
period for statutes of limitations. They thereby allow
farms to expand to whatever size they prefer,
regardless of the nature and scale of their impact on
the environment. 76 In other states, such as Minnesota,
new claims can only be made if an operation expands
by at least 25%. 77

With right-to-farm laws in place, it is possible for
agricultural businesses to enjoy de facto immunity from law,
especially if a state chooses to combine these three means. However,
it is worth noting that, while said exemptions cover all types of
agricultural businesses, only “practices commonly or reasonably
associated with agricultural production” 78 (known as “generally
accepted agricultural management practices,” or “GAAMPs”)
remain exempt from review. 79 Moreover, many states still require
that agribusinesses do not negligently 80 or illegally 81 impact their
neighbors or public goods.
Still, CAFOs remain very well protected. In the best case,
what counts as a generally accepted practice is determined by

MINN. STAT. ANN. § 561.19(2) (West Supp. 2010).
MISS. CODE ANN. § 95-3-29(1) (West Supp. 2009).
74
3 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 951–957, §954(a) (Westlaw through 2019
Sess.).
75
TEX. AGRIC. CODE ANN. §§ 251.001–.006, § 251.004 (West Supp. 2009).
76
GA. CODE ANN. § 41-1-7(d) (West Supp. 2009) (“If the physical facilities of the
agricultural operation or the agricultural support facility are subsequently expanded
or new technology adopted, the established date of operation for each change is not
a separately and independently established date of operation and the commencement
of the expanded operation does not divest the agricultural operation or agricultural
support facility of a previously established date of operation.”).
77
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 561.19(b) (West Supp. 2010).
78
Bormann v. Bd. of Supervisors In and For Kossuth Cty., 584 N.W.2d 309,
315–21 (Iowa 1998).
79
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 823.14(4)(a) (West 2012); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 165-4
(West 2001); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 286.473 (West 1981).
80
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 413.072 (West 2010) (exempting negligent behavior).
81
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3767.13 (West 1982) (failing to exempt any action that
becomes injurious to the health, comfort, or property of individuals or of the public).
72
73
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commissions of agriculture. 82 Such bodies suffer from a democratic
deficit because they lack an electorate and, therefore, public
accountability. 83 In all other cases, the agri-food industry itself sets
the standard for GAAMPs, and farmers are allowed to set up and rely
on unwritten GAAMPs. 84 Thus, even if a practice is woefully
intrusive, it can be deemed “generally accepted.” 85 GAAMPs in
most cases do not demand adherence to practices a reasonable person
would consider adequate, but, instead, revolve around a standard of
“normalcy.” 86 “Normal farm practices” are those practices that
prevail in the industry and are shared by a large enough number of
agribusinesses. 87 This is a considerable degree of self-regulation
given to agricultural corporations that risks threatening public goods,
as the practices these corporations set often do not reflect the same
balancing of interests between economic growth, sustainability, and
food security that would be expected from legislatively-defined
standards. 88
Most states only lift CAFOs’ nuisance immunity if their
activities have “a substantial adverse effect on public health and
safety.” 89 This caveat is highly questionable from a common good
perspective, because the public cannot be assumed to have agreed to
sweeping immunities threatening public goods, such as a safe
environment, sustainable food policies, and the humane treatment of
animals. Moreover, specific provisions state that farms that did not
constitute a nuisance prior to land use changes need not comply with
GAAMPs to benefit from nuisance protection. 90 Right-to-farm laws
also often shift the burden of proof to the affected parties, who must
show that the CAFO producer acted unreasonably. 91 This conflicts
with the aforementioned long-standing rule under the common law.92
See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 286.472(d) (West 1995).
Also, the GAAMPs are neither debated and passed by parliament nor published in
administrative codes. Patricia Norris, Gary Taylor & Mark Wyckoff, When Urban
Agriculture Meets Michigan’s Right to Farm Act: The Pig’s in the Parlor, 2 MICH.
ST. L. REV. 365, 388, 397 (2011).
84
Milan Twp. v. Jaworski, No. 240444, 2003 Mich. App. LEXIS 3105, at *14 (Mich.
Ct. App. Dec. 4, 2003) (relying on the absence of a provision that determines the list
is conclusive to argue that other practices are covered as GAAMPs).
85
Alford & Berger Richardson, supra note 44, at 152.
86
Id. at 131.
87
Id. at 142–43.
88
Id. at 143.
89
WASH. REV. CODE, § 7.48.305 (2009) (emphasis added).
90
Norris, Taylor & Wyckoff, supra note 83, at 383–84 (reading MICH. COMP. LAWS
§ 286.473(1) and (2) (1995) independently).
91
Gittins, supra note 67, at 1392.
92
Garrett Chrostek, A Critique of Vermont’s Right-to-Farm Law and Proposals for
Better Protecting the State’s Agricultural Future, 36 VT. L. REV. 233, 236 (2012).
82
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Many states (such as Georgia) 93 do not provide immunity to
farmers from only private nuisance; they also shield them from
public nuisance claims, i.e., claims pertaining to nuisances
threatening public health, safety, or welfare, or community
resources, such as water supplies. 94 The right-to-farm laws of
several states also preclude nuisance claims against zoning
ordinances and other local laws. 95 In Kentucky, legislators have
gone so far as to make it a statutory rule that “[n]o agricultural or
silvicultural operation or any of its appurtenances shall be . . . subject
to any ordinance that would restrict the right of the operator of the
agricultural or silvicultural operation to utilize normal and accepted
practices.” 96
Right-to-farm laws emerged from a relatively innocuous
desire to support traditional family-run farms as more and more
people moved to the countryside. 97 Today, most continue to defend
the legitimacy of these laws by invoking this narrative. 98 However,
in the past decades, agriculture has been subject to immense
restructuring, in particular as regards the concentration of
production. As technological changes have increased the number of
animals that can be handled at a plant, producers keeping up with
economies of scale have driven out or taken over weaker competitors
through horizontal integration. Corporations with large assets began
to take over the landscape through vertical integration, setting up
mergers and acquisitions with feed producers, breeders, food
processors, and meatpackers. 99
The structural changes of
agribusiness mean that right-to-farm laws are now primarily
GA. CODE ANN. § 41-1-7 (West 2018).
Commonwealth v. MacDonald, 347 A.2d 290, 301 (Pa. 1975); Jennifer L. Beidel,
Pennsylvania’s Right-to-Farm Law: A Relief for Farmers or an Unconstitutional
Taking? 110 PENN ST. L. REV. 163, 167 (2005).
95
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 286.473 (West 2018); Charter Twp. of Shelby v.
Papesh, 704 N.W.2d. 92, 96–102 (Mich. Ct. App. 2005) (“[I]f defendants’ farm is
commercial in nature and in compliance with the GAAMPs, it is a farm operation
protected by the RTFA. The ordinance conflicts with the RTFA to the extent that it
allows plaintiff [township] to preclude a protected farm operation by limiting the
size of a farm.”).
96
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 413.072(2) (Westlaw through 2019 Sess.).
97
See Madeleine Skaller, Protecting the Right to Harm: Why State Right to Farm
Laws Should Not Shield Factory Farms from Nuisance Liability, 27 SAN JOAQUIN
AGRIC. L. REV. 209, 216 (2018) (stating “[r]ight to farm laws were passed to ensure
the viability of agricultural operations when people were moving from urban to rural
areas”). Some criticize that the fear of urban sprawl impacting agriculture is a myth
and that most complainants were in fact rural residents. Alford & Berger
Richardson, supra note 44, at 149–50.
98
Brehm, supra note 32, at 797.
99
Note, Challenging Concentration of Control in the American Meat Industry, 117
HARV. L. REV. 2643 (2004).
93
94
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profiting large-scale and industrialized methods of production, but
these laws are ill-equipped to handle the impact of these methods on
the environment, animals, and human health. Moreover, in some
cases, state legislatures have begun to limit right-to-farm laws to
commercial operations and have denied non-commercial farmers and
hobbyists the benefits of anti-nuisance protection. 100 In this sense,
and as Alford and Berger Richardson argue, “RTFs [right-to-farm
laws] are less about ensuring the right to ‘farm’ and more about
ensuring the right to cheaply ‘produce’ large quantities of food.” 101
These various features of right-to-farm laws confirm that
unlike food sovereignty legislation, which seeks to empower the
public, right-to-farm laws protect the interests of agribusiness at the
expense of the collective. In Bormann (1998), the Iowa Supreme
Court became the first US judicial institution to invalidate a state’s
right-to-farm laws—which granted farmers unlimited immunity,
regardless of how long they had been running their business. 102 The
Court found that these laws were an unconstitutional taking. 103 The
Bormann ruling, however, has been widely criticized for qualifying
the issue as a per se taking, instead of a regulatory taking. 104 Six
years later, in Gacke, the same court declared Iowa right-to-farm
laws to be in violation of the state’s constitutional clause on
inalienable rights. 105 This trend, though anxiously awaited by
agricultural industries, was followed only by few neighboring
states. 106
Besides benefitting from right-to-farm laws, animal
agriculture enjoys exemptions from environmental and animal
protection laws across the US at both the federal and state level. On
the federal plane, the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA), which provides
that polluters are responsible for the expenses of the cleanup of
hazardous substances release, does not expressly cover agricultural

Sean McElwain, The Misnomer of Right to Farm: How Right-to-Farm Statutes
Disadvantage Organic Farming, 55 WASHBURN L. J. 223, 243 (2015).
101
Alford & Berger Richardson, supra note 44, at 149.
102
Bormann, 584 N.W.2d at 309; IOWA CODE ANN. § 352.11(1)(a) (Westlaw through
2019 legislation).
103
Bormann, 584 N.W.2d at 309; IOWA CODE ANN. § 352.11(1)(a) (Westlaw through
2019 legislation).
104
Centner, supra note 71, at 124–25; Beidel, supra note 94, at 177.
105
Gacke v. Pork Xtra, L.L.C., 684 N.W.2d 168, 179 (Iowa 2004).
106
Examples of states that followed this trend include Maryland and North Carolina.
McIlrath v. Prestage Farms of Iowa, L.L.C., No. 15-1599, 2016 WL 6902328 (Iowa
Ct. App. Nov. 23, 2016); In re NC Swine Farm Nuisance Litig., No. 5:15-CV-00013BR, 2017 WL 5178038 (E.D. N.C., Nov. 8, 2017).
100
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practices. 107 While there is a recent trend to hold agricultural
producers liable under the CERCLA, 108 animal agricultural
industries continue to escape the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act (RCRA). The RCRA, the nation’s principal hazardous
waste management and disposal regulation law, fails to classify
waste from CAFOs as hazardous. 109 The situation is markedly better
under the federal Clean Water Act (CWA). Since 2002, large
CAFOs must obtain a permit under the National Pollutant Discharge
Elimination System (NPDES) to discharge animal waste, fertilizers,
and pesticides into the waters of the US. 110 Nonetheless, the CWA
remains largely toothless, as it expressly excludes agricultural
stormwater “discharges . . . [and] return flows from irrigated
agriculture,” 111 permitting “most agricultural sources to escape
Section 402 regulation . . .”112 Another major federal law, the Clean
107
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of
1980, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–9676 (1994).
108
City of Tulsa v. Tyson Foods Inc., 258 F. Supp. 2d 1263 (N.D. Okla. 2003)
(finding Tyson Foods to be liable under CERCLA due to eutrophication in Tulsa
area lakes); Sierra Club v. Seaboard Farms Inc., 387 F.3d 1167 (10th Cir. 2004)
(holding Dorman Farms, a pig CAFO, responsible for ammonia emissions); City of
Waco v. Schouten, 385 F. Supp. 2d 595 (W.D. Tex. 2005) (holding that phosphorus
in cow manure is a hazardous substance under CERCLA).
109
40 C.F.R. § 261.4(b)(2)(ii) (1999); see also 42 U.S.C.A. § 6903(27) (Westlaw
through Pub. L. No. 116-91).
110
This is because CAFOs, given the requisite size, qualify as a “point source.” To
successfully apply for a permit, CAFOs must, among others, develop and implement
nutrient management plans. See Clean Water Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-217, 91
Stat. 1566 (1977) (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387 (1997 & Supp.
III 1997)). The Clean Water Act of 1977 was amended by the National Pollutant
Discharge Elimination System Permit Regulation and Effluent Limitation
Guidelines and Standards for Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations, which
explicitly stated that “[t]his rule establishes a mandatory duty for all CAFOs to apply
for an NPDES permit and to develop and implement a nutrient [manure and
wastewater] management plan.” National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System
Permit Regulation and Effluent Limitation Guidelines and Standards for
Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations, 68 Fed. Reg. 7176 (Feb. 12, 2003)
(codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 9, 122, 123, 412).
111
33 U.S.C. § 1342(l)(1) (1997 & Supp. III 1997) (“The Administrator shall not
require a permit under this section for discharges composed entirely of return flows
from irrigated agriculture, nor shall the Administrator directly or indirectly, require
any State to require such a permit.”); 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (1997 & Supp. III 1997)
(providing that the term “point source” “does not include agricultural stormwater
discharges and return flows from irrigated agriculture”); 33 U.S.C. § 1344(f)(1)(A)
(1997 & Supp. III 1997) (exempting from the prohibition of discharge of dredged or
fill material, material “from normal farming, silviculture, and ranching activities
such as plowing, seeding, cultivating, minor drainage, harvesting for the production
of food, fiber, and forest products, or upland soil and water conservation practices”);
see also J.B. Ruhl, Farms, Their Environmental Harms, and Environmental Law, 27
ECOLOGY L. Q. 263, 295 (2000).
112
Jan G. Laitos & Heidi Ruckriegle, The Clean Water Act and the Challenge of
Agricultural Pollution, 37 VT. L. REV. 1033, 1058 (2013).
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Air Act (CAA), which regulates hazardous air pollutants, 113 exempts
all CAFOs from coverage. Indeed, the administrator has the
authority to “establish a greater threshold quantity for, or to exempt
entirely, any substance that is a nutrient used in agriculture when held
by a farmer.” 114 Even if the CAA were applicable to CAFOs, it is
important to consider that the US Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) has declined to bring cases against CAFOs based on CAA
violations. 115 As a result, environmental law has given animal farms
a “virtual license” 116 to cause habitat loss, soil erosion and
degradation, water depletion, and to pollute water and air across the
US.
Similar, if not more sweeping, exemptions have been put in
place to inhibit animal welfare claims. The North Dakota
Constitution was amended in response to California’s Proposition 2
amendment, which required all confined farmed animals to have
sufficient space to stand up, turn around freely, and fully extend
limbs and wings, by adding that:
The right of farmers and ranchers to engage in
modern farming and ranching practices shall be
forever guaranteed in this state. No law shall be
enacted which abridges the right of farmers and
ranchers to employ agricultural technology, modern
livestock production, and ranching practices. 117
Thereby, the adoption of laws that would guarantee animals
a bearable life during confinement has been rendered infeasible.
Similarly, under the New York Agriculture and Markets Law, local
laws, ordinances, rules, or regulations may restrict the operations of
agricultural districts only if public health or safety is threatened. 118
Animal welfare, though of public concern, cannot limit any of these
agricultural operations, as it is not deemed to fall under these
exceptions.
Those benefiting from these immunities and rights are
primarily corporations (rather than individual farmers), which aligns
with the growing lobbying efforts of business to secure immunity
through ag-gag laws and veggie libel laws. Ag-gag laws generally
113
Clean Air Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (1970) (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7431 (1994 & Supp. III 1997)).
114
42 U.S.C. §§ 7412(r)(5) (1994 & Supp. III 1997); see also Wilson, supra note 32,
at 441.
115
Ruhl, supra note 111, at 263.
116
Id. at 263.
117
N.D. CONST., art. XI, § 29; see Pifer, supra note 69, at 716.
118
N.Y. AGRIC. & MKTS. LAW § 305-a(1).
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criminalize activities that expose and denounce animal agricultural
activities without the consent of their owner, particularly when these
activities are inhumane, unsafe, or even illegal. 119 In the US, seven
states have passed ag-gag laws and more than twenty-four such bills
have been introduced in other states. 120 Veggie libel laws, which
establish (strict) liability for members of the public who publicly
criticize food production practices, have passed in more than thirteen
US states. 121
In addition, the federal Animal Welfare Act (AWA), the
Twenty-Eight Hour Law, and the Humane Methods of Slaughter Act
(HMSA) all turn a blind eye to farmed animals. The AWA does not
apply to farmed animals; 122 the Twenty-Eight Hour Law, which
seeks to protect animals during transport, fails to cover transport by
truck, by air, and on water (and hence most of farm animal
transportation); 123 and the HMSA, which requires farmed animals to
be rendered insensible to pain prior to being hoisted, shackled, or cut,
does not apply to chickens and fish, which represent the highest
number of animals killed for the purposes of food production. 124 On
a state level, animal anti-cruelty statutes have largely exempted farm
practices from their application because they consider them to be
“common farm practices.” 125 As Schaffner explains, this creates a
paradox by which “criminal laws, designed to protect animals from
the intentional infliction of pain and suffering, perpetuate and in fact
endorse institutionalized cruelty to animals.”126 As a consequence,
119
What is Ag-Gag Legislation?, ASPCA.ORG, https://www.aspca.org/animal-prote
ction/public-policy/what-ag-gag-legislation (last visited Dec. 21, 2019).
120
Aurora Moses & Paige Tomaselli, Industrial Animal Agriculture in the United
States: Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations (CAFOs), in INTERNATIONAL
FARM ANIMAL, WILDLIFE AND FOOD SAFETY LAW 185, 199 (Gabriela Steier & Kiran
K. Patel eds., 2017).
121
Those are Alabama, Arizona, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Louisiana,
Mississippi, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Dakota, and Texas. Id.
122
7 U.S.C.A. § 2131, § 2132(g) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-91); see F.
Barbara Orlans, The Injustice of Excluding Laboratory Rats, Mice, and Birds from
the Animal Welfare Act, 10 KENNEDY INST. OF ETHICS J. 229 (2000) (discussing the
limits set by the US AWA on research animals); Gaverick Matheny & Cheryl Leahy,
Farm-Animal Welfare, Legislation and Trade, 70 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 325, 334
(2007) (discussing the same for farm animals); David J. Wolfson & Mariann
Sullivan, Foxes in the Hen House, in ANIMAL RIGHTS: CURRENT DEBATES AND NEW
DIRECTIONS 206 (Cass Sunstein & Martha Nussbaum eds., 2004). The AWA is,
therefore, inapplicable to 95% of all animals raised in the US. Id.; Matheny & Leahy,
supra.
123
49 U.S.C. § 80502(a) (2019).
124
7 U.S.C. §§ 1901, 1902(a) (2019); 9 C.F.R. § 301.2 (2019).
125
See PAMELA D. FRASCH ET AL., ANIMAL LAW IN A NUTSHELL 335 (West Acad. publ’g
2d ed. 2016); Wolfson & Sullivan, supra note 122, at 212–16.
126
JOAN E. SCHAFFNER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ANIMALS AND THE LAW 28 (2011); Paul
Waldau, Second Wave Animal Law and the Arrival of Animal Studies, in ANIMAL
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only wrongs committed against animals that do not restrict farmers’
common economic interests (such as causing animals to starve or
giving them inappropriate shelter) constitute animal cruelty. 127
Considering that the US is home to over 450,000 CAFOs, 128 these
far-reaching exemptions have the effect of rendering most laws
generally inapplicable to the animal agricultural sector.
B. Canada
Nuisance laws protecting property owners from interference
in their property rights have been part of a long-standing common
law rule in Canada since the 1880s. 129 Under these nuisance laws,
plaintiffs could ask the court to issue an injunction to cease
disturbance (such as excessive noise, manure smell or overflow, or
even excessive screams by animals), and seek monetary damages and
compensation for harms. 130
Over the past forty years, however, all states and provinces
of Canada have passed right-to-farm laws that greatly limit antinuisance claims. The first right-to-farm laws were enacted in
Manitoba in 1976. 131 They were followed by Quebec (1978), New
Brunswick (1986), Alberta (1987), Ontario (1988), British Columbia
(1989), Saskatchewan (1995), Prince Edward Island (1998), and
Newfoundland and Labrador (2003). 132 The initial purpose of these
laws was to prevent urban encroachment on agricultural land through
nuisance complaints about odor, noise, chemicals, pests, etc.,
because “those moving into the country may be seeking fresh air,
quiet, and scenery. The expectations of new country residents can
come into conflict with agriculture when they experience the realities
of modern agricultural production.”133

LAW AND WELFARE: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 37 (Deborah Cao & Steven
White eds., 2016).
127
E.g., Westfall v. State, 10 S.W.3d 85 (Tex. Ct. App. 1999); see also FRASCH ET
AL., supra note 125, at 79.
128
Wilson, supra note 32, at 440.
129
BETH BILSON, THE CANADIAN LAW OF NUISANCE (Butterworths 1991); Rylands
v. Fletcher [1868], UKHL 1, 3 H.L. 330.
130
Patrick McCormally, Right-to-Farm Legislation in Canada, PROBE INT’L 1 (July
2007), http://www.probeinternational.org/envirowaterarticles/rightofarmcanada.pdf.
131
Id.
132
Id.
133
Keith Wilson, Are You Losing Your Right to Farm?, 20 WCDS ADVANCES IN
DAIRY TECH. 245, 246 (2008).
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The scope of Canadian right-to-farm laws is typically
restricted to “normal farm practices.” British Columbia, for instance,
defines such a practice as one that “is conducted by a farm business
in a manner consistent with”:
(a) proper and accepted customs and standards as
established and followed by similar farm businesses
under similar circumstances, and
(b) any standards prescribed by the Lieutenant
Governor in Council, and includes a practice that
makes use of innovative technology in a manner
consistent with proper advanced farm management
practices . . . 134
The burden of proof usually lies on the complainant, who
must show that a disturbance lies outside normal agricultural
practices. 135 The effect of right-to-farm laws in Canada is analogous
to that of their US counterparts: no damages can be awarded for the
infringement of private property by “normal agricultural practices,”
and no injunction can be obtained to stop the nuisance. 136
The more disturbing aspect of right-to-farm laws in Canada
and elsewhere, however, is that the concept of “normal agricultural
or farm practice” may render legal otherwise illegal practices, such
as dumping toxic waste or inflicting cruelty to animals, provided a
sufficiently representative number of farmers engages in them. 137
This is, for example, the case in Saskatchewan. 138 Another
illustration is Ontario’s Farming and Food Production Protection
Act, which determines that “[n]o municipal by-law applies to restrict
a normal farm practice carried on as part of an agricultural
operation.” 139 Thus, not only are people prevented from accessing
courts to ask for economic and injunctive relief: they are further
barred from using their political rights in local policy-making. 140
Because environmental regulation may fall under the authority of the
municipalities, scholars have linked rising environmental pollution
Farm Practices Protection (Right to Farm) Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 131, s. 1 (Can.
B.C.).
135
E.g., Agriculture Operations Practices Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. A-7, s. 2(3) (Can.
Alta.); see also R.J. Farms & Grain Transport Ltd. v. Saskatchewan (Agric. Review
Bd.), 2011 SKQB 185 (Can. Sask.).
136
McCormally, supra note 130, at 2.
137
Id.
138
The Agricultural Operations Act, R.S.S. 1995, c. A-12.1, s. 3, amended by S.S.
2013, c. 27 (Can. Sask.).
139
Farming and Food Production Protection Act, S.O. 1998, c. 1, 6(1) (Can. Ont.).
140
Alford & Berger Richardson, supra note 44, at 156.
134
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and degradation to the adoption of right-to-farm laws. 141 Only a few
Canadian provinces (such as British Columbia, Prince Edward
Island, and Quebec) have determined that nuisance suits can only be
excluded if the practices do not violate other laws, such as
environmental protection acts or laws protecting human health. 142
Canadian right-to-farm laws provide that claims about
nuisances are adjudicated by the Agricultural Operations Review
Board, and not by a court. 143 The board is headed by current or
former farmers, 144 is only rarely used, and does not make its
decisions publicly available.145 Although judicial bodies can review
board decisions using the standard of reasonableness, 146 they usually
show great deference, commending the specialized knowledge of
these boards and their ability to gather firsthand evidence. 147 The
immunization from administrative adjudication, paired with broad
judicial deference and strict time limits for appeal, all “insulate the
farming industry from civil liability.”148
In Canada, agriculture is mainly regulated on a provincial
level, and occasionally on a municipal level, with the exception of,
inter alia, the Canadian Environmental Protection Act, the Pest
Control Products Act, the Water Act, and the Fisheries Act. 149 All
of Canada’s provinces lay down environmental standards that
prohibit depositing pollutants into water bodies unless the discharge

141
ELIZABETH BRUBAKER, GREENER PASTURES: DECENTRALIZING THE REGULATION
OF AGRICULTURAL POLLUTION (Andrew Stark ed., 2007); DAVID R. BOYD,
UNNATURAL LAW: RETHINKING CANADIAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY

(Sarah Wight ed., 2003).
142
E.g., Farm Practices Act, R.S.P.E.I. 1998, c. 87, s. 2 (Can. P.E.I.); Act Respecting
the Preservation of Agricultural Land and Agricultural Activities, R.S.Q. 1996,
c. 26, s. 79.17–79.19.2, s. 100 (Can. Que.); Farm Practices Protection (Right to Farm)
Act, R.S.B.C. 1996 c. 131, s. 2 (Can. B.C.).
143
McCormally, supra note 130, at 3.
144
In Saskatchewan, the Board is composed of six members representing the milk
industry, cattle feeder producers, three producers at large, and a representative of the
Saskatchewan Association of Rural Municipalities. Id.
145
There is an exception for the Farm Industry Review Board of British Columbia,
which publishes all of its decisions online. Id.
146
R.J. Farms & Grain Transport Ltd. v. Saskatchewan (Agric. Review Bd.), 2011
SKQB 185, paras. 17–22 (Can. Sask.).
147
Lubchynski v. British Columbia (Farm Practices Bd.), 2004 BCSC 657 (Can.
B.C.) (“[A]bsent special circumstances, questions of whether, in the context of a
nuisance action, a disturbance constitutes a ‘normal farm practice’ should generally
be left to the Board to determine.”); see also Lone Pine Comm. v. Alberta (Nat. Res.
Conservation Bd.), 2005 ABCA 348, paras. 14, 16 (Can. Alta.); Pyke v. Tri Gro
Enterprises Ltd. 2001 CarswellOnt 2762, paras. 55–57 (Can. Ont. C.A.).
148
Alford & Berger Richardson, supra note 44, at 156.
149
BRUBAKER supra note 141, at 10.
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has been expressly permitted. 150 Some have also introduced
“minimum distance separation” requirements between livestock
facilities and their neighbors. 151 Among the Canadian provinces,
only Quebec 152 and Saskatchewan 153 have specific acts designed to
cover CAFOs. Many of the laws still lack limitations on livestock
densities or total sizes. 154
Another notable weakness of
environmental policy regulation in Canada is the fact that these are
merely guidelines or best practices issued by private organizations.
As a result, CAFO regulation chiefly lies with corporate authorities,
and the odor and water effects of CAFOs remain outside the reach of
collective agricultural supply management policies. 155
In May 2000, the city of Walkerton, Ontario, suffered a
widespread contamination of Escherichia coli and Campylobacter
jejuni bacteria that came from manure that had been spread on a
nearby farm, as a consequence of which seven people died and many
more suffered long-lasting injuries. 156 Since then, many provinces
have reviewed their laws, 157 though sweeping exemptions are still
common. To date, the rules on waste of the Ontario Environmental
Protection Act do “not apply to animal wastes disposed of in
accordance with both normal farming practices and the regulations

E.g., Environmental Management and Protection Act, R.S.S. 2010, c. E-10.22,
s. 8 (Can. Sask.); e.g., Clean Water Act, R.S.N.B. 1989, c. C-6.1, s. 12(1) (Can.
N.B.); e.g., Environment Quality Act, C.Q.L.R., c. Q-2, s. 20, 22 (Can. Que.); e.g.,
Règlement sur les exploitations agricoles, R.R.Q., Q-2 r. 26, s. 4–5 (Can. Que.).
151
Most of these range at minimum at 150 meters. E.g., Standards and
Administration Regulation, Alta. Reg. 267/2001, s. 3 (Can. Alta.). The distance is
typically calculated based on a specific formula. E.g., A x B x C; A equals 500
meters, B equals manure factor, and C equals livestock factor. JERRY SPEIR ET AL.,
COMPARATIVE STANDARDS FOR INTENSIVE LIVESTOCK OPERATIONS IN CANADA,
MEXICO, AND THE UNITED STATES 54 (Comm’n for Envtl. Cooperation 2003).
152
Agricultural Operations Regulation, C.Q.L.R., c. Q-2, s. 1–2 (Can. Que.).
153
Agricultural Operations Act, R.S.S. 1995, c. A-12.1 s. 19–23 (Can. Sask.).
154
Most of them only do so indirectly via Nutrient Management Plans (NMPs). A
Review of Selected Jurisdictions and Their Approach to Regulating Intensive
Farming Operations, ONT. MINISTRY OF AGRIC., FOOD, AND RURAL AFFAIRS,
http://www.omafra.gov.on.ca/english/agops/otherregs1.htm (last udpated May 23,
2003).
155
Joel Novek, Intensive Livestock Operations, Disembedding, and Community
Polarization in Manitoba, 7 SOC’Y & NAT. RESOURCES 567, 567 (2003).
156
Scott Prudham, Poisoning the Well: Neoliberalism and the Contamination of
Municipal Water in Walkerton, Ontario, 35 GEOFORUM 343, 349 (2004).
157
Until relatively recently, environmental policies have also exempted Canadian
agriculture from scrutiny. Predrag Rajsic et al., Canadian Agricultural
Environmental Policy: From the Right to Farm to Farming Right, in THE ECONOMICS
OF REGULATION IN AGRICULTURE: COMPLIANCE WITH PUBLIC AND PRIVATE
STANDARDS 55, 56 (Floor Brouwer, Glenn Fox, Roel Jongenee & R. A. Jongeneel
eds., 2012).
150
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made under the Nutrient Management Act.”158 Similarly, under the
British Columbia Environmental Management Act, rules on waste
disposal do not prohibit “emission into the air of soil particles or grit
in the course of agriculture or horticulture.” 159 Under the Manitoba
Environment Act, “[a] person involved in an agricultural operation”
will not be punished for the unauthorized release of pollutants “if the
release occurred through the use of normal farm practices.”160
Analogously to their US counterparts, Canadian agricultural
industries enjoy substantial discretion as to how they treat the
animals they own. Cruelty inflicted on animals used for agricultural
purposes is exempt under the laws of Alberta, 161 British Columbia,162
Manitoba, 163 Nova Scotia, 164 Ontario, 165 Prince Edward Island, 166
Quebec, 167 Saskatchewan, 168 and Yukon. 169 Thus, in these
provinces, “common farm practices,” regardless of whether they
inflict suffering or even blatant cruelty on animals, never constitute
animal cruelty in a legal sense. 170 As a consequence, harm caused to
animals in the agricultural sector is deemed legal. 171
C. Australia
Australian law (like English law, upon which it heavily
draws) in principle provides that claims can be brought against both
public and private nuisances to stop a nuisance and to claim
Environmental Protection Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. E.19, s. 6(2) (Can. Ont.).
Environmental Management Act, S.B.C. 2003, c. 53, s. 2(6)(5)(i) (Can. B.C.).
160
The Environment Act, C.C.S.M. 2019, c. E125, 30.1(2) (Can. Man.).
161
Animal Protection Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. A-41, s. 2(2) (Can. Atla.) (“This section
does not apply if the distress results from an activity carried on in accordance with
the regulations or in accordance with reasonable and generally accepted practices of
animal care, management, husbandry, hunting, fishing, trapping, pest control or
slaughter.”).
162
Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 372, s. 24.02 (Can. B.C.)
(“A person must not be convicted of an offence under this Act in relation to an animal
in distress if . . . the distress results from an activity that is carried out in accordance
with reasonable and generally accepted practices of animal management that apply
to the activity in which the person is engaged, unless the person is an operator and
those practices are inconsistent with prescribed standards.”).
163
Animal Care Act, C.C.S.M. 2015, c. A84, s. 2(2) (Can. Man.).
164
Animal Protection Act, S.N.S. 2008, c. 33, s. 21(4) (Can. N.S.).
165
Ontario Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act, R.S.O. 1990,
c. O.36, s. 2(a) (Can. Ont.).
166
Animal Health and Protection Act, R.S.P.E.I. 2005, c. A-11.1, s. 4(1) (Can.
P.E.I.).
167
Animal Welfare and Safety Act, C.Q.L.R. 2016, c. B-3.1, s. 7 (Can. Que.).
168
Animal Protection Act, R.S.S. 2018, c. A-21.2, s. 2(3)(b) (Can. Sask.).
169
Animal Protection Act, R.S.Y. 2002, c. 6, s. (3)(3) (Can. Yukon).
170
See also Wolfson & Sullivan, supra note 122, at 205.
171
See also id.
158
159
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damages. 172 Sometimes, however, the activity at stake is authorized
under the law of the Australian states (New South Wales,
Queensland, South Australia, Tasmania, Victoria, and Western
Australia) and territories. 173 Compared to the US and Canada,
Australian right-to-farm legislation is recent and scarce.
Like most states, Australia witnessed “a socio-historical
transition from small, family-operated farming concerns to large,
corporate-owned agricultural enterprises.” 174 As Alex Bruce and
Thomas Faunce observe, this development severed the close
relationship and emotional bond that farmers had with their animals
and the environment. 175 Still, in the early 1990s, Australian authors
noted that the US experience with right-to-farm laws did not provide
compelling reasons for introducing similar legislation in Australia.176
The first and, to date, only 177 Australian right-to-farm law—the
Primary Industries Activities Protection Act 1995—was passed by
Tasmania in 1995. 178 The reasons leading to the adoption of the Act
resemble those that motivated the passing of analogous legislation in
North America, namely the concerns that growing urbanization
might jeopardize or constrain farming 179 and that environmental
regulation would restrict farming practices. 180 In light of these
concerns, the Tasmanian Act aims, on the one hand, to “protect
persons engaged in primary industry by limiting the operation of the
common law of nuisance in respect of certain activities that are
The law of nuisance is based on the common law, and it has been codified in
some statutes. See, e.g., Primary Industries Activities Protection Act 1995 (Tas.)
s. 3(1) (Austl.).
173
One example is the statutory exceptions established by the Civil Liability Acts
adopted in various Australian states. See, e.g., Wrongs Act 1958 (Vict.) s 30 (Austl.);
Civil Liability Act 2002 (N.S.W.) s 72(1) (Austl.).
174
Alex Bruce & Thomas Faunce, Food Production and Animal Welfare Legislation
in Australia: Failing Both Animals and the Environment, in INTERNATIONAL FARM
ANIMAL, WILDLIFE AND FOOD SAFETY LAW 359, 360 (Gabriela Steier & Kiran K.
Patel eds., 2017).
175
Id. at 363.
176
E.g., John Paterson, A Right to Farm; A Right to Live?, 28 AUSTRALIAN PLANNER
8, 8 (1990).
177
GARETH GRIFFITH, NSW PARLIAMENTARY RESEARCH SERV., RIGHT TO FARM
LAWS 10 (2014), https://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/researchpapers/Documents/rig
ht-to-farm-laws/The%20right%20to%20farm.pdf.
178
Primary Industries Activities Protection Act 1995 (Tas.) (Austl.).
179
DEP’T OF PRIMARY INDUS., PARKS, WATER & ENV’T., REVIEW OF THE PRIMARY
INDUSTRIES ACTIVITIES PROTECTION ACT 1995–ISSUES PAPER 9 (2014). Such
concerns are for instance expressed by the Victorian Farmers Federation. VICTORIAN
FARMERS FED’N., INQUIRY INTO THE SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT OF AGRIBUSINESS
IN OUTER SUBURBAN MELBOURNE (2009).
180
E.g., ANDREW MACINTOSH & RICHARD DENNISS, PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THE
ENVIRONMENT:SHOULD FARMERS HAVE A RIGHT TO COMPENSATION? (Austl. Inst.
2004), https://www.tai.org.au/sites/default/files/DP74_8.pdf.
172
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incidental to efficient and commercially viable primary
production.”181 It limits the power of courts to order the complete
cessation of the activity at stake. 182 On the other hand, for farming
activities not to constitute a nuisance, a number of conditions must
be fulfilled, including the condition that “the activity is not being
improperly or negligently carried out.” 183 Moreover, farming
activities must respect state and Commonwealth laws and council bylaws, 184 and they cannot derogate from “the operation or effect of any
other Act.” 185 In other terms, environmental regulation may still
apply. In light of these caveats, it is surprising that the Tasmanian
Environmental Management and Pollution Control Act of 1994
provides that an activity that conforms with the state’s right-to-farm
law does not constitute an environmental nuisance. 186 When
reviewing the Primary Industries Activities Protection Act in 2014,
the Tasmanian government expressed its intent “to strengthen the
legal protection of farmers” in the future. 187
While Tasmania is, as mentioned, the only Australian state
that has adopted a right-to-farm law, other states have recently
witnessed similar legislative proposals. In New South Wales,
member of the state parliament, Don Page, introduced the Protection
of Agricultural Production (Right-to-Farm) Bill in 2005, which is
based on similar concerns as those that led to the enactment of rightto-farm legislation in Tasmania and in the US. 188 However, the Bill
did not garner enough support in the state parliament. 189 Meanwhile,
farmers in New South Wales continue to lobby for such a right.190
The government has adopted a “right-to-farm policy” to respond to
these concerns and to address land use conflicts. 191
Primary Industries Activities Protection Act 1995 (Tas.) (Austl.).
Id. at s 5(1).
183
Id. at s 4(d).
184
Id. at s 3(1).
185
Id. at s 6.
186
Environmental Management and Pollution Control Act 1994 (Tas.) s 53(5)(b)(i)
(Austl.); see also GRIFFITH, supra note 177, at 11–12.
187
DEP’T OF PRIMARY INDUS., supra note 179, at 9; see generally AUSTRALIAN
NETWORK OF ENVTL. DEF. OFFICES INC., SUBMISSION TO THE PRODUCTIVITY
COMMISSION ON REGULATION OF AGRICULTURE: ISSUES PAPER (2015).
188
Protection of Agricultural Production (Right to Farm) Bill 2005 (N.S.W.)
(Austl.); see also GRIFFITH, supra note 177, at 13–15 (showing the similarity of the
clauses used in the legislation).
189
GRIFFITH, supra note 177, at 13.
190
Nicola Bell & Samantha Noon, NSW Farmers Want Their Right to Farm
Enshrined in Law, NSW FARMERS (Jan. 2019), http://www.nswfarmers.org.au/NSW
FA/Posts/The_Farmer/Rural_Affairs/NSW_farmers_want_their_right_to_farm_ens
hrined_in_law.aspx.
191
See Right to Farm Policy, N.S.W. GOV’T DEP’T OF PRIMARY INDUS.,
https://www.dpi.nsw.gov.au/agriculture/lup/legislation-and-policy/right-to-farm-po
181
182
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In South Australia, member of the state legislative council
Robert Brokenshire repeatedly proposed the adoption of US-inspired
right-to-farm legislation. 192 One of the stated goals of the bill is to
“ensure that protected farming activities are not subject to civil or
criminal liability under environmental legislation.”193 So far, none
of Brokenshire’s proposals have been endorsed by the state
parliament, but farmers are pushing for the right-to-farm to be
recognized by the law. 194
Further steps have been taken in order to protect farmers’
rights in Australia.
One example is the Intergovernmental
Agreement on a National Water Initiative. 195 This agreement—
between the Commonwealth of Australia and the governments of the
Australian Capital Territory, New South Wales, the Northern
Territory, Queensland, South Australia, and Victoria—grants
farmers a right to compensation when the amount of water they need
to irrigate their fields is restricted by environmental policy. 196
Moreover, farming lobbies have sought to obtain a statutory right to
compensation for environmental measures. They have done so by
drawing on the Inquiry Report published by the Australian
government’s Productivity Commission in 2004. 197 This report
states:
[T]he wider public should bear the costs of actions
to promote public-good environmental services—
such as biodiversity, threatened species preservation
and greenhouse gas abatement—that it apparently
licy (last visited Dec. 30, 2019).
192
See GRIFFITH, supra note 177, at 16–18 (explaining the bill was also introduced
in 2009, 2010, 2012, and 2015).
193
Right to Farm Bill 2012 (S. Austl.) ss 4–5 (Austl.).
194
Tom Nancarrow & Sowaibah Hanifie, Land Clash: Farmers Battle Urban Creep
With ‘Right to Farm’ Legislation, ABC RURAL (Mar. 13, 2018, 12:13 AM),
https://www.abc.net.au/news/rural/2018-03-13/sa-growers-push-for-right-to-farm-l
egislation-amid-urbanisation/95433062019.
195
Intergovernmental Agreement On a National Water Initiative Between the
Commonwealth of Australia and the Governments of New South Wales, Victoria,
Queensland, South Australia, the Australian Capital Territory and the Northern
Territory, AUSTRALIAN GOV’T DEP’T OF AGRIC. (June 25, 2004),
https://www.agriculture.gov.au/sites/default/files/sitecollectiondocuments/water/Int
ergovernmental-Agreement-on-a-national-water-initiative.pdf.
196
See, e.g., id. at ¶ 50. But cf. MACINTOSH & DENNISS, supra note 180, at 2
(providing a critical appraisal of the intergovernmental agreement).
197
E.g., MACINTOSH & DENNISS, supra note 180, at 2. The Productivity Commission
is an independent body advising the Australian government on a range of issues
pertaining to industry. See Productivity Commission Act 1998 (Cth) (Austl.)
(defining the functions of the Commission).
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demands, and which are likely to impinge
significantly on the capacity of landholders to utilise
their land for production. 198
It is also important to stress that farmed animals are, in
practice, excluded from the scope of Australian animal welfare
legislation. Since the 1980s, the Australian states and territories have
typically been regulating farmed animal welfare in codes. These
codes are often based on Model Codes of Practice elaborated by
federal and local industries ministers. 199 Yet, Steven White notes
that such codes are significantly less protective of animals than
standard animal welfare legislation because farmers are among the
issuers of the codes and they themselves are not legally obliged to
comply with the codes. 200 More generally, scholars highlight that the
regulation of factory farming is hampered by lobbying efforts of the
farming industry and conflicts of interest on the part of the
regulators. 201 A further issue is the use of indeterminate language,
which leaves considerable discretion to decisionmakers and may
serve the interests of the factory farming industry. 202
A contrary trend to these laws and legislative proposals
consists in limiting farmers’ rights—or at least in not taking those
rights for granted. Such a tendency is observed in the state of
Victoria, where the Sales of Land Amendment Act 2014 provides
that prospective purchasers of land must be given a due diligence
checklist. 203 The checklist recommends that potential buyers of land
in a rural zone assess whether the “surrounding land use [is]
compatible with [their] lifestyle expectations . . .”204
PRODUCTIVITY COMM’N, IMPACTS OF NATIVE VEGETATION AND BIODIVERSITY
REGULATIONS: PRODUCTIVITY COMMISSION INQUIRY REPORT NO. 29
(Commonwealth of Austl. 2004), https://www.pc.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/000
5/49235/nativevegetation.pdf; MACINTOSH & DENNISS, supra note 180, at 8.
199
Arnja Dale, Animal Welfare Codes and Regulations–The Devil in Disguise?, in
ANIMAL LAW IN AUSTRALASIA 174 (Peter White et al. eds., 2d ed. 2013).
200
Steven White, Regulation of Animal Welfare in Australia and the Emergent
Commonwealth: Entrenching the Traditional Approach of the States and Territories
or Laying the Ground for Reform? 35 FED. L. REV. 347, 355 (2007); see also Bruce
& Faunce, supra note 174, at 381.
201
Jed Goodfellow, Regulatory Capture and the Welfare of Farm Animals in
Australia, in ANIMAL LAW AND WELFARE–INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 195, 195
(Deborah Cao & Steven White eds., 2016); Elizabeth Ellis, Making Sausages & Law:
The Failure of Animal Welfare Laws to Protect Both Animals and Fundamental
Tenets of Australia’s Legal System, 4 AUSTL. ANIMAL PROTECTION L. J. 6, 9 (2010).
202
Ellis, supra note 201, at 8.
203
Sales of Land Amendment Act 2014 (Vict.) s 5 (Austl.).
204
Due Diligence Checklist–for Home and Residential Property Buyers, CONSUMER
AFFAIRS VICT., https://www.consumer.vic.gov.au/duediligencechecklist (last visited
Nov. 26, 2019); see also Sales of Land Amendment Act 2014 (Vict.) s 5 (Austl.); see
198
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Notwithstanding, the Australian legal landscape paints an
overall dreadful picture: the various measures and compensatory
claims in place to protect farmers neglect to recognize that the
environment is a public good. This is all the more worrisome given
Australian farmers’ intent to further intensify their production to
meet an ever-growing global demand (especially in Asia) for animal
products. 205 Another obstacle is the multilayered and fragmented
character of the Australian regulatory framework pertaining to
animals. 206
D. European Union
In contrast to the other jurisdictions under scrutiny in this
paper, right-to-farm legislation is, by and large, foreign to EU law.
One important explanation for this is that agriculture and fisheries
are a shared competence between the EU and its member states, 207
and the EU can only act pursuant to the principle of conferral. 208
Moreover, when comparing agricultural policies in and outside the
EU, and more generally across states, one component to factor in is
the demand for environmental regulation tailored to the
characteristics of the agriculture of one state or group of states.209
The present subsection examines how EU law regulates the activity
of CAFOs. It focuses on the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy
(CAP), which represents a substantial share of the EU budget. 210 It
also examines EU laws on animal welfare, which apply to animals in
CAFOs.
The CAP, the establishment of which dates back to the
Treaty of Rome, has undergone various changes since the late

also New Landholders, AGRIC. VICT., http://agriculture.vic.gov.au/agriculture/farmmanagement/business-management/new-landholders (last visited Nov. 26, 2019)
(drawing the attention of prospective purchasers to their legal obligations and
recommending sustainable land management).
205
Bruce & Faunce, supra note 174, at 366.
206
Id. at 389.
207
Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
art. 4(2)(d), June 7, 2016, 2016 O.J. (C 202) 47.
208
Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union, arts. 4–5, June 7, 2016,
2016 O.J. (C 202) 13.
209
For instance, Rajsic et al. note that “the demand for agricultural environmental
regulation in countries like the Netherlands and Belgium might be much more
intense than would be the case in relatively low nutrient intensity agricultures like
Australia, Argentina and Canada.ˮ Rajsic et al., supra note 157, at 61.
210
See Reform of the Common Agricultural Policy Post 2013, EUROPEAN COUNCIL,
https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/cap-reform/# (last visited Nov. 25,
2019) (noting that the CAP policy for 2014-2020 takes up 38% of the EU’s overall
budget, but that the percentage should drop over the next few years).

124

JOURNAL OF FOOD LAW & POLICY

[Vol.15

1950s. 211 Initially, reforms were primarily aimed at improving the
economic efficiency of farming—for instance, by encouraging largescale agriculture. 212 More recently, the CAP has shifted to
incorporate non-economic concerns, including health, social
concerns, animal welfare, and environmental considerations. 213 One
important reform occurred in 2003 with the adoption of the Single
Payment Scheme (granting direct payments to farmers) and the
decoupling of subsidies from the types (and quantities) of crops
produced. 214 Instead, payments became contingent on farmers
complying with specific environmental, animal welfare, and food
safety standards (this process is known as “cross-compliance”). 215
The last reform of the CAP entered into force in 2014 and
covers the period of 2014-2020. 216 It provides for the so-called
“greening” of farm payments, i.e., the financial encouragement of
agricultural businesses that are “beneficial for the climate and the
environment.” 217 It also seeks to reduce inequalities between smallscale and large-scale farming, e.g., by introducing a cap on subsidies
for farms exceeding a specific size. 218
Both the official webpage of the Directorate General for Agriculture and Rural
Development and the webpage of the Commissioner for Agriculture and Rural
Development provide today’s focus of the CAP. Agriculture and Rural
Development, EUROPEAN COMM’N, https://ec.europa.eu/info/departments/agricultu
re-and-rural-development_en (last visited Nov. 25, 2019); Commissioner of the
Agriculture & Rural Development, EUROPEAN COMM’N, https://ec.europa.eu/comm
ission/commissioners/2014-2019/hogan_en (last visited Nov. 25, 2019).
212
E.g., Memorandum on the Reform of Agriculture in the European Economic
Community and Annexes, at ¶¶ 36, 89, COM (68), 1000 Parts A and B (Dec. 18,
1968), https://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/sites/agriculture/files/cap-history/crisis-years
-1970s/com68-1000_en.pdf.
213
Alicia Epstein, The Ecological and Perpetual Dimensions of European Food
Security: The Case for Sustainable Agriculture, in AGRICULTURAL LAW CURRENT
ISSUES FROM A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 19, 20 (Mariagrazia Alabrese et al. eds., 2017).
214
Id. at 34.
215
Id. at 32.
216
EUROPEAN COUNCIL, supra note 210.
217
Regulation 1307/2013, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17
December 2013 on Establishing Rules for Direct Payments to Farmers Under
Support Schemes Within the Framework of the Common Agricultural Policy and
Repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 637/2008 and Council Regulation (EC) No
73/2009, 2013 O.J. (L 347) 608, art. 37 [hereinafter Regulation 1307/2013]. But cf.
CHARLES E. HANRAHAN & JEFFREY ZINN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 32624, GREEN
PAYMENTS IN THE U.S. AND EUROPEAN UNION AGRICULTURAL POLICY 1–21 (2005),
https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metacrs9126/m1/1/high_res_d/RL32624_
2005Nov22.pdf (providing a skeptical view on whether the European model can
inspire other jurisdictions to adopt the same legislations, as it is unclear whether
some aspects of EU policy, such as cross-compliance, could garner enough political
support elsewhere, for example in the US).
218
Regulation 1307/2013, supra note 217, at art. 11(1).
211
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The CAP has been criticized on several counts. 219 With
respect to the 2014 amendments, Diane Ryland notes that “[t]he
reformed CAP instruments are disappointing in that they do not aim
explicitly and directly to improve farm animal welfare.” 220 Others
criticize the fact that the CAP leads to deforestation 221 and other
types of environmental degradation, 222 or that it does not sufficiently
support small-scale farming. 223 Another point is that the CAP does
not prohibit specific practices. Instead, it merely creates incentives
for farmers to conform to specific environmental and animal welfare
standards.
In 2018, the EU Commission published regulatory proposals
to “modernize and simplify” the CAP for 2021-2027. 224 The budget
proposed for this period is expected to represent close to one-third of
the total EU budget. 225 The Commission’s proposal moves away
from a “one-size-fits-all” approach to a more flexible scheme,
allowing Members States to better account for local specificities. 226
It puts greater emphasis on environmental goals and on fighting
climate change. Through the new CAP, the Commission also seeks
to encourage “small and medium sized family farms.”227 At the time
of writing, the EU institutions were debating the new CAP. 228 The
extent to which the proposal will be accepted and implemented
remains to be seen.
Several EU legal instruments deal with animal welfare in
CAFOs. One example is the Directive 98/58/EC,229 which regulates
See, e.g., FRIENDS OF THE EARTH EUR., A NEW FOOD AND AGRICULTURE POLICY
FOR THE EUROPEAN UNION (2010), https://www.foeeurope.org/sites/default/files/cap
219

_pp_full_final1.pdf (highlighting the range of problems caused by CAFOs in the
EU).
220
Diane Ryland, Animal Welfare in the Reformed Common Agricultural Policy:
Wherefore Art Thou?, 17 ENVTL. L. REV. 22, 22 (2015).
221
E.g., Markus Sommerauer, Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) of the EU,
FLEGT and REDD+, FOREST INDUS., http://www.forestindustries.eu/content/comm
on-agricultural-policy-cap-eu-flegt-and-redd (last visited Nov. 23, 2019).
222
Epstein, supra note 213, at 20.
223
E.g., FRIENDS OF THE EARTH, BRIEFING: FACTORY FARMING IN EUROPE: THE
IMPACTS AND OUR DEMANDS OF THE COMMON AGRICULTURAL POLICY 2 (2012),
https://www.foe.co.uk/sites/default/files/downloads/cap_briefing_2012.pdf.
224
See EUROPEAN COMM’N , EU BUDGET: THE CAP AFTER 2020 (2018),
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/budget-may2018-moderni
sing-cap_en.pdf (providing a summary).
225
Id. at 1.
226
Id. at 1.
227
Id. at 3.
228
See, e.g., Future of the CAP Post 2020, EUR. COUNCIL, https://www.consilium.eu
ropa.eu/en/policies/cap-future-2020/ (last visited Nov. 23, 2019) (providing a
timeline of the CAP progression).
229
Council Directive 98/58, 1998 O.J. (L 221) 23.
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the protection of animals kept for farming purposes. The Directive
in a general manner states that the EU Members States “shall ensure
that the conditions under which animals . . . are bred or kept, having
regard to their species and to their degree of development, adaptation
and domestication, and to their physiological and ethological needs
in accordance with established experience and scientific knowledge,
comply with the provisions set out in the Annex.” 230 The Directive
has been subject of extensive literature, which we do not want to
replicate here. 231 It suffices to note that the Directive “cleaned up
around the edges,” 232 but by and large failed to change the status quo,
namely that animals are industrially produced and killed by the
billions. 233 Moreover, the Directive does not deal with other
externalities caused by CAFOs, such as their effects on the
environment or human rights affected by their operation.
EU norms on organic farming address some concerns
relating to animal welfare. 234 Regulation 834/2007 on Organic
Production and Labelling of Organic Products defines organic
production as:
[A]n overall system of farm management and food
production that combines best environmental
practices, a high level of biodiversity, the
preservation of natural resources, the application of
high animal welfare standards[,] and a production
method in line with the preference of certain
consumers for products produced using natural
substances and processes.235

Id. art. 4.
E.g., Magdalena Gajdzinska, Implementation of Council Directive 98/58/EC
Concerning the Protection of Animals Kept for Farming Purposes, EUROPEAN ENF’T
NETWORK (Sept. 8, 2016), http://www.lawyersforanimalprotection.eu/2016/09/08/i
mplementation-of-council-directive-9858ec-concerning-the-protection-of-animalskept-for-farming-purposes/.
232
THOMAS G. KELCH, GLOBALIZATION AND ANIMAL LAW: COMPARATIVE LAW,
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE 99 (2d ed. 2017).
233
See, e.g., CHARLOTTE E. BLATTNER, PROTECTING ANIMALS WITHIN AND ACROSS
BORDERS: EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION AND THE CHALLENGES OF
GLOBALIZATION 345–46 (Oxford Univ. Press 2019).
234
Council Regulation (EC) No 834/2007 of June 28, 2007 on Organic Production
and Labelling of Organic Products and Repealing Council Regulation (EEC) No
2092/91, 2007 O.J. (L 189) 1 [hereinafter Council Regulation 834/2007];
Commission Regulation (EC) 889/2008 of 5 September 2008 Laying Down Detailed
Rules for the Implementation of Council Regulation (EC) No. 834/2007 on Organic
Production and Labelling of Organic Products with Regard to Organic Production,
Labelling and Control, 2008 O.J. (L 250) 1.
235
Council Regulation 834/2007, supra note 234, at recital 1 (emphasis added).
230
231
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Yet, these norms only aim at regulating organic production
and labelling; they do not impose mandatory standards on all
farmers.
IV. How Farmers’ Rights Threaten Human Rights
Guarantees
In this section, we examine how farmers’ rights (rather than
agriculture itself), including right-to-farm laws and other legislation
exempting animal agribusiness, threaten and even violate human
rights. For reasons of scope, we limit our analysis to five rights: the
right to food (Part A), the right to water and sanitation (Part B), the
right to a safe environment (Part C), the emerging right to land (Part
D), and the right to animal protection (Part E). However, it is
important to note that many other human rights, such as the right to
privacy, home, and family life, may be affected by these laws as well.
A. Right to Food
The right to food has been described as one of “the least
realized human rights”236 and even as “the most violated human right
worldwide.” 237 It is rejected by major global players such as the
US 238 and deemed non-justiciable by states such as Canada. 239
While European states tend to support the right to food abroad, they
are much more cautious to implement this right within their own
jurisdiction. 240 Moreover, as highlighted by the Office of the High
Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), the right to food is often
misunderstood. 241 Yet the right to food is protected by the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR)242 and guaranteed by various
Kerstin Mechlem, Food, Right to, International Protection, in MAX PLANCK
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 1 (Rüdiger Wolfrum Online 2017).
237
See The Most Violated Human Right Worldwide: The Right to Food, CIVIL SOC’Y
& INDIGENOUS PEOPLES’ MECHANISM FOR RELATIONS WITH UN COMM. ON WORLD
FOOD SECURITY (Oct. 12, 2018), http://www.csm4cfs.org/violated-human-right-worl
dwide-right-food/.
238
The US is not a party to the ICESCR, which guarantees the right to adequate food.
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966,
993 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter ICESCR]; see Sandra Raponi, A Defense of the Human
Right to Adequate Food, 23 RES PUBLICA 99–100 (2017); see also Eve Garrow &
Jack Day, Strengthening the Human Right to Food, 7 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 275–76
(2017) (discussing food security in the United States).
239
See, e.g., Priscilla Claeys, The Right to Food: Many Developments, More
Challenges, 2 CAN. FOOD STUD. 60 (2015).
240
Jose Luis Vivero Pol & Claudio Schuftan, No Right to Food and Nutrition in the
SDGs: Mistake or Success?, 1 BMJ GLOBAL HEALTH 1, 3 (2016).
241
See Fact Sheet No. 34, supra note 18, at 3.
242
G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 25(1) (1948)
[hereinafter UDHR].
236
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international human rights treaties, 243 including the International
Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR),244
the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), 245 the Convention
on the Elimination of All Form of Discrimination Against Women
(CEDAW), 246 and the Convention on the Rights of Persons With
Disabilities (CRPD). 247 Many of the UN human rights treaty bodies
have dealt with this right, 248 and the Human Rights Council has
called upon states to protect it. 249 Scholars endorse the right to food
as well. 250 Some commentators point to several UN General
Assembly resolutions that acknowledge the existence of the right to
food 251 to argue that this right has the status of customary
international law, 252 and the OHCHR considers that “at least freedom
from hunger can be considered as a norm of international customary
law.” 253 All in all, human rights lawyers converge in saying that the
right to food is one of the most fundamental human rights. 254
Article 11 ICESCR, upon which we focus in this subsection,
“deals more comprehensively” 255 with this right in international law.
It states that the parties to the Covenant “recognize the right of
everyone to . . . adequate food.” 256 Moreover, it provides that states
commit to “improve methods of production . . . of food,” inter alia
See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMM’R OF HUMAN RIGHTS, International
Standards, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Food/Pages/Standards.aspx (last visited
Dec. 30, 2019) (providing a list of internationals standards and rights).
244
We do not focus on the right to be free from hunger, which is also guaranteed by
the ICESCR. ICESCR, supra note 238, art. 11(2).
245
Convention on the Rights of the Child, arts. 24(2)(c),(e), 27(3), Nov. 20, 1989,
1577 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter CRC].
246
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women,
art. 12(2), Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 [hereinafter CEDAW].
247
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, art. 25(f), Dec. 13, 2006,
2515 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter CRPD].
248
See Fact Sheet No. 34, supra note 18, at 34–35.
249
See Human Rights Council Res. 7/14, ¶ 8 (Mar. 27, 2008).
250
Ana Ayala & Benjamin Mason Meier, A Human Rights Approach to the Health
Implications of Food & Nutrition Insecurity, 38 PUB. HEALTH REV. 1 (2017); Vivero
Pol & Schuftan, supra note 240, at 1; Garrow & Day, supra note 238, at 275; Naomi
Hossain & Dolf te Lintelo, A Common Sense Approach to the Right to Food, 10 J.
HUM. RTS. PRAC. 367 (2018) (discussing how an understanding of the right to food
is shared across different cultures).
251
G.A. Res. 71/191 The Right to Food (Jan. 18, 2017).
252
Mechlem, supra note 236, at 13.
253
See Fact Sheet No. 34, supra note 18, at 9.
254
See, e.g., Hilal Elver (Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food), Interim Report
on the Right to Food, U.N. Doc. A/72/188, ¶ 5 (July 21, 2017).
255
U.N. Comm. on Econ., Soc. and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 12: The
Right to Adequate Food, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1999/5 (May 12, 1999) [hereinafter
General Comment 12].
256
ICESCR, supra note 238, art. 11(1).
243
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“by developing or reforming agrarian systems in such a way as to
achieve the most efficient development and utilization of natural
resources.” 257 Pursuant to article 2(1) ICESCR, states have a duty of
progressive realization with respect to this right. 258 They cannot
discriminate against specific groups of individuals when giving
effect to the right to food (article 2(2) ICESCR), nor can they take
so-called retrogressive measures impairing its realization. 259
It is widely held that agriculture is necessary to realize the
right to food. 260 On this basis, one could consider that guaranteeing
the right to food requires maintaining and further developing existing
agricultural practices, including industrial animal agriculture
businesses. However, several arguments show that this assumption
is treacherous and actually prevents states from complying with their
duty to respect, protect, and fulfill261 the right to food. As the UN
Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights has stressed,
the concepts of adequacy, sustainability, availability, and
accessibility are central to the right to food. 262 For our purposes,
adequacy and sustainability are particularly important. 263
In regards to adequacy, the UN Committee on Economic,
Social, and Cultural Rights has noted:
Id. at art. 11(2).
Id. at art. 2(1).
259
Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMM’R OF
HUMAN RIGHTS, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Food/Pages/FoodIndex.aspx (last
visited Dec. 30, 2019).
260
See, e.g., Kerstin Mechlem, Harmonizing Trade in Agriculture and Human
Rights: Options for the Integration of the Right to Food Into the Agreement on
Agriculture, 10 MAX PLANCK YEARBOOK OF U.N. L. 127 (2006); see Fact Sheet No.
34, supra note 18, at 10; see also Jean Ziegler (Special Rapporteur on the Right to
Food), Rep. of the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights on the
Right to Food, ¶ 22, U.N. Doc. A/57/356 (Aug. 27, 2002) [hereinafter U.N. Doc.
A/57/356] (emphasizing the importance of access to land); Olivier de Schutter
(Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food), Interim Rep. of the Special Rapporteur
on the Right to Food, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. A/66/262 (Aug. 4, 2011) [hereinafter U.N. Doc.
A/66/262].
261
See, e.g., Mechlem, supra note 236, at 19; see also HENRY SHUE, BASIC RIGHTS:
SUBSISTENCE, AFFLUENCE, AND US FOREIGN POLICY (Princeton Univ. Press 1980).
262
General Comment 12, supra note 255, ¶ 7; see also Hilal Elver (Special
Rapporteur on the Right to Food), Interim Report of the Special Rapporteur on the
Right to Food, U.N. Doc. A/70/287 (Aug. 5, 2015) [hereinafter U.N. Doc. A/70/287].
263
However, other aspects are relevant as well, considering that the UN Committee
on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights has stated that the “roots of the problem
of hunger and malnutrition are not lack of food but lack of access to available food.”
Meat production, in particular, deprives individuals from crops and other plant-based
food because these products are fed to animals in large quantities rather than being
directly used to feed local populations. See General Comment 12, supra note 255,
¶ 5.
257
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[T]he right to adequate food implies: [t]he
availability of food in a quantity and quality
sufficient to satisfy the dietary needs of individuals,
free from adverse substances, and acceptable within
a given culture; [t]he accessibility of such food in
ways that are sustainable and that do not interfere
with the enjoyment of other human rights. 264
It has further stated that the meaning of adequacy is “to a
large extent determined by prevailing social, economic, cultural,
climatic, ecological and other conditions.” 265 As previously stated in
the introductory section, 266 the prevailing animal agricultural
production methods (CAFOs) create massive negative externalities
from an environmental perspective, which puts into question their
adequacy as a means to guarantee the right to food.
Similarly, sustainability, which can be defined as the
accessibility of food for both present and future generations, 267
supports abandoning agricultural products that are major drivers of
climate change and that jeopardize food security. 268 It has been
shown, in this context, that meat production consumes particularly
large amounts of resources (e.g., water, energy, and land) compared
to plant-based diets. For instance, the production of 1 kg of beef
meat consumes over 15,400 liters of water.269 The water footprint of
the same quantity (1 kg) of rice consumes 2,497 liters; 1 kg of cereals
uses 1,644 liters; and 1 kg of potatoes requires 287 liters. 270 Because
Id. ¶ 8.
Id. ¶ 7.
266
See supra Part I.
267
See General Comment 12, supra note 255, ¶ 7.
268
See U.N. Doc. A/70/287, supra note 262, ¶ 41.
269
Water Footprint of Crop and Animal Products: A Comparison, WATER
FOOTPRINT NETWORK, https://waterfootprint.org/en/water-footprint/product-waterfootprint/water-footprint-crop-and-animal-products/ (last visited Dec. 10, 2019); see
also How Much Water Is Needed to Produce Food and How Much Do We Waste?,
THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 10, 2013), https://www.theguardian.com/news/datablog/2013/
jan/10/how-much-water-food-production-waste#data; see also How Much Water
Does It Take to Produce Meat?, THE CATTLE SITE (Apr. 26, 2016),
http://www.thecattlesite.com/news/49594/how-much-water-does-it-take-to-produce
-meat/; ANKE SONNENBERG ET AL., DER WASSER-FUSSABDRUCK DEUTSCHLANDS 7
(WWF 2009), http://www.wwf.de/fileadmin/fm-wwf/Publikationen-PDF/wwf_stud
ie_wasserfussabdruck.pdf (last visited on Oct. 14, 2019).
270
WATER FOOTPRINT NETWORK, supra note 269; see also THE GUARDIAN, supra
note 269. The Water Footprint Network is a non-profit organization which, to date,
constitutes the main source of information in terms of the water used to produce
various goods. See also Global Water Footprint Standard, WATER FOOTPRINT
NETWORK, https://waterfootprint.org/en/water-footprint/global-water-footprint-stan
dard/ (last visited Dec. 15, 2019) (providing the methodology used in this context).
While some methodological concerns remain, the water footprint standard is widely
264
265
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meat-based diets are so nutritionally inefficient and unsustainable,
animal agricultural production greatly inhibits states’ ability to
ensure food security in the long term. As Alex Bruce and Thomas
Faunce put it, animal farming has a highly damaging “environmental
domino effect.” 271
Civil society actors are increasingly highlighting that a
rational solution to world hunger would consist of shifting toward a
plant-based diet. 272 A report of the UN Environmental Programme
published in 2010 reached the same conclusion, stating:
Impacts from agriculture are expected to increase
substantially due to population growth increasing
consumption of animal products. Unlike fossil
fuels, it is difficult to look for alternatives: people
have to eat. A substantial reduction of impacts
would only be possible with a substantial worldwide
diet change, away from animal products. 273
Despite compelling evidence regarding the environmental
and human rights benefits of a plant-based diet, the UN Special
Rapporteurs on the right to food have thus far refrained from
explicitly describing an adequate diet as primarily plant-based—or
even as based on the consumption of little meat. This omission might
be owed to political and strategic reasons given that the Rapporteurs
readily highlight the health benefits of consuming fruit and
vegetables 274 and that they stress the health and other (including
food-supply) problems created by increasing meat consumption.275
The Rapporteurs have also pointed to the negative nutritional effects
of industrial food, which is typically the product of factory

regarded as directionally accurate. See Jonathan Chenoweth, Michalis Hadjikakou
& Christos Zoumides, Quantifying the Human Impact on Water Resources: A
Critical Review of the Water Footprint Concept, 18 HYDROLOGY & EARTH SYS. SCI.
2325, 2337 (2014).
271
Bruce & Faunce, supra note 174, at 385.
272
Nachhaltige Ernährung, SENTIENCE POLITICS, https://sentience-politics.org/de/po
sitionspapiere/nachhaltige-ernaehrung-ch (last visited Dec. 15, 2019).
273
See UNEP, supra note 31, at 82; see also HARALD VON WITZKE, STEFFEN NOLEPPA
& INGA ZHIRKOVA, FLEISCH FRISST LAND: ERNÄHRUNGSWEISEN FLEISCHKONSUM
FLÄCHENVERBRAUCH (WWF 2014), https://www.wwf.de/fileadmin/fm-wwf/Publik
ationen-PDF/WWF_Fleischkonsum_web.pdf.
274
See, e.g., Olivier de Schutter (Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food), Rep. of
the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/19/59 (Dec. 26,
2011).
275
Olivier de Schutter (Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food), Rep. of the Special
Rapporteur on the Right to Food, ¶ 7, U.N. Doc A/HRC/16/49 (Dec. 20, 2010)
[hereinafter U.N. Doc. A/HRC/16/49].
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farming, 276 and they have recommended shifting away from this type
of industrial agricultural production. 277 They have further
emphasized states’ obligation to respect farmers’ right to food. 278
However, instead of advocating for changing food habits, the UN
Special Rapporteurs have primarily recommended relying on
agroecology as an alternative to industrial agriculture. 279 They have
stressed that article 11 ICESCR calls for small-scale farming in light
of the benefits that this type of farming generates, e.g., in terms of
employment, sustainability, and non-discrimination of vulnerable
populations. 280
As scholars note, “[a] strong linkage exists between the right
to food, sustainable agriculture, and sustainable soil
management.” 281 Goal 2 of the UN’s 2030 Agenda for Sustainable
Development states that the UN members undertake to “end hunger,
achieve food security and improved nutrition[,] and promote
sustainable agriculture.” 282 Similarly, the FAO recommends that
“[s]tates should assist farmers and other primary producers to follow
good agricultural practices,” so as to ensure the progressive
realization of the right to adequate food. 283
In view of the aforementioned observations, however,
profound reforms of current agricultural practices, and especially of
factory farming, appear necessary to guarantee the right to food.
Hilal Elver (Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food), Interim Rep. on the Right
to Food, ¶¶ 22, 23, U.N. Doc. A/71/282 (Aug. 3, 2016) [hereinafter U.N. Doc.
A/71/282]; Hilal Elver (Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food), Interim Rep. on
the Right to Food, ¶ 7, U.N. Doc. A/73/164 (July 16 2018).
277
U.N. Doc. A/71/282, supra note 276, ¶ 92.
278
Id.
279
See U.N. Doc. A/HRC/16/49, supra note 275 (on agroecology); see also
Anastasia Telesetsky, Fulfilling the Human Right to Food and a Healthy
Environment: Is It Time for an Agroecological and Aquaecological Revolution?, 40
VT. L. REV. 791, 806–07 (2016).
280
U.N. Doc. A/66/262, supra note 260; U.N. Doc. A/57/356, supra note 260,
¶¶ 22–42; Olivier de Schutter (Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food), Interim
Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, ¶¶ 27–38, U.N. Doc. A/65/281
(Aug. 11, 2010) [hereinafter U.N. Doc. A/65/281]; Human Rights Council, Rep. of
the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, ¶ 104, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/34/48 (Jan.
24, 2017).
281
Tina Beuchelt et al., The Human Right to Food and Sustainable Soil
Management: Linking Voluntary Agricultural Sustainability Standards with Food
Security, in INTERNATIONAL YEARBOOK OF SOIL LAW AND POLICY 2016 237, 242
(Harald Ginzky et al. eds., 2017).
282
G.A. Res. 70/1, Transforming Our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable
Development, at 14 (Sept. 25, 2015) [hereinafter G.A. Res. 70/1] (emphasis added).
283
See FOOD & AGRIC. ORG., VOLUNTARY GUIDELINES ON THE PROGRESSIVE
REALIZATION OF THE RIGHT TO ADEQUATE FOOD IN THE CONTEXT OF NATIONAL FOOD
SECURITY 20 (2005), http://www.fao.org/3/a-y7937e.pdf.
276
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Indeed, “[i]ndustrial agriculture and fishing practices encourage the
waste of natural capital, such as soil, and violate the human right-tofood.” 284 By contrast, plant-based diets “could play an important
role in preserving environmental resources and reducing hunger and
malnutrition in poorer nations.” 285 This issue needs to be addressed
urgently, not least because of the steady growth of the global human
population and its reliance (and dependence) on finite resources.
B. Right to Water and Sanitation
The CEDAW, adopted in 1979, is the first international
human rights treaty to have mentioned the right to water and
sanitation.286 Since then, other treaties have included this right in
their text. 287 In 2002, the UN Committee on Economic, Social, and
Cultural Rights stated that this right is contained in article 11
ICESCR, which protects “the right to an adequate standard of living
. . . including adequate food, clothing and housing.” 288 Moreover,
the Committee deems the right to water and sanitation “inextricably
related” 289 to article 12(1) ICESCR (which guarantees the right to
health), 290 article 11(1) ICESCR (which protects the right to housing
and the right to food), 291 and the right to life. 292 Later, in 2010, the
UN Human Rights Council reaffirmed these statements 293 a few
months after the UN General Assembly had recognized the human
Telesetsky, supra note 279, at 803.
Simona Baroni et al., Evaluating the Environmental Impact of Various Dietary
Patterns Combined with Different Food Production Systems, 61 EUROPEAN J. OF
CLINICAL NUTRITION 279, 285 (2007), https://www.nature.com/articles/1602522.pdf.
286
CEDAW, supra note 246, art. 14(2)(h).
287
CRC, supra note 245, arts. 24, 27(3); CRPD, supra note 247, art. 28.
288
U.N. Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 15: The
Right to Water, ¶ 3, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2002/11 (Jan. 20, 2003) [hereinafter General
Comment 15].
289
Human Rights Council Res. 15/9, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/15/9, ¶ 3 (Oct. 6, 2010)
[hereinafter HRC Res. 15/9] (“[T]he human right to safe drinking water and
sanitation is derived from the right to an adequate standard of living and inextricably
related to the right to the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health,
as well as the right to life and human dignity.”); see also Amanda Cahill, ‘The
Human Right to Water–A Right of Unique Status:’ The Legal Status and Normative
Content of the Right to Water, 9 INT’L J. OF HUM. RTS. 389, 391 (2005) (discussing
the right to water as a “derivative right,” in a broader sense than in the Human Rights
Council’s terminology).
290
General Comment 15, supra note 288, ¶ 3.
291
See e.g., Jean Ziegler (Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food), Rep. Submitted
by the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food in Accordance with Commission on
Human Rights Resolution 2002/25, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2003/54 (Jan. 10, 2003).
292
See also Stephen McCaffrey et al., The Emergence of a Human Right to Water
and Sanitation: The Many Challenges, 106 PROC. OF THE ASIL ANN. MEETING 43,
46 (2012).
293
HRC Res. 15/9, supra note 289, ¶ 3.
284
285
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right to water and sanitation. 294 Goal 6 of the UN’s Sustainable
Development Goals is to “[e]nsure availability and sustainable
management of water and sanitation for all.” 295 However, among
states and international lawyers, this right remains controversial,296
and it is not deemed part of customary international law. 297
Researchers have highlighted “the complex interplay of interests
behind the recognition of the right to water.”298 This explains why
the right to water and sanitation has been pictured as a right requiring
further development and institutionalization. 299
Given that the right to water is “inextricably related” to the
right to food, it comes as no surprise that agricultural practices can
threaten this right as well. As a matter of fact, agriculture currently
consumes, on average, 70% of the water used worldwide. 300 Animal
agriculture absorbs a large share of this portion, since meat-based
diets require particularly high amounts of water compared to plantbased diets. 301 For instance, in California, agriculture draws more
than 90% of the total water, with animal agriculture consuming
47%. 302 The substantial water depletion caused by animal
agriculture jeopardizes water security, which is currently under high
U.N. GAOR, 64th Sess., 108th plen. mtg., at 9, U.N. Doc. A/64/PV.108 (July 28,
2010); G.A. Res. 64/292, ¶ 1 (July 28, 2010).
295
G.A. Res. 70/1, supra note 282, at 14.
296
One manifestation of this conflict is that forty-one nations, including Australia,
Canada, and the US, did not vote in favor of General Assembly Resolution 64/292,
adopted on July 28, 2010. U.N. GAOR, 64th Sess., 108th plen. mtg., at 8, 9, 11, 17,
U.N. Doc. A/64/PV.108 (July 28, 2010); Colin Brown et al., The Human Right to
Water and Sanitation: A New Perspective for Public Policies, 21 CIÊNCIA & SAÚDE
COLETIVA 661, 663 (2016).
297
E.g., Stephen McCaffrey, The Human Right to Water: A False Promise?, 47 U.
PAC. L. REV. 221, 227, 231 (2016); George S. McGraw, Defining and Defending the
Right to Water and Its Minimum Core: Legal Construction and the Role of National
Jurisprudence, 8 LOY. U. CHI. INT’L L. REV. 127, 143–45, 161, 189–91 (2011).
298
JOOTAEK LEE & MARAYA BEST, THE HUMAN RIGHT TO WATER: A RESEARCH
GUIDE & ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY 4 (Ne. U. Sch. of L. 2017), https://papers.ssrn.
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2924632.
299
Lady Justice Arden, Water for All? Developing a Human Right to Water in
National and International Law, 65 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 771, 782–87 (2016).
300
Catarina de Albuquerque (Special Rapporteur on the Right to Safe Drinking
Water and Sanitation), Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on the Human Right to Safe
Drinking Water and Sanitation in Accordance with Human Rights Council
Resolution 16/2, ¶ 35, U.N. Doc. A/68/264 (Aug. 5, 2013) [hereinafter U.N. Doc.
A/68/264]; see also FOOD & AGRIC. ORG., AGRICULTURE, FOOD AND WATER 17–27
(2003) (discussing the use of water in agriculture).
301
See Pimentel & Pimentel, supra note 55, at 660S, 662S; see generally The Water
Footprint of Beef: Industrial vs. Pasture-Raised, WATER FOOTPRINT CALCULATOR
(Nov. 29, 2018), https://www.https://www.watercalculator.org/water-use/water-foot
print-beef-industrial-pasture/.
302
JULIAN FULTON ET AL., CALIFORNIA’S WATER FOOTPRINT 3 (Pac. Inst. 2012),
http://pacinst.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/ca_ftprint_full_report3.pdf.
294
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threat across the world. 303 While California was the first US state to
recognize the human right to water (in 2012), 304 the implementation
of this right has been incomplete. 305
The FAO 306 and the UN Special Rapporteurs on the Human
Rights to Safe Drinking Water and Sanitation 307 have also
highlighted the link between agriculture and environmental
pollution—more specifically, water pollution. 308 Animal agriculture
pollutes water to a disproportionate extent compared to the
production of plant-based food, 309 notably through animal
excrements, antibiotics, hormones, fertilizers, and pesticides for
fodder cultivation. 310 In the US, for instance, animal agriculture is
responsible for 37% of all pesticides applied and 50% of all
antibiotics consumed, 311 which run off into ground and fresh water
reserves. 312 The FAO succinctly summarizes that “the livestock
sector has an enormous impact on water use, water quality,
hydrology and aquatic ecosystems.” 313
With animal agriculure resulting in water depletion, large
investments in animal agriculture jeopardize the human right to
water. This right, according to the UN Committee on Economic,
Social, and Cultural Rights, requires that water be “sufficient, safe,
acceptable, physically accessible, and affordable . . .”314 Problems
C. J. Vörösmarty et al., Rivers in Crisis: “Global Water Insecurity for Humans
and Biodiversity,” 467 NATURE 555 (2010).
304
CAL. WAT. CODE § 106.3(a) (West 2013).
305
KENA CADOR & ANGÉLICA SALCEDA, A SURVEY OF EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE
UNIVERSAL ACCESS TO WATER AND SANITATION IN CALIFORNIA 1, 3–5, 25 (ACLU
N. Cal. & Pac. Inst. 2018), https://www.aclunc.org/sites/default/files/SurveyReport.
pdf.
306
E.g., FOOD & AGRIC. ORG., supra note 300, 43–46.
307
The initial denomination (for 2008-2014) was that of “Independent Expert on the
issue of human rights obligations related to access to safe drinking water and
sanitation.” This expert was appointed by the Human Rights Council in 2008. See
Human Rights Council Res. 7/22, ¶ 2 (Mar. 28, 2008). The mandate was extended
and transformed into that of a Special Rapporteur in 2011. See HRC Res. 16/2 (Apr.
8, 2011).
308
U.N. Doc. A/68/264, supra note 300, ¶ 35.
309
Leo Horrigan et al., How Sustainable Agriculture Can Address the Environmental
and Human Health Harms of Industrial Agriculture, 110 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP.
445, 445–49 (2002); Margot J. Pollans, Regulating Farming: Balancing Food Safety
and Environmental Protection in a Cooperative Governance Scheme, 50 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 399, 404 (2015); see also FOOD & AGRIC. ORG., supra note 33, at
125–32.
310
Ernährung, supra note 272.
311
FOOD & AGRIC. ORG., supra note 33, at 168.
312
Id. at 137–39, 142–43, 145.
313
Id. at 167.
314
General Comment 15, supra note 288, ¶ 2 (although these terms are sometimes
replaced by synonyms or by related adjectives).
303
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arise with regard to the criterion of safety, which requires that water
be “free from micro-organisms, chemical substances and
radiological hazards that constitute a threat to a person’s health.”315
Of course, when water is accessible to factory farmers to the
detriment of local populations, the criteria of sufficiency, physical
accessibility, and affordability are likely to be undermined as well.
The same problems arise when water is driven away from local
populations to meet the needs of meat production. The end product
is mostly consumed by individuals living in rich, minority world
countries. In the US, for instance, the standard food diet requires
4,200 gallons (15,899 liters) of water per day, while a person on a
vegan food diet only needs 300 gallons (1,136 liters) of water per
day. 316 What is more, when water is lacking, other human rights can
be affected. For instance, inadequate access to water has a disparate
impact on women and girls. 317 Instead of investing water resources
into an unsustainable system that accounts for adverse and
discriminatory effects, these resources could be used for direct
consumption and thereby make it more likely for the human right to
water of local and foreign populations to be guaranteed. 318
C. Right to a Safe Environment
The strong link between human rights and the environment
became salient at latest in 1972, when the Stockholm Conference on
the Human Environment issued a declaration that recognized a
quality environment as a precondition for “a life of dignity and wellbeing.” 319 As political and civil society actors increasingly
recognized environmental protection as essential for the enjoyment
of the right to life, health, home life, and property, 320 calls for a right

Id. ¶ 12(b).
Aisling Maria Cronin, You Can Save Over 200,000 Gallons of Water a Year With
One Simple Choice, ONE GREEN PLANET, http://www.onegreenplanet.org/environme
nt/how-to-save-water-with-one-simple-choice/ (last visited Dec. 19, 2019).
317
Léo Heller (Special Rapporteur), Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on the Human
Right to Safe Drinking Water and Sanitation, ¶¶ 1–14, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/33/49 (July
27, 2016).
318
See e.g., Mark W. Rosegrant & Claudia Ringler, Impact on Food Security and
Rural Development of Transferring Water Out of Agriculture, 6 WATER POL’Y 567
(2000).
319
U.N. Conference on the Human Environment, Declaration of the United Nations
Conference on the Human Environment, at 4, princ. 1, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.48/14/Rev.1(June
5-16, 1972); see G.A. Res. 45/94 (Dec. 14, 1990).
320
Melissa Thorme, Establishing Environment as a Human Right, 19 DENV. J. INT’L
L. & POL’Y 301, 310–11 (1991); Dinah Shelton, Human Rights and the Environment:
Substantive Rights, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW 265 (Malgosia Fitzmaurice et al. eds., 2011).
315
316
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to a safe environment became stronger, both nationally and
internationally. 321
Today, over one hundred constitutions worldwide—adopted
since 1992—enshrine the right to a clean and healthy environment.322
For example, Section 20(2) of the Finnish constitution recognizes
“. . . the right to a healthy environment and for everyone the
possibility to influence the decisions that concern their own living
environment.” 323 More than one hundred states incorporated an
explicit right to a healthy environment in domestic environmental
legislation, totaling 155 states that are obligated to respect, protect,
and fulfill the right to a healthy environment under domestic law.324
On the international level, the African Charter for Human and
Peoples’ Rights325 and the Protocol to the American Convention on
Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights326 both provide for a human right to a healthy environment.
General Comment No. 14 to article 12 of the ICCPR (which
guarantees the right to the highest attainable standard of health)
stipulates that “the right to health embraces a wide range of socio321
James W. Nickel, The Human Right to a Safe Environment: Philosophical
Perspectives on Its Scope and Justification, 18 YALE J. INT’L L. 281, 281 (1993).
322
Those include Angola, Argentina, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Belgium, Benin, Brazil,
Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Chad, Chechnya, Chile, Colombia,
Congo, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cuba, Czech Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Ethiopia,
Finland, Georgia, Honduras, Hungary, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Macedonia, Mali,
Moldova, Mongolia, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Niger, Norway, Paraguay,
Philippines, Portugal, Russia, Sao Tome and Principe, Seychelles, Slovakia,
Slovenia, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Tajikistan, Togo, Turkey, Ukraine, and
Yugoslavia. EarthJustice Presents 2004 ‘Human Rights and the Environment’
Report to UN, EARTHJUSTICE (Apr. 6, 2004), https://earthjustice.org/news/press/200
4/earthjustice-presents-2004-human-rights-and-the-environment-report-to-un; see
David R. Boyd (Special Rapporteur on Human Rights and the Environment), Rep.
of the Special Rapporteur: Issue of Human Rights Obligations Relating to the
Enjoyment of a Safe, Clean, Healthy and Sustainable Environment, ¶¶ 7–16 ,U.N.
Doc. A/HRC/40/55 (Jan. 8, 2019) [hereinafter U.N. Doc. A/HRC/40/55]; see also
Dinah Shelton, Human Rights and the Environment: What Specific Environmental
Rights Have Been Recognized, 35 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 129, 164–65, 164
n. 172 (2008). Some countries, like Argentina, Chile, Ecuador, and Brazil,
guarantee this right as a fundamental individual right, while others, like Colombia,
Costa Rica, and Nicaragua, enshrine it as a collective right.
323
SUOMEN PERUSTUSLAKI, [CONSTITUTION], June 11, 1999, 731, § 20 (Fin.).
324
U.N. Doc. A/HRC/40/55, supra note 322, ¶¶ 15–16.
325
African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights, art. 24, June 27, 1981, 21 I.L.M.
58 [hereinafter African Charter on Human and People’s Rights] (“All peoples shall
have the right to a general satisfactory environment favourable to their
development.”).
326
Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights “Protocol San Salvador” art. 11, Nov. 17,
1988, O.A.S.T.S. No. 69, 28 I.L.M. 1641 (stating that “everyone shall have the right
to live in a healthy environment . . .”).
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economic factors that promote conditions in which people can lead a
healthy life, and extends to the underlying determinates of health,
such as . . . a healthy environment.” 327 In 2003, the Council of
Europe’s Parliamentary Assembly issued a recommendation for the
governments of the member states of the Council of Europe to
“recognize a human right to a healthy, viable and decent
environment.” 328 The European Convention on Human Rights
(ECHR) 329 does not expressly provide for a right to a healthy
environment, but it covers those instances in which an unsafe
environment threatens people’s right to life (article 2 ECHR), the
right to privacy and family life (article 8 ECHR) and, in the ECHR’s
Protocol No. 1, the right to property (article 1). 330
Though widely recognized domestically and internationally,
the content of the right to a healthy environment is still in dispute.
Some scholars argue for a broad definition of the right, namely as a
right to a safe, healthy, secure, clean, sustainable, or ecologicallybalanced environment, 331 as enshrined in the constitutions of
Honduras, 332 Portugal, 333 or South Korea. 334 Another camp argues
for a narrower interpretation of this right, i.e., for guaranteeing the
right to a safe environment. 335 In this view, environments must not

U.N. Comm. on Econ., Soc. and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 14: The
Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health, ¶ 4, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2000/4
(Aug. 11, 2000) [hereinafter General Comment 14]. “[I]n March 2012, the Human
Rights Council decided to establish a mandate on human rights and the environment,
which will (among other tasks) study the human rights obligations relating to the
enjoyment of a safe, clean, healthy, and sustainable environment, and promote best
practices relating to the use of human rights in environmental policymaking.” UN
Mandate, UN SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE ENVT.,
http://srenvironment.org/un-mandate (last visited Dec. 30, 2019).
328
Eur. Parl. Ass., Environment and Human Rights, 3d Sess., Doc. No. 1614, ¶ 9.2
(2003).
329
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
arts. 2, 8, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter ECHR].
330
Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, art. 1, Mar. 20, 1952, 213 U.N.T.S. 262.
331
Thorme, supra note 320, at 310 (1991); see also Shelton, supra note 320, at 265.
332
See REPÚBLICA DE HONDURAS CONSTITUCIÓN DE 1982 CON REFORMAS HASTA
2019 [CONSTITUTION], Jan. 29, 2019, art. 145 (Hond.) (mentioning “an adequate
environment to protect the health of persons”).
333
See CONSTITUCIÓN DE LA REPÚBLICA PORTUGUESA [CONSTITUTION], Apr. 2, 1976,
art. 66, ¶ 1 (Port.) (mentioning the right to “a healthy and ecologically balanced
human living environment”).
334
See 대한민국 헌법 [CONSTITUTION], Oct. 29, 1987, art. 35 (S. Kor.) (mentioning
the right to “a healthy and pleasant environment”).
335
Nickel, supra note 321, at 281–82. Scholars argue that, in the environmental
domain, it is more appropriate to appeal to obligations and responsibilities towards
the environment, or to the respect of environmental goods. See Cynthia Giagnocavo
327
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be destructive to human health and must provide protection from
contamination and pollution. 336 Activities that cause adverse
environmental effects but do not manifest a damage or threat to
human health, such as noises emanating from nearby farms, are not
covered by this narrower, anthropocentric 337 reading. 338 Critics
question what such a narrow right adds to existing human rights, such
as the right to life or the right to property, and denounce a “rights
inflation”—dangers of “policy and resource overload” that may
occur because of too many human rights enunciations. 339 In the
following, we examine the right to an environment through the
narrower lens, due to the fact that this perspective seems to more
closely follow the current state of international law, and because it
acknowledges the close connection between human rights and the
environment. After all, the environment is the physical basis, the
sine qua non, without which there are no human rights to enjoy or
protect, as famously stated by Judge Weeramantry in his separate
opinion to the Gabçikovo-Nagymaros judgment of the International
Court of Justice. 340
The right to environmental protection only imposes a duty
on natural and legal persons to refrain from activities that damage or
threaten the environment to the determined extent (i.e., when these
activities threaten human safety), and to restore damage and pay
compensation to those affected. 341 Governments, in contrast, are
“obligated to respect, protect, and fulfill the right to a healthy
environment,” as the UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights and
the Environment, David R. Boyd, noted in a report unanimously
adopted by the UN General Assembly in January 2019. 342 States
have both a “negative duty to refrain from actions . . . [threatening]
human life and health,” and a positive “duty to protect the inhabitants
of their territories against environmental risks . . . [caused] by
& Howard Goldstein, Law Reform or World Re-form: The Problem of
Environmental Rights, 35 MCGILL L. J. 345, 359–60, 373–74 (1990).
336
Nickel, supra note 321, at 284.
337
Non-anthropocentric values, such as “duties toward the environment” and “rights
of nature,” are protected by the Earth Charter and numerous international
environmental law treaties. Shelton, supra note 322, at 131–32.
338
Nickel, supra note 321, at 285.
339
Shelton, supra note 320, at 279; see generally Upendra Baxi, Too Many, or Too
Few, Human Rights?, 1 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1 (2001) (providing an in-depth
discussion of the “human rights overload”).
340
Gabçikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), Separate Opinion of Judge
Weeramantry, 1997 I.C.J. 7, at 91 (Sept. 25) (“The protection of the environment
is . . . a sine qua non for numerous human rights such as the right to health and the
right to life itself.”).
341
Nickel, supra note 321, at 286.
342
U.N. Doc. A/HRC/40/55, supra note 322, ¶ 6.
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governments or private agencies.” 343 The duty to protect more
specifically calls on governments to prevent, investigate, and
prosecute violations as well as to provide appropriate redress. 344 The
right to environmental protection also encompasses procedural
duties, such as the duty to allow individuals to sue polluters,
participate in the formation of environmental laws, and access
information. 345 In this scheme, international law does not directly
enable victims to sue private enterprises; only states can be held
accountable for failure to do so and for the resulting harm. 346 So far,
claims that the human right to a safe environment is threatened or
violated have mostly been raised against oil and logging
industries. 347
The consumption of meat and milk products has for years
been marketed as beneficial to human health and even as an indicator
Nickel, supra note 321, at 286.
Shelton, supra note 322, at 130.
345
Access to judicial and administrative proceedings, including redress and remedy,
is guaranteed by: the Rio Declaration; the Aarhus Convention on Access to
Information Public, Participation and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters;
the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change; the UDHR; the
ICCPR; the ECHR; the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man; the
African Charter; and the Committee on Economic Social and Cultural Rights’
General Comment No. 14 to Article 12 of the Covenant. U.N. Conference on
Environment and Development, Rio Declaration on Environment and Development,
U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26 (Vol. I), princ. 10 (Aug. 12, 1992); Convention on
Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to
Justice in Environmental Matters, art. 9, June 25, 1998, 2161 U.N.T.S. 447; United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, art. 6, May 9, 1992, 1771
U.N.T.S. 107; see UDHR, supra note 242, art. 8; International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, art. 2(3), Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR];
ECHR, supra note 329, art. 6; American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of
Man, art. XVIII, May 2, 1948, O.A.S. Res. XXX; African Charter on Human and
Peoples’ Rights, supra note 325, arts. 7, 24; General Comment 14, supra note 327,
art. 12, ¶¶ 11, 59.
346
Shelton, supra note 322, at 130.
347
Statements by United Nations Special Rapporteur John H. Knox provide an
example of logging. See Statement of United Nations Special Rapporteur John H.
Knox on the Conclusion of His Mission to Madagascar, UNITED NATIONS HUMAN
RIGHTS OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMM’R (Oct. 31, 2016), https://www.ohchr.org/EN/N
ewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=20791&LangID=E. In June 2017,
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court set a precedent by challenging fracking under the
right to a safe environment, referencing the Declaration of Rights of Pennsylvania’s
state constitution, which recognizes “environmental rights as commensurate with
their most sacred political and individual rights.” See Pa. Envtl. Def. Found. v.
Commonwealth, 161 A.3d 911, 916 (Pa. 2017); see generally John C. Dernbach,
Kenneth T. Kristl & James R. May, Recognition of Environmental Rights for
Pennsylvania Citizens: Pennsylvania Environmental Defense Foundation v.
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 70 RUTGERS U. L. REV. 803 (providing a
disscussion of the case).
343
344

2019]

AGRICULTURAL EXCEPTIONALISM

141

of the prosperity of a civilized nation. 348 This framing, pushed by
corporate lobbying, 349 largely ignores the human health costs of
animal agriculture. As CAFOs become larger and more intensified,
there is a rising awareness of the fact that emissions of excessive
nitrates cause blue baby syndrome, affect the development of the
central nervous system, and lead to miscarriages. 350 Hydrogen
sulfide is associated with mild cerebral dysfunction and brain
damage for people living close to CAFOs. 351 Asthma, chronic
bronchitis, declining lung functions, cardiovascular irritation,
headaches, and even brain damage and death have been observed due
to the exposure of CAFO workers and their families to hydrogen
sulfide, ammonia, and dust. 352 People living near CAFOs have been
reported to suffer from increased levels of depression, anxiety, and
sleep disturbances. 353 Surroundings of CAFOs are also increasingly
exposed to pathogen outbreaks, including bacteria, fungi, viruses,
helminths (parasitic worms), and protozoa. 354 The high toxicity of
CAFOs becomes evident with the example of Mexico: due to animal
waste and fertilizer runoff, there is a now a dead zone of 20,000 km2
with no marine life in the Gulf of Mexico. 355 The multi-level
contamination of water, air, and soil by CAFOs directly and
fundamentally threatens people’s health and life.
Because they continue to subsidize and even to immunize
CAFOs from environmental responsibility, governments can and
should be held accountable for violating their duty to refrain from
After the postwar period, milk and other animal products were identified as
products of wealth and economic growth. See ANNE MENDELSON, MILK: THE
SURPRISING STORY OF MILK THROUGH THE AGES 45 (2008).
349
See Melissa Mialon & Jonathan Mialon, Corporate Political Activity of the Dairy
Industry in France: An Analysis of Publicly Available Information, 20 PUB. HEALTH
NUTRITION 2432, 2435–36 (2017); see SHARON TREAT & SHEFALI SHARMA, SELLING
OFF THE FARM: CORPORATE MEAT’S TAKEOVER THROUGH TTP 16, 45 (2016); see
Julie C. Keller, Margaret Gray & Jill Lindsey Harrison, Milking Workers, Breaking
Bodies: Health Inequality in the Dairy Industry, 26 NEW LAB. F. 36, 36–37 (2017).
350
Wilson, supra note 32, at 445 & n. 45 (discussing ammonia emissions from
animal agriculture and studies of the effects of such emissions in North Carolina and
Iowa); Brehm, supra note 32, at 813–14; Marc B. Schenker et al., Respiratory Health
Hazards in Agriculture, 158 AM. J. RESPIRATORY & CRITICAL CARE MED. S1, S2
(1998).
351
Brehm, supra note 32, at 814.
352
Id.; Wilson, supra note 32, at 446.
353
Kelley J. Donham et al., Community Health and Socioeconomic Issues
Surrounding Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations, 115 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP.
317, 318 (2007).
354
U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, RISK ASSESSMENT EVALUATION FOR CONCENTRATED
ANIMAL FEEDING OPERATIONS 29 (2004).
355
Janet Raloff, Dead Waters: Massive Oxygen-Starved Zones Are Developing
Along the World’s Coasts, SCI. NEWS (May 30, 2004, 4:30 PM), https://www.science
news.org/article/dead-waters.
348
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damaging human life and health, as well as for their failure to fulfill
their duty to protect people from harm to life and health caused by
third parties (i.e., animal agribusinesses). As Shelton argues, “there
may be little difference between a state that arbitrarily executes
persons and a state that knowingly allows drinking water to be
poisoned by contaminants.”356
D. Right to Land
The right to land, or land rights, can be defined as “rights to
use, control, and transfer a parcel of land.” 357 Some voices, including
land rights movements within civil society, 358 have called for the
recognition of such a right in international human rights law. 359 One
such voice is that of Miloon Kothari, the former UN Special
Rapporteur on adequate housing. 360 Olivier de Schutter, the former
Special Rapporteur on the right to food, even speaks of an “emerging
human right to land.”361
Together with food sovereignty claims, 362 the legal
recognition of the right to land is one of the main concerns of the
transnational movement La Via Campesina, composed of farmers
and members of rural and indigenous populations. 363 The movement
emerged in response to the growing commodification of land and to
the large-scale acquisitions of land by corporate actors over the past
decades. 364 Presently, the right to land is not explicitly recognized
as a self-standing human right in international human rights law; land
is only mentioned at the margins 365 or via related concepts, such as
property 366 or housing. 367
Shelton, supra note 322, at 171.
Jérémie Gilbert, Land Rights as Human Rights: The Case for a Specific Right to
Land, 18 SUR INT’L J. ON HUM. RTS. 115, 115 (2013).
358
Id. at 116; Priscilla Claeys, The Right to Land and Territory: New Human Right
and Collective Action Frame, 75 REVUE INTERDISCIPLINAIRE D’ÉTUDES JURIDIQUES
115, 117, 124 (2015).
359
De Schutter, supra note 27, at 305; Gilbert, supra note 357, at 116; Jennifer C.
Franco, Sofía Monsalve & Saturnino M. Borras, Democratic Land Control and
Human Rights, 15 CURRENT OPINION IN ENVTL. SUSTAINABILITY 66, 66, 68 (2015).
360
Miloon Kothari (Special Rapporteur on Adequate Housing as a Component of the
Right to an Adequate Standard of Living), Report of the Special Rapporteur on
Adequate Housing as a Component of the Right to an Adequate Standard of Living,
¶¶ 25–31, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/4/18 (Feb. 5, 2007).
361
De Schutter, supra note 27, at 303.
362
Saturnino M. Borras Jr., Jennifer C. Franco & Sofía Monsalve Suárez, Land and
Food Sovereignty, 36 THIRD WORLD Q. 600, 603 (2015).
363
Claeys, supra note 358, at 117.
364
Id. at 116–17.
365
E.g., CEDAW, supra note 246, art. 14.
366
E.g., UDHR, supra note 242, art. 17.
367
E.g., ICESCR, supra note 238, art. 11(1).
356
357
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Why talk about land if no corresponding right exists in
contemporary international law? Simply because it is widely
accepted that access to land is key to the realization of other human
rights. 368 As a matter of fact, land rights are present in several ways
in international human rights law. 369 In a report published in 2014,
the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights noted that land issues,
including large-scale agriculture, affect a variety of human rights,
namely the right to self-determination, non-discrimination and
equality, the right to life, the right to an adequate standard of living
(including food, housing, and water), freedom from hunger, the right
to an effective judicial remedy, freedom of opinion, expression,
assembly and association, and the right to take part in public
affairs. 370 Following a number of scholars, 371 the Commissioner has
advocated viewing land issues through a human rights lens. 372
Right-to-farm laws and exemptions for animal agricultural
industries greatly threaten the (emerging) human right to land. In
2014, agriculture took up 36.99% of all available land. 373 Meat-

E.g., Gilbert, supra note 357, at 115; see also Land and Human Rights, UNITED
NATIONS HUM. RTS. OFF. OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Iss
ues/LandAndHR/Pages/LandandHumanRightsIndex.aspx (last visited Oct. 14,
2019) [hereinafter Land and Human Rights].
369
Gilbert, supra note 357, at 115 (mentioning property law, the protection of
indigenous eoples, the right to food, and housing); see UDHR, supra note 242,
arts. 15, 25; see International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination, art. 5, Mar. 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195; see CEDAW, supra note
246, arts. 14(2)(h), 16; see ICCPR, supra note 345, art. 27; see ICESCR, supra note
238, art. 11; see CRC, supra note 245, art. 27(3); see also U.N. Comm. on Econ.,
Soc. and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 4: The Right to Adequate Housing,
art. 11(1), U.N. Doc. E/1992/23 (Dec. 13, 1991); U.N. Comm. on Econ., Soc. and
Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 7: The Right to Adequate Housing: Forced
Evictions, art. 11.1, U.N. Doc. E/1998/22 (May 20, 1997).
370
Econ.nd Soc. Council, Rep. of the High Commissioner for Human Rights,
¶¶ 15–34, U.N. Doc. E/2014/86 (July 11, 2014) [hereinafter U.N. Doc. E/2014/86];
see also Land and Human Rights, supra note 368 (“[T]he shift to large-scale
farming has . . . led to forced evictions, displacements and local food insecurity,
which in turn has contributed to an increase in rural to urban migration and
consequently further pressure on access to urban land and housing.”); see
generally Office of the High Comm’r for Human Rights, Land and
Human Rights: Standards and Applications, at 10, U.N. Doc. HR/PUB/15/5/Add.1
(2015), http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/Land_HRStandardsApplica
tions.pdf [hereinafter Standards and Applications] (providing a comprehensive
overview of the human rights implications of land-related issues).
371
E.g., Gilbert, supra note 357, at 115; De Schutter, supra note 27, at 303.
372
U.N. Doc. E/2014/86, supra note 370, at ¶¶ 62–66; see also Standards and
Applications, supra note 370, at 53–54.
373
Land Use Statistical Data, FOOD & AGRIC. ORG., http://www.fao.org/faostat/en/#
data (last visited Dec. 21, 2019) (follow “Land Use Indicators” hyperlink under
“Agri-Environmental Indicators” heading; select “World + (Total)” under
368
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based nutrition requires significantly more land than plant-based
nutrition. 374 According to the FAO, the livestock sector uses 78% of
all agricultural land and 33% of all cropland. 375 More specifically, a
study conducted in the Netherlands for the year 1990 has shown that
meat production required 57.9 m2 of land per kg (with beef meat
requiring 20.9 m2/kg), while the total production of cereals, sugar,
potatoes, vegetables, and fruit required only 3.8 m2 of land per kg
(over fifteen times less). 376 To satisfy the demand for meat, many
minority world countries today need more land than the surface that
is available domestically. For instance, between 2008 and 2010, the
EU used a surface of almost fifteen million hectares of land, thirteen
of which were located in South America. 377
These developments do not necessarily lead to investment
relationships from which all parties benefit. As a matter of fact, these
global “land grab policies” often lead to dire conflicts as arable land
is taken away from populations in the Global South, who
simultaneously bear the environmental and human rights
externalities of meat production.378 In South America, for example,
approximately four million hectares of forest are disappearing every
year, mainly due to the spread of agricultural activity. 379 CAFOs also
threaten grasslands, which are frequently replaced by monoculture
production. 380 Given the continuous growth of the world population
and the steady increase in meat consumption, 381 these issues will
only become more severe in the future.
The use of land for the purpose of animal agriculture affects
individuals and their environment in a myriad of ways: it accelerates
climate change and it leads to the pollution of water and soil, land
degradation, and water depletion. 382 Intensive animal agriculture
“Regions”; select “Agricultural Land” under “Items”; select “All” under
“Elements”; select “2014” under “Years”; and then select “Show Data”).
374
FOOD & AGRIC. ORG., supra note 33, at 74.
375
Id.
376
See P. Winnie Gerbens-Leenes, Sanderine Nonhebel & Wilfried P.M.F. Ivens, A
Method to Determine Land Requirements Relating to Food Consumption Patterns,
90 AGRIC., ECOSYSTEMS AND ENV’T. 47 (2002) (discussing the amount of
agricultural land required for plant-based versus meat-based food production); see
also WITZKE, NOLEPPA & ZHIRKOVA, supra note 273; FOOD & AGRIC. ORG., supra
note 33, at 23–74.
377
WITZKE, NOLEPPA & ZHIRKOVA, supra note 273, at 6.
378
Id. at 7.
379
Id. at 17.
380
FOOD & AGRIC. ORG., supra note 33, at 34–35.
381
WITZKE, NOLEPPA & ZHIRKOVA, supra note 273, at 15–17 (discussing the
increasing consumption of meat in Germany in recent years).
382
In the US, for example, livestock is estimated to be responsible for 55% of soil
erosion on agricultural land. FOOD & AGRIC. ORG., supra note 33, at 73.
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also catalyzes soil acidification, notably because of the fertilizers on
which it relies. 383 The appropriation of land to meet the demands of
agriculture can threaten specific human rights, such as the right to
housing when the demand for land triggers forced evictions and
displacements. 384 The environmental and human rights side effects
of animal agriculture are particularly palpable for specially
vulnerable groups, such as indigenous communities. 385
Land issues related to factory farming have major
consequences for the right to food. The UN Special Rapporteur has
frequently stressed that access to land is a prerequisite for realizing
the right to food. 386 It emerges from de Schutter’s analysis that
factory farming increases the poverty (and hence jeopardizes the
right to food) of small-scale farmers, but also of agricultural workers
on large farms. 387 Addressing these issues requires reforming
agricultural policy to ensure an equal distribution of land and security
of tenure. 388 Moreover, given the high impact of animal agriculture
on these rights, the relevant policies need to be designed based on a
holistic approach so as to take into account the interlinkage between
CAFO production, land use, and the enjoyment of human rights.

383
See Fertilizers and Soil Acidity, CROPNUTRITION (Apr. 2013),
http://www.cropnutrition.com/fertilizers-and-soil-acidity.
384
See Miloon Kothari (Special Rapporteur), Basic Principles and Guidelines on
Development-Based Evictions and Displacement, Annex 1 of the Rep. of the Special
Rapporteur on Adequate Housing as a Component of the Right to an Adequate
Standard of Living, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/4/18 (Feb. 5, 2007).
385
E.g., G.A. Res. 61/295, United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples (Sept. 13, 2007).
386
See U.N. Doc. A/57/356, supra note 260; see also U.N. Doc. A/65/281, supra
note 280, ¶ 27 (discussing access to land and the right to food); Oliver de Schutter
(Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food), Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on the
Right to Food, Addendum on Large-Scale Acquisitions and Leases: A Set of
Minimum Principles and Measures to Address the Human Rights Challenge, U.N.
Doc. A/HRC/13/33/Add.2 (Dec. 28, 2009). De Schutter argues that access to land
is sometimes a self-standing right and sometimes instrumental to the right to food.
See De Schutter, supra note 27.
387
De Schutter, supra note 27.
388
Id.; Olivier de Schutter, The Green Rush: The Global Race for Farmland and the
Rights of Land Users, 52 HARV. INT’L L. J. 504 (2011); see also ICESCR, supra note
238, art. 11(2)(a); U.N. Doc. A/57/356, supra note 260, ¶ 30 (“[A]ccess to land and
agrarian reform must form a key part of the right to food.”) (cited by Elisabeth
Wickeri & Anil Kalhan, Land Rights Issues in International Human Rights Law, 4
MALAYSIAN J. ON HUM. RTS. 16 (2010)); U.N. Doc. A/70/287, supra note 262, ¶ 34.
The importance of ensuring security of land tenure has, for example, been mentioned
by the FAO. See FOOD & AGRIC. ORG., VOLUNTARY GUIDELINES ON THE
PROGRESSIVE REALIZATION OF THE RIGHT TO ADEQUATE FOOD IN THE CONTEXT OF
NATIONAL FOOD SECURITY 17 (2005) (referring to Guideline 8B).
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E. Right to Animal Protection
Today, many animal protection and animal welfare acts
throughout the world recognize animals as sentient, living beings,
whom we owe moral and legal duties. These laws provide that
animals ought not to be treated inhumanely or caused unnecessary
suffering. This “general principle of animal welfare” 389 is
established law in, among others, the following countries and supraor international organizations: the EU, the Council of Europe,
Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada,
Costa Rica, Croatia, Estonia, Fiji, Finland, France, Germany,
Gibraltar, Greece, Hong Kong, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Israel,
Kenya, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Malaysia, Malta, Myanmar,
the Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway, Papua
New Guinea, Paraguay, the Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Puerto
Rico, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, South Korea, Sri
Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, Tanzania, Tonga, Turkey,
Uganda, Ukraine, the UK, the US, Vanuatu, Venezuela, and
Zambia. 390 In addition, more and more states (such as Brazil, Egypt,
Germany, India, Luxemburg, and Switzerland) have expressed their
concern for animals at a constitutional level, including by setting up
duties owed to animals. 391 These provisions make an important
value statement about the claims of animals against us and
MICHAEL BOWMAN ET AL., LYSTER’S INTERNATIONAL WILDLIFE LAW 678 (2d ed.
2010); Sabine Brels, Animal Welfare Protection: A Universal Concern to Properly
Address in International Law, J. ANIMAL WELFARE L. 34, 37 (2012); Katie Sykes,
Sealing Animal Welfare Into the GATT Exceptions: The International Dimension of
Animal Welfare in WTO Disputes, 13 WORLD TRADE REV. 471 (2014); Neil Trent et
al., International Animal Law, With a Concentration on Latin America, Asia, and
Africa, in THE STATE OF THE ANIMALS III 65, 77 (Deborah J. Salem & Andrew N.
Rowan eds., 2005); Steven White, Into the Void: International Law and the
Protection of Animal Welfare, 4 GLOBAL POL’Y 391 (2013).
390
Charlotte E. Blattner, An Assessment of Recent Trade Law Developments From
an Animal Law Perspective: Trade Law as the Sheep in Wolf’s Clothing?, 22
ANIMAL L. 277, 304–6 (2016).
391
Article 225 paragraph 1 VII of the Brazilian Constitution states that it is “the
responsibility of the Government to . . . prohibiting, as provided by law, all practices
that . . . subject animals to cruelty.” CONSTITUIÇÃO DA REPÚBLICA FEDERATIVA DO
BRASIL [C.F.] [Constitution] Oct. 5, 1988, art. 225, para. 1(IV) (Braz.). Article 45
of the Egyptian Constitution commits the state to “the protection of plants, livestock
and fisheries; the protection of endangered species; and the prevention of cruelty to
animals.” CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT [CONSTITUTION] Jan. 15,
2014, art. 45 (Egypt); see also Egypt’s Constitution of 2014, INT’L IDEA,
https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Egypt_2014.pdf (last updated Dec. 4,
2019) (providing a translated version of Egypt’s Constitution). In Germany, article
20a of the Basic Law identifies animal protection as a state objective. See
GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [BASIC LAW] May 23, 1949, art. 20a (Ger.), https://www.btgbestellservice.de/pdf/80201000.pdf; ENTWURF EINES GESETZES ZUR ÄNDERUNG DES
GRUNDGESETZES (STAATSZIEL TIERSCHUTZ) [LAW TO CHANGE THE BASIC LAW
389
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“bring . . . [animals] into the very structure of the body politic.”392
Also on the international level, we are observing a growing
awareness of the importance of thinking about the impacts of human
activity on animals, e.g., under the auspices of the World
Organization for Animal Health (OIE), 393 the UN, 394 the Council of

(STATE OBJECTIVE OF ANIMAL PROTECTION)] July 31, 2002, BGBl. I at 2862 (Ger.)
(amendments introduced by the Gesetz zur Änderung des Grundgesetzes). Article
51 of the Indian Constitution, introduced in 1976, provides that “[i]t shall be the duty
of every citizen of India . . . to protect and improve the natural environment including
forests, lakes, rivers and wild life, and to have compassion for living creatures.” THE
CONSTITUTION OF INDIA Nov. 26, 1949, art. 51 A(g) (India). Luxembourg’s
constitution provides in article 11: “The State guarantees the protection of the human
and cultural environment, and works for the establishment of a durable equilibrium
between the conservation of nature, in particular its capacity for renewal, and the
satisfaction of the needs of present and future generations. It promotes the protection
and well-being of animals.” CONSTITUTION OF THE GRAND DUCHY OF LUXEMBOURG
Oct. 17, 1868, art. 11bis (Lux.). The Swiss Constitution protects the dignity of
animals. See FEDERAL CONSTITUTION OF THE SWISS CONFEDERATION Apr. 18, 1999,
art. 120, para. 2 (Switz.); see generally Jessica Eisen & Kristen Stilt, Protection and
Status of Animals, in MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 55 (Rainer Grote, Frauke Lachenmann & Rüdiger Wolfrum
online eds., 2017) (providing an in-depth discussion of the aforementioned
provisions). Some Constitutions also allocate competences among state institutions
or regulatory levels over animal protection matters, e.g., in Austria and Slovenia.
392
BRUCE A. WAGMAN & MATTHEW LIEBMAN, A WORLDVIEW OF ANIMAL LAW 260
(2011).
393
World Organization for Animal Health [OIE], Terrestrial Animal Health Code,
s. 7 (2018); OIE, Aquatic Animal Health Code, s. 7 (2018); see also OIE, Third
Strategic Plan 2001-2005, 69 GS/FR (2000); see also OIE, Sixth Strategic Plan
2016-2020, at 3, 83 SG/17 (2015) (identifying animal welfare as a mandate of the
organization); see also FOOD & AGRIC. ORG., LEGISLATIVE AND REGULATORY
OPTIONS FOR ANIMAL WELFARE 7 (2010).
394
G.A. Res. 66/750, at 8, 15, 18 (Mar. 20, 2012); U.N. NGO Branch, Dep’t of Econ. &
Soc. Affairs, 64th UN DPI/NGO Conference, Bonn Declaration on Rio+20
Presented to the General Assembly (Apr. 26, 2011) (arguing that safeguarding animal
welfare is a requirement for achieving the goals of sustainable development and
eradication of poverty, that the Millennium Consumption Goals should respect animal
welfare, and that global agricultural production should ensure both good animal health
and welfare); see also Gateway to Farm Animal Welfare, FOOD & AGRIC. ORG.,
http://www.fao.org/ag/againfo/themes/animal-welfare/aw-abthegat/aw-whaistgate/
en/ (last visited Dec. 18, 2019) (a multi-stakeholder platform to exchange national
and international knowledge about farm animal welfare).
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Europe, 395 and the World Trade Organization (WTO). 396 Viewed
together, these developments suggest an emerging universal
consensus about the relevance of animal issues and that human
diligence must be exercised when interacting with animals.
In parallel, more and more scholars argue that humans feel
violated themselves—in their dignity, and even in their rights—when
animal protection laws are not adhered to or when governments fail
to enact such laws in the first place. This claim rests on an argument
that ethicists have been raising for centuries, namely that there is a
direct link between treating animals unkindly and the degradation of
man. Immanuel Kant famously stated it as:
If a man shoots his dog because the animal is no
longer capable of service, he does not fail in his duty
to the dog, for the dog cannot judge, but his act is
inhuman and damages in himself that humanity
which it is his duty to show towards mankind. If he
is not to stifle his human feelings, he must practice
kindness towards animals, for he who is cruel to
animals becomes hard also in his dealings with
men. 397
Today, policy makers recognize the connection between
preventing animal cruelty and curbing human crimes, on the one
hand, and animal cruelty and the brutalization of society, on the
other. People who are cruel towards humans often have a history of
animal cruelty; vice versa, animal abuse is regularly an indicator for
abuse of other family members (in the literature, these correlations
are known as “the link”).398
Council of Europe, Convention for the Protection of Animals During
International Transport, Dec. 13, 1968, C.E.T.S. No. 065; Council of Europe,
Convention for the Protection of Animals During International Transport (revised),
Nov. 6, 2003, C.E.T.S. No. 193; Council of Europe, Convention for the Protection
of Animals Kept for Farming Purposes, Mar. 10, 1976, C.E.T.S. No. 087; Council of
Europe, Convention for the Protection of Animals for Slaughter, May 10, 1979,
C.E.T.S. No. 102; Council of Europe, Convention for the Protection of Vertebrate
Animals Used for Experimental and Other Scientific Purposes, Mar. 18, 1986,
C.E.T.S. No. 123; Council of Europe, Convention for the Protection of Pet Animals,
Nov. 13, 1987, C.E.T.S. No. 125.
396
See Appellate Body Report, EC–Measures Prohibiting the Importation and
Marketing of Seal Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS400/AB/R, WT/DS401/AB/R (adopted
June 18, 2014).
397
IMMANUEL KANT, LECTURES ON ETHICS 212 (P. Heath & J.B. Schneewind trans.,
1997).
398
This link is noticed and examined by Rebecca L. Bucchieri. See Rebecca L.
Bucchieri, Bridging the Gap: The Connection between Violence Against Animals and
Violence Against Humans, 11 J. ANIMAL & NAT. RESOURCE L. 115 (2015); see also
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Drawing on these insights, Konstantin Leondarakis argues
for a human right to animal protection, providing the following: “It
is a right of every person to reasonably safeguard the lives and
integrity of animals, and ensure they are treated with dignity.” 399
Such a right is needed, he claims, because current violations of
animal interests cannot be redressed by animals, and because humans
have only a limited ability to contribute to the proper enforcement of
these laws; indeed, humans themselves lack standing because they
have not suffered an injury. 400 Leondarakis argues that a discrete
human right to animal protection should be established, but that it
could also be drawn from existing human rights guarantees, like the
human right to privacy and family life, 401 and the protection of
human dignity. 402
In CAFOs, farmed animals suffer from numerous
production-related cardiovascular, skeletal, and respiratory diseases
as well as mutilation, mourning, aggression, frustration, and lethal
stress syndromes. 403 Against this background, exempting animal
cruelty in agriculture from the purview of the law is problematic in
two ways. First, the general principle of animal welfare 404 demands
FRASCH ET AL., supra note 125, at 107; HUMANE SOC’Y OF THE U.S., FIRST STRIKE: THE
VIOLENCE CONNECTION (2008), https://www.sheriffs.org/publications/first_strike.pdf;
KONSTANTIN LEONDARAKIS, ETHIK IM RECHT: DIE VERLETZUNG VON
MENSCHENRECHTEN DURCH DIE VERLETZUNG VON BELANGEN AN TIEREN 34 (2001);
ANDREW LINZEY, THE LINK BETWEEN ANIMAL ABUSE AND HUMAN VIOLENCE (2009);
SCHAFFNER, supra note 126, at 28; WAGMAN & LIEBMAN, supra note 392, at 145.
399
KONSTANTIN LEONDARAKIS, MENSCHENRECHT “TIERSCHUTZ”: DIE VERLETZUNG
VON MENSCHENRECHTEN DURCH DIE VERLETZUNG VON BELANGEN VON TIEREN 54
(2006) (authors’ translation).
400
Id. at 30.
401
Id. at 41. Article 8 ECHR protects relationships to other beings, namely animals.
See ECHR, supra note 329, art. 8 (providing that “[e]veryone has the right to respect
for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence.”).
402
Not only does a violation of animal protection violate a person’s subjective
dignity; it also infringes the objective worth of dignity. LEONDARAKIS, supra note
398, at 42.
403
The animal industry has changed the morphology and physiology of animals,
which impairs their ability to adapt. Today, chickens reach the weight of two
kilograms twice as fast as they did fifty years ago. Dairy cows were intensively bred
for more productive mammary glands. Cows used for meat production now have
enormous muscle mass, which strains their internal organs. Joy M. Verrinder, Nicki
McGrath & Clive J.C. Phillips, Science, Animal Ethics and the Law, in ANIMAL LAW
AND WELFARE: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 63, 63–64 (Deborah Cao & Steven
White eds., 2016). In CAFOs, animals are mutilated to prevent injuries that arise at
high stocking densities: tails are docked; beaks, teeth, and toes are clipped; ears are
notched; horns are removed; and castration is undertaken without anesthetics. See
David N. Cassuto, Bred Meat: The Cultural Foundation of Factory Farm, 70 L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 59, 64 (2007); Matheny & Leahy, supra note 122, at 328; PEW
COMM’N, supra note 29, at 35.
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See supra text accompanying note 389.

150

JOURNAL OF FOOD LAW & POLICY

[Vol.15

that animals be treated humanely and that they be spared from
suffering. Because agricultural production affects the highest
number of domesticated animals, it is, from a teleological
perspective, unjustifiable not to apply this principle to the
agricultural sector. This prompts us to address and question the
blanket authorizations given to CAFO industries to inflict systematic
cruelty on animals through broad right-to-farm laws and far-reaching
immunities from the law. Second, should the human right to animal
protection be established as a stand-alone right or as an integral part
of the human right to privacy and family life, then states would
violate their legal duties to protect and respect this right by not
establishing the necessary legal framework to review practices that
threaten and likely violate it. In other words, the human right to
animal protection would apply regardless of sweeping farmers’
rights. Together, these developments make clear that the interests of
animals and humans are often intertwined and that there are
numerous entry-points that could be used more systematically in the
future for litigation and advocacy purposes.
V. Conclusion
Across the world, most people cling onto a “happy farm”
image, be it the red barn in the US or cows roaming on green pastures
in Europe. This image has been produced and sustained through
heavy marketing campaigns. 405 The reality is markedly different.
Laws originally designed to govern small family farms now protect
corporate giants, many of which are multinationals. By benefitting
from farmers’ rights (i.e., right-to-farm laws and exemptions from
environmental and animal laws), agribusinesses are, in many cases,
shielded from regulation. In fact, as we argued, the combination of
rampant corporate activity and de facto immunity from the law acts
as a toxic agent that threatens the environment and our livelihoods.
The host of negative effects of animal agriculture on the
immediate environment, workers, and the local community are welldocumented. However, little is done academically to explore their
global repercussions, particularly on human rights guarantees.
Human rights litigation, advocacy, and research have yet to
recognize and address this angle. With this contribution, we have
attempted to fill this soaring gap. We have shown how intensified
animal agriculture threatens and violates the human rights to food,
water, a safe environment, land, and animal protection, and we have
made apparent the urgency to address these issues. Under
international law, states are obligated to respect, protect, and fulfill
405
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human rights—duties which they violate when they exempt from the
law the many activities of animal agriculture that directly cause
human suffering and violate or threaten well-established basic rights.
While in domestic law, states are prima facie at liberty to establish
insulations for agriculture, international law (particularly the human
rights regime) binds all states and puts a halt to the most sweeping
forms of agricultural exceptionalism. This knowledge can and
should be used as a strategy for litigation and advocacy to hold states
accountable, and further prompt us as a society to seriously question
the rationale underlying the many right-to-farm laws and exemptions
enjoyed by this type of agriculture. 406
Through our contribution, we hope to forge a pathway for
the many more analyses that are needed at this juncture. In particular,
more research is necessary to determine which other human rights
are violated or threatened by animal agriculture, such as the right to
life, housing, privacy, and family life. Future research should
notably also explore the responsibility of agricultural businesses to
protect these human rights and how such actors can be held
accountable for violations. 407
As time passes, finding alternatives to CAFOs will become
a matter of practical necessity due to the biophysical limits of land,
water, and biomass. In the meantime, for the sake of human health
and life, animals, and a safe environment, appropriate regulation—
including and perhaps especially on the international plane—is
essential to anticipate, address, and remedy these violations.
International human rights lawyers are uniquely equipped to address
these issues and contribute to the further development and
reconceptualization of this nexus, acting as catalysts for muchneeded change.

Ruhl, supra note 111, at 263; see also Alford & Berger Richardson, supra note
44, at 136 (“RTFs [right-to-farm laws] have failed to adapt to changing industry
standards in agricultural production and to incorporate the level of public
accountability required to ensure the continued sustainability of the industries and
lands they exist to protect.”).
407
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